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GLOSSARY: LIST OF JAPANESE WORDS
ainu Indigenous people in Japan
burakumin Hamlet people, outcasts
ie seido House system
kihontcki jinken Basic human rights
kokuseki Japanese legal nationality
kokusekijoko Nationality clause
koseki House registry
koseki ho House registry law
kyoteki ciju 
nihonjinron 
nikkeijin
Agreement permanent residence, by 1965 Act 
Discussion on Japanese 
Japanese descendants
sakoku Seclusion
teiju ¡’aikokujin Settled aliens
tenno monarchy
tokubetsu ciju (sha) Special permanent residence, by 1991 Act
tokurei ciju Exceptional permanent residence, by 1981 Act
tsuu mei Japanese style name
uji Surname
In the main text, Japanese and Korean names are put in customary order: 
surname first, forename last, except those works written in English.
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ABSTRACT
'rhis thesis aims to draw a comparison on Britain and Japan on issues of 
citizenship and nationality for the former empire subjects. In multi-national state 
Britain, those of New Commonwealth immigration issue is mainly conceptualised 
as ‘racial' topics, while in nation-state Japan, Koreans and Taiwanese or aliens’ 
issue is mainly conceptualised as legal ‘nationality' topics.
The framework is set from the Japanese ‘nationality’ perspective, in 
order to point out what are missed in the 'race' framework, in particular, when 
they are applied to the Japanese context. Discussion of formal rights in Japan is 
divided in two as rights with regard to residence, and their right for citizenship 
status. In chapter 2, I discuss that the former is similar to denizenship discussion 
while the latter is similar to patriality topic.
The methodology section explores what is the best way to conduct a 
comparison between Britain and Japan on these citizenship and nationality issue, 
as well as considering what are the main factors in each country to make some 
impact on public policy of the government. I consider court cases are important 
tool for minorities in Japan, while in Britain, pressure through the parliament 
seems much more influential.
The research chapters explore the topics of denizenship and patriality of 
each country, the British chapters examine the impact of the 1971 Immigration 
Act, while the Japanese chapters examine the impact of the 1952 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty and the following circular, and see whether minorities formal rights 
has been changed after since or not.
The conclusion examines whether the withdrawal from empire had 
some significant impact of citizenship and nationality legislation as well as the 
concepts in Britain and Japan. It argues that the impact of the former empire 
subjects on legislation has been slow and continuous in Britain, while in Japan 
there was a major change once for all, but the results are continuous. The two 
concepts are slowly converging in Britain, while in Japan, they are gradually 
diverging.
IX
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Terms of reference
In the modem world, nationality and citizenship are crucially important issues. They 
are concerned with an individual’s identity and membership in a national community as 
well as giving them a legal relationship with a state. To be stateless is to be without 
security and rights - almost to be a non-person. Certainly, citizeaship and nationality 
have enormous effects in the international politico-legal community: for instance, when 
we travel abroad, a passport or internationally accepted identity documents are 
essential to certify who we are, and where we come from. In addition, such documents 
prove that we have rights of residence, or entry to a state and the right to protection. 
However, some people may migrate from one country to another and remain there for 
the rest of their lives. Others might be bom in a country to which they do not belong, 
and in the worst case, may be treated as ‘aliens' from birth. But to what extent, can 
these systems or regulations of state affect individuals? And how important are they in 
practice? Some authors argue that, ‘globalisation will proceed in “ internationalising'’ 
economies and the movement of people, but the framework of laws lag behind' 
(discussion in Horitsu Jiho, 1985). States are still powerful actors on the world stage. 
They decide the legal framework for migration and citizenship laws.
In this study, the main focus is on the treatment of ‘former empire subjects’ by the 
governments of Britain and Japan. They are sometimes described as ‘minorities' in host 
societies. These ‘former empire subjects’ have stronger ties with the mother/host 
country than so-called guestworkers who are labour migrants recruited by advanced
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industrial countries to meet labour shortages. They have a common history, language 
and education and often acquire a common citizenship although that may be 
temporary. For instance, in the British case, Miles (1993:132) argues that New 
Commonwealth migration, which began in the late 1940s is ‘anomalous’ since at ‘the 
time that it began, it was a migration of British Subjects’. This was similar to the 
Japanese situation, where Onuma states that ‘when Koreans came to Japan, it was 
internal movement within the Japanese territory’ (Onuma, 1979a:l 10).
The migration of British colonial subjects is clearly a different case from other 
European countries and in particular, the case of guestworkers. However, in the 
gradual post-colonial adjustment such as voluntary abolition of an empire, or like 
Japan, as a result of losing a war, former empire subjects have been treated on the 
same level as guestworkers or aliens. Apart from that, the experience of holding an 
empire or of having former empire subjects may involve the problem of so-called 
second-class citizenship. Bearing these points in mind, 1 shall conduct a comparative 
study of Britain and Japan on citizenship and nationality issues.
1.2 Hypotheses
The major hypothesis of this study is as follows. The withdrawal from empire by both 
Britain and Japan which occurred after the World War II and the subsequent ‘post 
colonial adjustment’ has had a major impact on legal, political and popular definitions 
of citizenship and nationality.
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In the case of Japan, the withdrawal from empire was rather precipitous owing to 
defeat in the war and the resulting loss of overseas territories. In Japan, the Peace 
Treaty of 1952 and the subsequent internal legislation was an immediate and critical 
blow to colonial subjects acquired by Japan, particularly Koreans and Taiwanese. In 
the British case, the withdrawal from empire began soon after the war in 1948 but was 
a prolonged process. In Britain a series of events and legislative acts have had a large 
cumulative effect on the citizenship and nationality of colonial subjects and especially 
on their immigration rights.
With this hypothesis, this thesis will address a number of questions. Firstly, matters 
relating to former empire subjects are conceptualised in Britain, as 'racial' issues, while 
in Japan, such matters are connected with 'kokuseki' (legal nationality). The term 
‘former empire subjects' means exclusively ‘those of different ethnicity’ (Kibata, 
1992); in the Japanese context, mainly Koreans and Taiwanese, while in the British 
case, people from New Commonwealth countries. The question then is, to what extent, 
this 'race' and 'kokuseki' framework of Britain and Japan is useful in understanding the 
specific relationship of ‘citizenship’ and 'nationality' in each country?
The results of withdrawal from empire on the status of former empire subjects were, in 
the British case, the creation of ‘second-class citizenship', while in the Japanese case, 
the creation of 'aliens’. Most of those who were influenced by the withdrawal, in the 
British case, remain outside Britain, while in the Japanese case, the majority have 
remained inside Japan. The result of this is that, the status of former empire subjects in 
Britain is inextricably connected with the issues of 'entry control' (immigration) in
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Britain, while in Japan, is connected with ‘internal control' such as alien registration 
and naturalisation, a nationality issue.
Then, how is the process of the withdrawal from the empire comparable between 
Britain and Japan? What are the impacts of the withdrawal from empire on citizenship 
and nationality, and how can we observe these impacts? In this study, the above 
questions are tackled from the Japanese perspective. Discussion of those former 
empire subjects in Japan concerning their political, legal and social rights are divided 
into two areas: rights and residence and the acquisition or non-acquisition of Japanese 
nationality. In Japanese literature, the first topic examines the function of 'kokuseki 
joko ' (legal nationality criterion), while the latter topic considers the function of koseki 
(house registry), which has a function to identify those who are Japanese nationals. 
This approach is called functions of nationality (see Onuma, 1985). In English 
academic discussion, the issues are more likely to be rights of permanent residence and 
rights of descendants, or denizenship and patriality. Denizenship is defined as rights 
and entitlements of long-standing residents, regardless of their citizenship status, while 
patriality is defined as a right which comes from lineage and descent from formal 
citizens. Denizenship acts as a concept which separates citizenship from nationality, 
while patriality acts to connect citizenship and nationality. The importance of 
denizenship is growing due to the process of globalisation. On the other hand, the 
rights of patrials are continuously secured by many countries, including some European 
countries. This goes in the opposite direction of uniting two concepts of citizenship 
and nationality.
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In order to make a comparison both simple and manageable, this study will focus 
mainly on the 1971 Immigration Act in Britain' as a central focus for comparison with 
the 1952 peace treaty and following legislation in Japan. As both series of legislation 
are concerned with the principle of jus sanguinis and have had a significant impact on 
the status of the former empire subjects of different ethnicity, this comparison should 
be worthwhile.
In addition, from a methodological point of view, the study will also pay attention to 
the utility of legislation as well as case laws in solving the problems of majority- 
minority relationship in society, such as what kind of discussions took place during the 
process of preparing legislation—and what sort of problems were expected or not 
expected to occur following implementation of legislation.
1.3 Background
This section aims to put the thesis into context as well as to provide justifications for 
the research. As a background for contemporary study, it will be necessary to explore 
historical issues which relate to the formulation of citizenship and nationality in Britain 
and Japan. Firstly, Britain and Japan share historically important similarities such as 
insularity, which has given rise to notions of self-distinctiveness and geographical 
particularity (Shipman, 1971). Both of the countries under review have a similar 
geographical situation, lying off large continents, and share the notion that islands or
1 I am aware of the importance of the 1962 as well as the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, as 
the 1962 Act firstly restricted the entrance of Commonwealth Immigration, and had 'a decisive 
impact on the pattern of migration' afterwards (Anwar, 1986:9) and the 1968 Act firstly introduced 
the grand-parental clause for the further restriction. However, to make the comparison simple and 
manageable. I shall concentrate on the 1971 Immigration Act as a focus.
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territories are protected and separated from the continents by the natural border of the 
sea. The sense of insularity has been increased by the unlikelihood of invasion from 
outsiders. In the British case, there has been no serious invasion since the Norman 
conquest in the eleventh century, while Japan had a long period of being closed to 
outsiders from the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century.
Secondly, Britain and Japan have strongly developed overseas trade (Shipman, 1971). 
Both have developed through maritime-mercantile-manufacturing endeavour and the 
service industries. In the Japanese case, shortage of natural resources such as oil led to 
development of trade and its main exports have long been manufactured goods. 
Furthermore, both countries are relatively densely populated. According to Norton 
(1994:6), the density of England in 1987 is higher than that of Japan. Due to the 
pressure of population and demand for resources, emigration from Britain in search of 
new sources of wealth had already started in the seventeenth century. In the case of 
Japan, during the Meiji period as well as just after the Second World War, there was 
substantial emigration overseas.
Religion has also played an important role in the history of both countries. In Britain, 
Protestantism has had an important influence in the creation of an English national 
identity, by excluding Catholics from the main political as well as economic arenas. 
The two revolutions in the seventeenth century were among the first in the world to 
limit the power of the sovereign. In the Japanese case, Shinto came to the main stage 
after Meiji restoration, in order to justify the monarchy's rule as well as later, to 
mobilise people. It was officially the state religion until Japan lost the war.
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However, there are also significant differences between Britain and Japan. While Japan 
had an experience of seclusion from most parts of the world, Britain did not. While 
Britain was one of the victors of the Second World War, Japan was one of the losers. 
Sometimes, differences between subjects for comparison can illuminate similarities and 
both remain useful for comparison. For instance, even though Britain did not have a 
period of seclusion, it was the only country within Europe which was not defeated or 
directly occupied by another country during the two World Wars. Besides, Britain has 
avoided military invasion since 1066, which was greatly helped by its island situation. 
In other words, without the experience of seclusion or occupation by a foreign power, 
its experience provided a 'continuity of the regime' (Kavanagh, 1996:9) as well as 
sense of strong insularity, factors which have influenced Japan, too. As a preliminary 
discussion, let us look at the distinctive ways of nation-building in Britain and Japan, 
and in particular, its relation to nationality and citizenship issues.
1.4 Multinational-state vs nation-state
When we consider the process and style of nation-building, we can call the UK2 a 
multi-national state, while Japan is more like a nation-state. In the case of the UK, 
most often 'the nation' is understood in the context of each of four nations-England, 
Scotland, Wales and Ireland.
21 am aware of the difference between 'the UK', which includes Northern Ireland, and 'Britain', as 
England. Wales and Scotland. In addition. I am also aware of the difference of its institutions in 
Scotland. However, as I am going to discuss ‘immigration law', enforced in the UK, and 'British' 
nationality law at the same time, in the following, I shall use 'the UK' and 'Britain' interchangeably, 
when it is necessary.
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The creation of 'Britain', as distinct from England, is well explored in Colley (1992), 
who argues that forging the British nation was completed between 1707 and 1837, 
with the link of ‘mass allegiance' and ‘the invention of Britishness’, by wars against 
outsiders (mainly France) as well as a common religion - Protestantism. Colley also 
contends that 'Great Britain was an invention forged above all by war... time and time 
again, war with France... whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England,... 
into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define 
themselves collectively against it’ and, ‘increasingly as the wars went on, they defined 
in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples who were manifestly alien 
in terms of culture, religion, and colour’ (Colley, 1992:5).
Before then, England itself was unified in the eleventh century. Anglo-Saxon monarchs 
were established in the tenth century, and the monarchy was consolidated by the 
Normans. In 1707 the union of England (which had already united with Wales in 1277) 
and Scotland was achieved. Scotland had been an independent state for several 
centuries before, and the union was voluntary. Although the Scottish parliament ceased 
to exist, other institutions such as separate legal and education systems and church 
remained as they were. This was different from the Welsh case. Wales was 
incorporated into Britain earlier after gradual invasion, and Wales did not have a 
unified government before its Union with England (Birch, 1989:77).
Meanwhile, there were other important milestones. A strong monarchy was established 
during the Tudor period in the sixteenth century. In 1534 Henry VIII set up a national 
Church of England, subordinate to the state, and eliminated the role of the Roman
8
Catholic Church. There were two famous revolutions and the English civil war 
established its supremacy of parliament and this was confirmed by the constitutional 
settlement at the end of the seventeenth century, despite an attempt by groups to re­
establish the divine Right of Kings, and in 1688, the constitutional revolution took 
place by which Britain enjoyed a constitutional monarchy and sovereignty lay in the 
hands of parliament (Kavanagh, 1996:5).
From 1707 onwards, British boundaries seemed settled and clearly marked out. The 
making of Britain was completed in 1837 when the external wars against France and 
Spain ended. Furthermore, these victories and the consolidation of the Empire 
reinforced the strong sense of pride as Britons - except for relations between Britain 
and Ireland, which remained complicated and controversial. Ireland never achieved 
acceptance as an equal part of Great Britain due to the dominance of Catholicism 
which has made Ireland suspect as a potentially disloyal ally. Ireland was ‘never able or 
willing to play a satisfactory part in the invention of Britishness' as religion and war 
played an important role in forming the British national identity, and since religious 
antagonism was partially exploited politically (Colley, 1992:8). The Irish were 
regarded as ‘exceptionally poor and backward' by English landowners (Birch, 
1989:96), and at the time of the Glorious Revolution, Roman Catholic Irish, together 
with France, fought against the newly-crowned English (Protestant) king, which made 
English people hostile to the Irish. Some authors have argued that Ireland was treated 
as an ‘internal colony' (Hechter, 1975) even after its formal union with Britain in 1801.
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Japan, as stated earlier, is considered to be more of a nation-state. There are two views 
regarding when Japan was unified or created. Some consider that the period of 
seclusion (sakoku) from foreign countries in the seventeenth century at the time of Edo 
Shogunate (for instance, Oishi, 1977) was critical in providing relative stability and 
homogeneity thereafter until the nineteenth century. Others consider that the Meiji 
Restoration in the mid nineteenth century created the modem Japanese nation (for 
instance, Yamamuro, 1990). This study favours the second position, as concerning 
issues of citizenship and nationality, in which the systematic integration and 
incorporation of 'nation' (territory and people) was achieved during the Meiji period, 
and later by war. Moreover, the territory of Japan was clarified to the north as well as 
to the south during the Meiji period.
After the seventeenth century, the centralised Edo Bakufu (Shogunate) was established 
and a policy of seclusion was later introduced to preserve national unity and to 
maintain a stable regime by monopolising foreign trade. While this provided an 
environment for the formation of a 'unitary' culture compared to other countries, it led 
to a certain stunting of economic and military development. In 1854, the Japanese 
seclusion policy was firstly breached by the United States, and in its wake an ‘expel the 
barbarians' movement arose. This was, however, crushed due to the inequality of 
military power. Then, each han (domain) started a modernisation programme, which 
led to the overthrow of the Shognate and the restoration of tenno, the monarchy. The 
feudalists structure was broken and the new centralised administrative and political 
system was established.
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The tenno was restored in 1868, although the tenno himself had little direct impact on 
the process of transformation, for he was fifteen years old at that time (Lehmann, 
1982:178). The ex-lower class of bus hi (warriors) mainly from Choshu and Satsuma 
domain played an important role in this restoration. They had received a Confucian- 
oriented education, and the majority had also been educated by the previous shogunate 
school of western learning (Inoue et al. eds., 1991).
As the Meiji government was introduced by a military coup d'etat, it had to consider 
its legitimacy. The Meiji government brought the tenno who had kept silent for 
centuries and created a governing system ‘according to’ the tenno’s will. The tenno 
was placed above all people, and people were all equal under him (Inoguchi, 1993:52- 
3). The new government, which was composed from advanced domain leaders was 
authorised by the Meiji tenno, started to modernise the military, the constitution and 
the system of government and encouraged national integration through a programme 
of encouraging literacy and State Shinto-ism.
Regarding the territorial determination of Japan, in 1869 the northern parts, Hokkaido, 
began to be cultivated. Gradually the settlement of mainlanders went forward. In 1886, 
the whole of Hokkaido was put under the control of the ‘Hokkaido agency’, as one of 
prefectures of the Meiji government. Speaking of Hokkaido, Tamura (1992:99) 
regards it as an ‘internal colony' because of its role as the destination for emigration as 
well as its abundant coal and marine products. With regard to the south, the Ryukyu 
was subject to both Satsuma domain and China (the Ching dynasty) until the Meiji 
period. In 1879, Ryukyu was abolished and was re-named as the Okinawa prefecture,
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also under the control of the Meiji government. The belonging of ‘Okinawa' was 
clarified by the Sino-Japan war later in 1895.
Since the Restoration, though Japan was not directly colonised by western countries, 
her economic subordination seriously compromised internal structures such as 
traditional industries. Given that the first aim of the Meiji government was to revise the 
unequal treaties, all reforms, starting from the modernisation programme, were 
directed to this effort. At that time, the ‘national' slogan was, ‘enrich the country and 
strengthen the army', which itself, implies its imperialistic connotation. Countries such 
as Britain, benefited from ensuing trade, and did not allow Japan to revise the treaties, 
especially on tariff autonomy. The only option that appeared open to Japan was to 
pursue an imperialist policy of its own by seeking colonies. Gradually, from the 1870s, 
Japan had small conflicts with China and Korea, and made Korea open the country, 
and later made Taiwan and Korea its overseas territories. This was the beginning of the 
incorporation of former empire subjects.
Internally, one of the important systems established was koseki. Koseki (house registry, 
or census registry) records private information such as individual and familial 
relationships for official purposes. It had an important role since the Meiji Restoration. 
By koseki, the traditional family system was given legal status. The values of loyalty, 
obedience and piety incorporated in this family system were sustained and used to 
define the relationship between individual and the state as symbolised by the ‘Emperor' 
(Shipman, 1971:218). A family as a private unit suddenly became a unit of public 
institution. Conscription and suffrage were imposed according to this koseki registry.
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This system has been used indirectly to check and exclude persons of different origin, 
and its function and significance will be described later in detail. In some ways, this 
institution is said to support the notion of ‘blood’, as a means of belonging to the 
nation, to the tenno, and to the legitimate regime.
1.5 Subject status and holding of an empire
Both Britain and Japan had the experience of holding an empire and of ruling, or being 
responsible for, their colonial subjects. Of the ‘ethnic minorities’ or, ‘aliens' in the 
Japanese case, within Britain and Japan, a large proportion are from the former empire 
subjects. This point is quite important, as these former empire subjects should merit 
better treatment and as well should have received separate discussion from other 
guestworkers, who in many respects had weaker connections with their host countries.
Subject status prevailed over nationality during the imperial period. Usually, subject 
status can have a positive effect during the imperial period, since it can include non­
nationals much more easily than nationality status can. However, once the empire was 
lost or declined it became just an image and a negative effect of subject status appeared 
in order to clarify ‘subjects' and ‘aliens'. Subject status did not necessarily mean 
equality for all. The idea of subject status in Britain is that the individual primarily 
owes allegiance and obedience to the crown rather than being an active citizen in 
charge of the political system (Kido, 1982:49).
British subject status, described by this allegiance of an individual to the British crown 
continued until 1948. The 1948 Nationality Act did not change the existing subject
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status within the legislation. Until the 1960s, Britain was accepted as a homogenous 
society with a common set of values and historical continuity (Urwin, 1982:21). The 
feudal relationship based on the land became the source of Common law. The idea of 
‘historic right' (Imai, 1982:115) is bound up with ‘vindicating and asserting their 
ancient rights and liberties' (Bill of Rights, 1689, quoted in Lively and Lively eds. 
1994:177). The tradition of Common law is still influential in the former British 
territories. In case of England, legislation consistently ‘opposed the categories of 
subject and alien, although the former category can be considered to embody the 
meaning of nationality' (Miles, 1989:428).
In Japan, subject status was lost by colonial people in the Peace Treaty of 1952 which 
ended the World War II. In the case of Japan, after the Meiji restoration in 1869, the 
feudal status of warriors, farmers, artisans, tradesmen and, outcasts (later, referred to 
as Burakumin) was normalised into two classes of peerage and commoners. The latter 
class included all those under farmers. However, status discrimination remained in 
practice. In particular, after the enforcement of the Koseki Act in 1871, the distinction 
of ‘new commoners' for Burakumin, and ‘ex-indigenous' for Ainu on the registry 
remained controversial. Koseki registration was initially conducted to restrict 
Christianity during the Edo period. First, the registration was organised by temples, 
then by shrines. In the Meiji period, the government established koseki as a centralised 
system.
The Meiji Constitution was promulgated in February 1889 by the Meiji tenno. The 
Meiji Constitution took Prussia as its model, which had the strong prerogatives of
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Emperor. The Meiji Constitution’s first article starts with ‘the Great Japanese Empire 
is governed by the Emperor in perpetuity’ (Article 1). Under this constitution, the 
people are referred to as ‘subjects’ (shinmin).
1.6 Tradition of holding monarchy
Almond and Verba (1963:37) see British people as accepting authority from above as
well as having a participatory tradition, while Americans are much more active citizens
(see also Turner, 1992). Both Japan and Britain have retained the monarchy in the
course of their history unlike countries with a populist tradition such as France and the
USA. In the British case, apart from the brief period 1649-60, England has had a
monarchy since the tenth century, and the monarch used to have a real power.
However, it is now ‘a constitutional monarchy’ which mainly has a ceremonial role.
Naim (1988:9) argues that the ‘British monarchy is genuinely important for British
nationalism', because of the monarchy’s continuation, popularity, and also because of
its significant position for ‘British national existence’. Naim explains:
...a personalised totemic symbolism was needed to maintain the a-national 
nationalism of a multi-national (and for long imperial) entity: and the ‘crown’ 
could effectively translate identity onto that 'higher plane' required by a country 
(heartland England) which has since the seventeenth century existed out of itself 
as well as in’ (1988:11).
In relation to colonies, the role of monarchy was crucial. For instance, at the time when 
British colonies were considering independence, the Colonial office was attempting to 
keep them inside the Commonwealth. In order to 'make the colonial people want to 
remain within the Commonwealth’ (CO875/50/3 160802), they should take every 
opportunity to use 'the links of tradition which bind the colonies to Britain and most
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clearly show in the loyalty and respect of all the colonial peoples for the Royal Family’ 
(ibid.)
In the Japanese case, the title of ‘tenno' (monarchy) was first used in the beginning of 
the seventh century (Inoue et al. eds, 1991). The importance of tenno increased after 
the Meiji restoration, when the new administration claimed its legitimacy through tenno 
after overthrowing the previous regime. During the Meiji period, translations of official 
documents used the term 'head of the state’ instead of tenno. Later the Meiji leaders 
changed this into ‘emperor’ because they thought that, to foreign leaders, the word 
‘emperor’ would conjure up images of pomp and the public display of immense wealth 
and power, both quite antithetical to the role and functions of the tenno throughout 
most of Japanese history (Smith, 1983:13).
In the case of Japanese colonial policy, at the institutional level, the relationship
between the colonies and the Japanese mainland was the compromise between the
British and French systems. For instance, Chen (1984) argues that Japan ‘developed a
complex legal compromise between the British which had various status/systems of
overseas territories and French systems especially that in Algeria regarding
relationships between metropole and overseas territories'. We can see similar kinds of
treaties between ‘colonies’ and the mainland in the following:
'His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain, & c., the island of Hong Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity by her 
Britannia Majesty, her heirs and successors...’ (Ratification exchanged at Hong 
Kong, 1843) 
nd
His Majesty the Emperor of Corea makes complete and permanent cession to His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of 
Corea' (Treaty of Annexation between Corea and Japan, 22/8/1910, Article 1)
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Since Japan lost the war, the Japanese monarchy has played only a symbolic role'1. On 
the other hand, at the level of ideology, it was mainly an 'assimilationist policy’, similar 
to that of France, attempting to extend the idea of the Japanese subjects. For instance, 
Premier Hara made a statement that ‘Korea is a part of Japan, not a dependent 
territory, nor a colony, but an extension of Japan' (19/8/1919, quoted in Hatada, 
1969). This was reported on the same day as the tenno made a famous Imperial 
rescript of 'isshi dojin' which asks Koreans to be Japanese in practice (ibid.,). 
Therefore, the level of institution and administration and that of ideology were 
mismatched.
1.7 Learning from experience
By finding common elements among two countries, a comparative study can promote 
mutual understanding. Japan in the nineteenth century attempted to use Britain as its 
role model. The Japanese were aware of becoming like the British and as early as 1891 
it was said ‘Suppose the English had been stuck in the mainland, there would have 
been no British Empire”1.
We can also read statements like this as an expression of Japan's insularity. During the 
Meiji period, the idea of Japanese insularity is regarded both as a positive feature 
supporting homogeneity as superior as well as a negative one, and something to be
' Nakamura (1989:179) argues that when the Allied Force discussed the new status of tenno as 
distinct from 'emperor', the word ‘symbol’ used in the present constitution might come from 
the Charter of Westminster in 1931: 'the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations...'
4 'Igirisujin ga hongoku no shima ni tojikomotte ireba daieitcikoku ha nakatta dearou' 
(Taguchi Ukichi) quoted in Oguma (1995:45).
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overcome in order to achieve expansion. There were some Japanese who thought that
they could learn the colonial experience from Britain. At the time of the colonial
administration, the previous experience of Britain, combined with that of France was
always an issue of serious concern for Japan. For instance, often quoted Yanaihara
Tadao, the famous scholar on colonial policy argues:
At this moment when we examine the status of Dominions within the British 
empire, it seems that the stronger the political connection with the mainland, the 
more similar the compositions of ethnic groups which the Dominions 
have...however, it seems that in Ireland this political connection is weak (and it 
narrowly remains in the state of Dominion after it paid enormous sacrifice to 
suppress the independence movement). Then, the case of our Taiwan and Korea 
seems to be, above all, closest to the experience of Ireland’ (1926:360-1).
His words come in the context of examining whether to allow colonies to send 
representatives to the imperial Diet or whether to let them have a separate colonial 
assembly, and he compared the relationship between its colonies and Japan to the 
relationship between Ireland and the British Empire.
Another example of the Korea-Ireland comparison is also drawn from Soejima 
Michimasa on the administration of Korea, who was at that time the president of a 
newspaper company in Korea. He criticises the government policy of extension of the 
mainland to Korea in 1926, saying that ‘the cultural sphere which Koreans created are 
too substantial to erase by political assimilation. It is as if the island of Ireland keeps 
Irish culture forever' (quoted in Ubukata, 1964:12). Another author, Caiman (1992) 
also admits this point and says, ‘Korea was Japan's Ireland’ (p.196) and sees strong 
similarity between Japan and Korea from 1875 to 1945 and Irish history of the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.
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Within my study, however, there is no direct comparison between Korea and Ireland, 
as the focus is on the institutions of the former mainland — Britain and Japan after the 
Second World War. At the same time, there is a significant difference between the 
status of Ireland (a Dominion) which, for all practical purposes was an independent 
state after 1921, and Korea (a colony). Nevertheless, the example is worth examination 
as it shows that Japan was interested in learning from the experience of the British 
empire system.
After World War II, the insularity of Japan and also of Britain became an issue. In the 
Japanese case, the experience of losing the war influenced its people greatly. It had to 
give up overseas territories such as Korea and Taiwan. This renunciation and 
subsequent post-war adjustment, such as the repatriation of ex-colonials re-established 
the idea of Japan as a ‘unified nation'5, though just after the war the significance was 
not recognised. In the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of a 'unified nation' came under the 
spotlight. The idea of insularity appears in politicians’ statements such as ‘since Japan 
is a unified nation, education is relatively easy6. This invited criticisms from Ainu in 
Japan as well as from the United States, for its narrow conception. This statement is 
often referred as 'tan’itsu minzoku hatsugen’ (the mono-race statement), which is 
often quoted in the context of the discussion of the post-war 'mono-ethnicity’ of 
Japan. However, a similar statement was made as early as 1975 by the then prime 
minister Miki: 'Japan has a high standard of education, and does not have racial
5 According to Oguma (1995:7) on Origins o f the myth o f homogeneous nation in Japan, he 
argues that a 'unified' state (kokka) and a 'homogeneous' nation (minzoku) are not 
distinguished by those who discuss these ideas.
* Former prime minister Nakasone at the House of Representatives of the Diet on 
25/9/1986: ‘Nihon lui tan 'itsu minzoku dearunode hikakuteki kyoikului okonaiyasuku. . . ' , 
quoted in Sapporogakuin Daigaku America Kenkyukai (1989).
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problems, nor civil wars. If we cannot construct a model country, the politicians are 
responsible' (1/11/1975, in Nihon Shakaito, 1989). This statement was also raised at 
the House of Councilors's committee, with relation to Ainu in Japan (6/11/1975, ibid.).
In the case of Britain, statements concerning insularity often appear in the context of 
immigration discussion. Gradually, immigration from Commonwealth countries 
(especially the New Commonwealth) became so great that the ties between Britain 
itself and other Commonwealth countries were considered as a burden. Thus, 
statements like this appear in the House of Commons debates: 'The British people will 
in time be supplanted by aliens and British people will gradually disappear from those 
islands' (J.Stokes, Commons, debate, vol.997, col.988, 28/1/1981). There is also an 
often quoted statement by Margaret Thatcher in 1978, who indicated that ‘people are 
really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a 
different culture' (Grenada Television programme, ‘World in action-, 30/1/1978). 
Within this context, she implies a restriction on immigration for which a parallel cannot 
be found in the statements of Japanese politicians.
1.8 ‘Minorities’ in Japan
This is a difficult question, since there is no consensus in Japanese administrators, 
scholars and society, as a whole about what constitutes its ‘minority issues’ in Japan. 
For instance, Japanese sociologists have been researching, as more or less socially 
disadvantaged groups, such as people as Koreans, Ainu, Ryukyuans, new migrants 
from other Asian countries and Latin America, and to a lesser extent, Burakumin.
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However, academics treat these people separately from each other, and hardly refer to 
them collectively under the name of ‘minorities in Japan'.
Reports published by international organisations, in particular ones that are prepared 
by ‘specialist’ groups, follow the line of these works published in English, and often 
refer to Koreans, Ainu, Ryukyu and Burakumin as minority groups. However, this is 
quite a different view from how academics in Japan understand the situations of these 
people in Japan.
In English literature, there are four kinds of groups which are often referred to as 
‘minorities in Japan’ (for instance, De Vos, 1983). They are, Ainu, Burakumin, 
Koreans and Ryukyuans. Ainu are indigenous aboriginal groups who live in the 
northern part of Japan, and who have their own distinctive language and culture.
Ryukuans, a territorial group, live in the southern part of Japan, the islands of 
Okinawa. It was an independent kingdom until around the seventeenth century and 
under a separate administration between 1952 and 1972. It was the only place within 
the Japanese territories under the occupation of the United States. Ryukyuans have a 
distinctive culture and language.
Burakumin (outcast people) are one of the most notable groups in English literature. 
Historically they were people who were involved in specific occupations such as 
leather workers or work linked to religious activities or funerals, which were regarded
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as ‘dirty’ by the traditions of Buddhism and perhaps also for the justification of the 
feudal rule.
Koreans in Japan are those descendants of former empire subjects most of those 
migrated to Japan forced or economically before and during the Second World War. 
Most of them remain as ‘aliens’, instead of naturalising.
1.9 Summary
This chapter has discussed some historical similarities between Britain and Japan. 
These are; geographical insularity, the experience of maintaining an empire and a long­
standing monarchy. In addition, Japan in the past has regarded Britain as its model, and 
politicians and intellectuals sometimes make telling comparisons. Although the 
experiences of Britain as a multi-national state, and a relatively unitary Japan are quite 
different in some ways, both countries had a past which united internal minorities first, 
then in the similar way, incorporated other colonial or imperial subjects.
In the following chapters research will focus on ‘Citizenship and Nationality’ in Britain 
and Japan with reference to the former empire subjects. One important source of data 
for me is its analysis of court cases brought by those former colonial subjects. The 
analysis is mainly based on post-war and more contemporary situations showing what 
sort of status these former subjects have within these countries.
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1.10 The construction of the thesis
Chapter 2 discusses themes of nationality and citizenship, and theories of citizenship 
and nationality in British and Japanese contexts. As these terms (citizenship and 
nationality) have distinctive meanings in Britain and Japan, the chapter needs to 
provide background information, and a tentative definition of citizenship as a legal 
institution and nationality as national identity. The distinction between the two 
concepts of 'nationality' and ‘citizenship’ has not been deeply explored, and this 
equation emerged only after the modem period when theories of nationalism proposed 
that each nation should have its own state, whose members should be deemed to have 
the same status. Then, this study will include two indicators: denizenship and patriality, 
and will consider the inter-relation of these two indicators as well as citizenship and 
nationality.
Chapter 3 considers method and methodology and will examine different types of 
comparative studies and the kinds of comparison which can be applied within this 
research. Within this process, I shall look at literature on topics such as industrial 
relations and education, which include direct and indirect comparisons of Britain and 
Japan. Then, I shall consider the kind of areas which I intend to compare such as 
minorities, politics and law, and examine the possibility of the application of 
comparative method (or style) to this research area.
Chapter 4 examines rights and residence in Britain. It will explore rights regardless of 
immigration status in Britain after the 1971 Immigration Act and also examine the 
function of the word 'nationality' arising from the citizenship law context. In this
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section, court cases and other materials will be used to consider settlement, ordinary 
residence, and nationality rules.
Chapter 5 then examines rights and residence in Japan. It will look at the status of 
‘settled aliens', of whom most are Koreans in Japan. It will consider the extent to 
which rights in Japan can be entitled to those without Japanese nationality, most of 
whom are long-standing aliens.
Chapter 6 looks at patriality in Britain and examines the importance of ‘the status of 
patrial’ within the 1971 Immigration Act and the sort of role it played in practice. It 
will look closely at the debates on the 1971 Bill and see what kind of points were 
raised, and how they related to later events. In addition, it will also see how, by the 
incorporation of a lineage clause in immigration legislation, the nationality status of 
Britain changed.
Chapter 7 considers patriality in Japan. This section considers whether koseki  in Japan 
is comparable with British ‘patriality’, and how it relates to nationality status in Japan. 
It will look at the debates around koseki  first, to see what kind of issues are regarded 
as problematic and then examine the various court cases in which koseki  was 
discussed, to see what sort of significance it has had.
Chapter 8 is the final discussion on the findings of this research. Here, the connection 
or distance between nationality, citizenship and jus soli, which can be drawn from the 
denizenship argument and jus sanguinis, by the patriality argument can be examined to
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see how important these areas are for status. The two different types of legislation 
tradition, as jus soli/jus sanguinis have influenced the way these two countries 
distinguish outsiders.
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Chapter 2: Citizenship and Nationality - a literature review
2.1 Introduction
It is impossible to do justice to the vast literature on citizenship and nationality, 
as these are themes on which much has been written. I shall start with citizenship 
theory. Within the section on citizenship, there are two areas I am particularly 
keen to explore: first, the concept of 'denizenship', and second, the areas of 
distinction and convergence between citizenship and nationality. These two 
themes relate closely to the chapters which explore 'right and residence’ and 
'patriality'.
The ideas of ‘denizenship’ and ‘patriality’ are closely connected to theories of 
citizenship and nationality. If, tentatively, we define citizenship as a legal 
institution and nationality as a psychological identity, the discussion of 
denizenship is about how to ‘separate’ citizenship from nationality. The main 
point of denizenship is how to acquire rights by the fact or the length of 
residence for people - usually immigrants- in countries of settlement, but without 
acquiring the host country’s citizenship. To migrants, the idea of denizenship 
provides the distinction of what kind of rights are available to them without 
acquiring the citizenship where they settled. On the other hand, the discussion on 
patriality follows a different direction; how to connect 'psychological belonging' 
(nationality) with legal institution (citizenship). Since patriality is about rights of 
descent, it follows that only members are entitled to specific rights, such as the 
right to enter his/her own country or automatic transmission of citizenship in
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some countries. By considering both the kinds of rights that are only reserved for 
descendants, and the kind of rights that are open to long-standing residents, it 
will provide a useful illustration on the different histories of Britain and Japan. In 
a sense, this is an attempt to reconsider the relationship between jus soli and jus 
sanguinis principles and is therefore an important area for a review of literature 
on both citizenship and nationality.
However, as we will see later, literature and materials on 'rights and residence’ 
and ‘patriality’, the latter in particular and some part of the debate on 
denizenship, mainly exist in factual and specific contexts rather than in theoretical 
considerations, and they are in general not well researched areas. Hence, some 
aspects of 'patriality' and "rights and residence’ will be dealt with in the research 
chapters rather than here.
In the following, I will examine the concept of 'denizenship (Hammar, 1990) and 
the Japanese concept of ‘teiju gaikokujin' (settled aliens) first. Regarding the 
discussion or activities of teiju gaikokujin in Japan, the circumstance of Britain 
and its Commonwealth immigrants is often given as a good example to compare 
with the Japanese context (for instance, Komai, 1993). This chapter will also 
address the relationship between citizenship and nationality in general, then 
discuss theories of nationality, the application of these and finally concepts and 
theories in the specific situations of Britain and Japan. Discussion in relation to 
Britain and Japan will appear towards the end of this section.
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Since the definition of the words citizenship and nationality may differ in the 
British and Japanese contexts, it is important to avoid confusion as much as 
possible. Although 'citizenship' and ‘nationality- were defined earlier, it is not 
always possible to apply these terms directly in the research chapters. This arises 
from the practical difficulty, largely in the Japanese context, where citizenship 
and nationality as concepts are hardly distinguished. A further complication 
arises from the fact that, within the British Nationality Acts, the terms 
‘citizenship’, ‘citizen', and 'nationality' are often (and confusingly) used within a 
single legal document. Nevertheless, consideration of political and sociological 
arguments on citizenship and nationality will emerge later when the contexts are 
studied in which these words are used and applied in practice.
2.2 Citizenship
There are a large number of works written on this subject, as citizenship has 
become one of the most fashionable concepts of the 1990s, not only for political 
science and sociology, but also in political debates, and in particular, in Britain. 
At the same time, citizenship has been used quite loosely to cover a large number 
of different situations. Referring to this diversity and difficulty, Blackburn has 
argued that 'Citizenship means different things to different people' (Blackburn, 
1993). Whilst this may be an exaggeration, it is not so easy to summarise the 
idea of citizenship overall.
The meaning of ‘citizenship’ is given in a dictionary as: ‘the relationship between 
an individual and a state, defined by the law of that state with corresponding
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duties and rights in the state' (Encyclopaedia Brittanica,p.352). This is a 
traditional and basic definition of citizenship. However, in recent debates, the 
focus is on the contents of rights and duties as the issue, and not just to the state. 
This is due to the development of globalisation of super-state connections and 
the movement of migrant workers as well as autonomy for regional movement 
within a state. Or put a different way, the weakening of the function of nation­
states (Held, 1991).
One way of classifying citizenship, depending on the types of political 
community, is as a relationship between a state and a citizen, or a member, 
defined as contractual or communal (Mclnnes, 1996; Oldfield, 1990). The 
contractual perspective emphasises the individual perspective, and focuses on the 
obligations of the citizen, in return for which the citizen receives entitlements. 
This has roots in the thoughts of Hobbes and Locke. The communitarian view 
expresses the idea of community, encouraging participation and co-operation for 
mutual benefit. This view comes from the philosophy of Rousseau. In other 
words, the former emphasises rights and obligations, while the latter emphasises 
active participation. However, in practice, these two theories often coexist.
A second way of dividing citizenship is to distinguish on the one hand between 
state citizenship, which is a formal legal status, and on the other hand democratic 
citizenship, which is a sharing membership of a political community. The latter is 
not necessarily binding to a state, but also binds to a regional community as well 
as transnational organisations, such as the European Community (Stewart, 1995;
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Kymlica and Norman, 1994:353). The idea behind this division is that the 
communitarian view of citizenship is more flexible in connecting different levels 
of community, and could involve multiple citizenships. Within Kymlica and 
Norman's argument, along with the development of the welfare state and the 
notion of social citizenship, they emphasise the latter conception of citizenship as 
a desirable activity.
Since this study chiefly focuses on questions of status, I shall mainly consider 
citizenship in its institutional form, in relation to a state. The problem here is that 
such citizenship is connected with legal status, and is often identified or confused 
with 'nationality’. This is because modem states are often considered or regard 
themselves as ‘nation-states’ (idea-typical), where membership of the state is 
supposed to be identical with membership of a nation, and its status is referred to 
as citizenship. The problem of legal status, or coincidence of nationality and 
citizenship has attracted attention because of the increase in foreign migrant 
workers, who do not have full citizenship status but gradually come to be 
members of the host society. In the words of Hall and Held (1989), ‘the main 
arena in which questions of citizenship have remained alive until recently, at least 
in the West, has been in relation to questions of race and immigration- in other 
words, questions which have challenged both the identity and the boundaries of 
‘the community’ in relation to both nations and states' (quoted in Yuval-Davis, 
1997:73).
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In this respect, citizenship consists of different kinds of rights, and the question 
of which rights one should be entitled to, is one direction for discussion. 
Citizenship in the British arena often starts from Marshall's ‘Citizenship and 
social class' in 1950 (Marshall, 1950). Marshall offers the classical theory of 
citizenship in Britain. Apart from legal citizenship, he applies the concept of 
citizenship to describe inequalities between classes within a state. He defines 
citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of (the) 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties with which the status is endowed’ (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992). Then, 
they divide citizenship rights into three parts:
-civil rights which are 'necessary for the individual freedom, liberty of the 
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts and the right to justice’, achieved in the eighteenth 
century,
-political rights which are 'to participate in the exercise of political power, as a 
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such as body' achieved in the nineteenth century,
-social rights which are 'a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right 
to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society’ achieved in the twentieth 
century (ibid., 1992:18).
In Marshall’s conception, civil rights and political rights are bestowed to each 
individual already, and the extension or contents of ‘social rights' (or so-called
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equality in practice) is mainly contested. In other words, in the British situation, 
formal or legal equality among members is assumed to be already achieved. 
Simultaneously, because of the historic notion of the British subject which used 
to ensure the equality to all British subjects, that is, colonial and Commonwealth 
citizens, this also helps the understanding of equality issues (Marshall and 
Bottomore, op.cit.).
The main criticisms of Marshall are firstly, that there are many different types of 
inequalities apart from class, such as those which are based on race or gender. 
Secondly, his conception is mainly applicable to the British situation, hence his 
emphasis on the evolutionary perspective. In other words, questions are raised 
on the content of ’citizenship' status or who has equal status, which at the same 
time, depends upon each country’s history. For instance, Barbalet (1988) 
proposes to extend Marshall’s work in aspects of the relationship between the 
different elements of citizenship with the role of state, and the relationship with 
struggle and repression as well as with increased rights (p. 108). From a gender 
perspective, Young (1989) argues that the idea of universal citizenship has to 
include the idea of group representations or group differentiated rights so as not 
to impose homogeneity or equal treatment from a majority perspective.
Bendix (1964:74) relates ’citizenship’ to ‘nation-building’, saying that citizenship 
is ‘the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens’, and it is the 
‘core element of nation-building as its codification matters whether exclusively 
or inclusively defined.' Recently, Marshall’s theory has been expanded and
related to other countries' situations, by, for instance, Mann (1987) and Turner 
(1993). Mann (1987) considers Marshall's model as anglocentric and 
evolutionary and he stresses the importance of geo-politics and war. He defines 
'state-centered' citizenship in five typifications, as ‘ruling class strategies' 
including ‘from constitutionalism to liberalism (Britain)' and 'from absolutism to 
authoritarian monarchy (Japan)’ (pp.129, 133). Turner (1993:2,9) defines 
citizenship as a ‘set of practices’ (judicial, cultural, political and economic) and 
proposes different versions of citizenship in different social and cultural 
traditions, following the idea of Mann's citizenship as ‘ruling class’ strategies. At 
the same time, Marshall's theme is expanded to other areas of inequality existing 
in Britain including discussion of active participation. As 'active participation’ 
means bottom-up direction of participation, and relates moral obligation of 
individuals. Marshall's theory which includes three kinds of rights (civil, political 
and social) is useful when studying the entitlements to rights for immigrants in 
different countries.
In addition, there is some legal literature on citizenship in the British context. For 
instance, there is the research done by Blackburn ed.(1993); Juss (1993); 
Dummett (1976); and Dummett and Nicol (1990). Blackburn ed.(1993) is a 
collection on ‘Rights o f Citizenship', and includes different kinds of rights from 
civil rights such as freedom of expression and political rights to social and 
economic rights such as racial equality. This attempts to extend Marshall’s 
conventional definition of citizenship rights. Dummett and Nicol (1990) are often 
cited on the historical development of British nationality and immigration law.
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The characteristics of the British situation is that citizens and citizenship became 
sub-categories of ‘nationality’ acts, as British subject status was ensured to all 
colonial and Commonwealth citizens living inside and outside the British Isles; 
since 1962 this has been gradually re-defined in terms of immigration rights to 
Britain, but detailed of this will follow in later chapters.
Let us now consider the discussion by Hammar (1990) on denizenship, and by 
Baubock (1994a) on immigration and citizenship. These relate their discussion in 
particular to more recent issues of migrants who have begun to settle in their 
host countries and it is of interest to see whether it is possible to relate their 
views to the situation in Japan, and to citizenship issues of former empire 
subjects.
Hammar (1990) defines citizenship as formal membership of a state and 
‘substantive citizenship' as the possession of a number of rights and duties in the 
state. He deals with the formal as well as the relationship between the formal and 
the substantive (p.3). He proposes to use the term ‘denizen' to signify ‘persons 
who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status’ (p.15) in 
their countries of residence, but not their home countries. His terminology is 
particularly applicable to migrant workers who entered western Europe during 
the 1960s and 1970s, and remained in their host country after these countries 
stopped recruiting migrant workers. The status of denizen is somewhere in 
between the status of citizens and aliens, depending on the accessibility of rights. 
There are three ‘gates' which all states use to control immigration into their
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territories: the first controls initial admission, the second controls permanent 
residence, and the final gate allows access to naturalisation i.e. access to 
citizenship. Foreign citizens, who have passed through the first gate hold 
temporary permits with insecure status and unless they comply with the 
regulations, there is the possibility of deportation. Once they have stayed for a 
while and are accepted as permanent residents, these foreign citizens become 
‘denizens', who have substantial civil and social rights such as family unification 
and free employment permits. When these permanent residents apply for and are 
accepted for naturalisation, they become citizens of their country of residence 
and acquire full rights including political rights (Hammar, 1990:22-1; Layton- 
Henryed., 1990:13).
Hammar’s discussion considers two key issues, namely the possibility of 
entitlement to political rights for these denizens, and the ease with which 
qualification for naturalisation or acquisition of full citizenship can be gained by 
denizens. As a background, he sees a potentially unstable situation developing in 
nation-states due to the large population of ‘non-citizens' within their territory. 
He then poses two important questions. First, ‘the extent to which political rights 
should be given to those who are not formal citizens’ and second, ‘the extent to 
which, and the conditions upon which, formal citizenship should be given to 
foreign residents with a long period of residence’ (p.3). In his view, ‘domicile’ 
and ‘residence' seem to be the key. ‘Residence is the real situation, while 
domicile is a legally tolerated or granted residence' (p. 195). ‘Residence Is 
exclusively determined on factual criteria, domicile also implies some kind of
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legal relationship to the state' (p. 192). In this case, a person can choose his or 
her residence, but domicile has to be granted or recognised by the authority. In 
addition, this means that in some circumstances, the acknowledgement of a 
previously accepted domicile could be withdrawn, as in the case of Koreans in 
Japan. Hammar gives us an example: ‘as a requirement, a foreign citizen shall 
have obtained at least a temporary residence, for if he has not, his stay and his 
relationship to the state is not legal. An illegal immigrant could in other words be 
a resident but he could not be domiciled in the country he has illegally entered' 
(p. 194). For a resident to be a domicile, it seems to be sufficient that the person 
holds a temporary permit; however, if he intends to prolong it, and the state has 
no such intention then he might lose his domicile status.
I will explore Hammar's arguments in two respects. First, I think the main reason 
why the issues of easing naturalisation and entitlement to political rights 
(especially suffrage) are difficult is that both of these relate to the issue of 
identity or nationality. However, Hammar omits the concept or the fact of 
'nationality' as a cultural identity to be seen alongside present political and legal 
status. He ignores the congruence between nationality and citizenship within the 
nation-state (ideal-type), even though he sometimes uses ‘nationality’ or 
‘national' as synonymous with citizenship of a country (pp.32, 199). However, 
he admits the difficulty in defining ‘nation’, and treats it indirectly with regard to 
conflict (pp.37-9). It seems that Hammar follows the liberal model of citizenship 
as a legal and contractual membership of a state and avoids the problems of 
communitarian citizenship which involves membership of a national community
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as well. Furthermore, with reference to immigration and the naturalisation of 
foreign residents (p.51), given that citizenship and nationality within a nation­
state is of prime importance, the relationship between nation and state has not 
been well explored. This problem of the distinction between citizenship and 
nationality is a large one, so I shall refer to it later separately.
Second, Hammar omits the circumstances of Britain from his examples of 
denizens. He considers that the New Commonwealth and Irish immigrants are 
rather like ‘de facto citizens rather than denizens' (p.23-5). The part of 
inapplicability comes from the fact that his theory does not include ‘subjecthood’ 
since his citizenship is mainly attached to the modem nation-state (Joppke, 
1995). He does not discuss the 'absence of state derived concept of citizenship’ 
as it is developed in Britain (Stewart, 1995). His theory cannot incorporate 
‘alienisation of immigrants’ (Lee, 1995), who came to the host country as 
citizens (or at least, subjects), but have insecure status compared with other 
citizens, or in some cases are treated as ‘alien citizens'. In the following section, 
I will discuss this issue mainly in relation to these two points in order to connect 
with other areas of the literature.
For the second point, I would like to relate this to the discussion in Japan on 
teiju gaikokujin (settled aliens). It is said that the Japanese situation of foreign 
workers is 'twenty years behind those of Europe’ (Kajita, 1994:15), as it was not 
until the 1980s when foreign guestworkers coming to Japan increased 
significantly. Mori, H.U996) evaluates this situation as 'achieving economic
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growth without attracting foreign workers’ (p.32). The tight immigration law, 
which is modelled on the United States, excluding regulations on immigration 
visas does not accept ‘immigration as permanent residence' as a system 
(Hirowatari, 1992:70-1), and this could be another reason.
Therefore, the issue of ‘Koreans in Japan’, or the former empire subjects 
continuously residing in Japan, have been the most important case relating to 
aliens in Japan. Most of them came to Japan before and during the Second World 
War as Japanese subjects, but later lost their Japanese status. Regarding the 
discussion of denizenship and teiju gaikokujin discussion in Japan, Cohen (1991) 
mentions a possible analogy between the discussion of ‘denizens’, with the long­
standing community of Koreans. Given this background, the discussion on teiju 
gaikokujin as between citizens and aliens, is targeted mainly on these Koreans in 
Japan, while other aliens are termed ‘new comers’ or migrant workers. There 
are, of course, some teiju gaikokujin who are not ‘old comers’, so these 
descriptions are far from precise.
The term teiju gaikokujin was firstly used by So as early as 1977 for ‘those who 
have their living base in Japan, with a social/cultural relationship with Japanese 
society, but without legal status as Japanese’ (So, discussion in Horitsu Jiho, 
1985). This term gradually came to signify Koreans in Japan, in order to 
distinguish them from other aliens, who came to Japan more recently. However, 
the key point in this definition is that these teiju gaikokujin are those who 
acquired their Japanese nationality regardless of their will before the war and lost
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it due to the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, again regardless of their will. 
However, the term teiju gaikokujin is not a concept used in law. It is ‘an 
established fact' in statutory law but not in the constitution (Annen, 1993:168). 
Put another way, this teiju gaikokujin can be seen as a conceptual term 
developed through the activities of Koreans in Japan in order to claim their rights 
in Japan, as we shall see later. However, there are other quite similar terms to 
teiju gaikokujin used in statutory law, such as tokubetsu eijusha (special 
permanent residents) or tcijusha (settlers). It is therefore important to distinguish 
this academic concept of teiju gaikokujin from other technical and legal terms.
The background is as follows. In 1979, Japan ratified the International 
Convention of Human Rights, and in 1981, the Refugee Treaty and the protocol, 
which obliged the Japanese government to alter domestic legislation, especially 
on social security matters such as pensions, public housing, and child allowances. 
Until the ratification, these ‘social rights' (meaning in this context, the right to 
receive services from the state) were regarded and interpreted as only applicable 
to Japanese nationals. However, as we shall see later, some political rights and 
social rights are still closed to aliens. This alteration came about owing to the 
sudden flow of refugees, but incidentally improved the status of Koreans in 
Japan.
Onuma, an international law scholar who has been researching the status of 
Koreans in Japan since the 1970s, proposes in his article that a distinction should 
be made between general aliens, settled aliens who have resided in Japan more
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Recently, this discussion on teiju gaikokujin has been connected with aliens’ 
suffrage issues in Japan.1 The characteristic of such Japanese discussion is that 
this debate on teiju gaikokujin concentrates on legal issues and compared with 
reality, the legal theory is regarded as far behind. Therefore, re-interpretations of 
words used in constitution have been proposed and discussed widely. For 
instance, Kondo (1996a) suggests proof of entitlement to teiju gaikokujin 
suffrage using the words ‘future generations’, as used in the United States.
The definition of teiju gaikokujin as a concept, and the application of this 
concept in real contexts is a matter of dispute, as we shall see later. For instance, 
Takasaki (1995:17) and Nakahara (1993:58) consider the 1965 Japan-South 
Korea Treaty, which 'formulates the categories of ‘permanent resident aliens’ 
and other general aliens’ as the key document, while Ebashi (1995a) focuses on 
the 1991 Special Immigration Act, when a new category of ‘special permanent 
resident’ (tokubetsu eijusha) integrated all those existing categories of Koreans 
of south as well as north. These ‘special permanent residents’ are statutory 
defined as ‘children and grandchildren of those who lost Japanese nationality by 
the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty ‘Heiwa Joyaku Kokusekiridatusha no 
sison ' in the 1991 Special Immigration Act.1 2 This is because the previous law of
1 See for instance. So ed. (1992), Kondo (1996a) ,Li (1993) amongst others.
2 (Shutsunyukoku Kauri Tokureihou), the formal name is 'Nihonkoku to no Hciwajoyaku ni motozuki 
Nihon no Kokuseki wo ridatsushita monotouno Shutsunyukoku kanri ni kansuru Tokureihou ’ (Act on 
Exceptional Entry-Immigration Control for those who lost Japanese Nationality by the Peace Treaty
than five years, according to his definition, and refugees, by the criteria of having 
membership of a society (1983:370-1).
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1952 is only applicable to first and second generations of Koreans in Japan, since 
its need for expansion they are distinguished from other 'permanent residents’ 
(eijusha) defined in other immigration acts, who do not have historic ties with 
Japan.
Apart from this debate, there is also growing interest in Hammars’ 1990s 
concepts of citizen, denizen and foreign nationals amongst scholars in Japan 
(Komai, 1994; Lee, 1995; Kondo, 1996a). Ashibe (1993:190) regards 
■permanent residents’ (eijusha) as well as ’special permanent residents’ as teiju 
gaikokujin. The difficulty arises in that ‘settlers’ and ’permanent residents’ are 
statutory terms, and the criteria of ’permanent residents ‘ in Japan are strict 
(Kondo, 1996a; 152-3). However, for a long time, the campaigns by Koreans in 
Japan have been focused on achieving ‘secure permanent residence' (Tanaka, 
1975:97). For those involved in these campaigns, it was and is important to 
oppose the government viewpoint which tends to equate teiju gaikokujin with 
historic ties to Japan alongside other new comers within one single category of 
‘aliens'. The present situation of Koreans in Japan and the problems associated 
with them will be investigated later, as the debate on teiju gaikokujin is concrete 
and practical rather than theoretical.
Baubock (1994a) proposes ‘immigration citizenship’ with reference to the 
development of European integration or globalisation. He regards citizenship as 
membership of a political community as well as a bundle of rights (1994a: 19),
with Japan), 1991. Here after , ‘Special Immigration Law 1991'. Apart from this, there is a (normal)
Immigration Control Act enacted in June, 1989 (revised Entry-Immigration Control Act, 1989).
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and defines the former as ‘nominal membership' and the latter as 'substantial 
membership'. This is similar to Hammar’s definition. With reference to resident 
aliens in European countries, Baubock pays attention to the significance of rights 
of residence and at the same time, to the distinction between the status of 
citizens and those of aliens, especially on political rights (1994b:203). He 
proposes his theory of citizenship in relation to liberal democracy (1994a:35), 
which has as its major principle on the ideal of equality. Baubock emphasises 
societal memberships, rather than territorial sovereignty and nominal citizenship, 
and attempts to apply the norm of equality onto the base of societal membership. 
Such membership (libertarian, contractarian, republican, and nationalist 
(1994b:215), Baubock regards libertarianism as the best norm for the inclusion 
of resident aliens.
However, in Baubock's theory, the configuration between nationality and 
citizenship is unclear, as he equates nominal citizenship with nationality, but does 
not relate it to his substantial membership. Moreover, as he regards nationality 
membership as merely one element of societal membership, his theory of 
international organisation or legal scope is rather superficial as he does not 
account for the fact that the present international system relies on 'nation-states’ 
as an ideal type construction.
2.3 Citizenship and nationality
Although it is quite permissible to omit the discussion of 'nationality' within the 
discussion of 'status' and 'citizenship', in order to avoid confusion it is
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worthwhile examining the relationship between citizenship and nationality. This 
will be the background to the ‘patriality’ debate which follows later.
Patriality can be defined as ‘of or belonging to one’s native country’ but it is a 
very recently created concept used in law, and not written about theoretically nor 
thematically. However, the importance of patriality lies in two aspects. First, this 
is a legal concept as well as a psychological concept relating to identity and 
emphasising descent. In other words, patriality connects citizenship and 
nationality. Second, it is of relatively recent origin but is acquiring increasing 
importance despite the development of globalization, or relative open access to 
borders. It also has implications for gender relations because rights connected 
with descent involve the ‘family’, and are not just ‘ethnic’, as we can clearly see 
in the case of Japan.
The distinction between citizenship and nationality is not always clear, as this 
topic has not been well explored. The function of the nation-state (ideal type) is 
described by Heywood (1994) as offering ‘the prospect of both cultural cohesion 
and political unity. Where a group of people who share a common cultural 
identity gain the right to self-government, community and citizenship coincide' 
(p.63). In other words, both types of ‘nations’ have to come together to claim 
status as a nation-state.
Brubaker (1989) defines the modem nation-state as membership organisation 
and territorial organisation (p.14). He also categorises six norms of membership
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relating to citizenship in the ideal typical nation-state. In this ideal type 
citizenship is: egalitarian - status of full state membership, sacred - obligatory, 
national - nation and state should coincide, democratic - encourage active 
participation, unique - exhaustive and mutually exclusive and socially 
consequential - membership linked to important privileges (ibid., 3-4).
Joppke (1995:171) points out that ‘the crucial distinction between citizenship 
and subjectship disappears when defining citizenship as Brubaker does, so 
broadly.’ And that it 'blends citizenship and national identity’, especially, 
Brubaker's criteria of 'sacred, national and unique’ (Layton-Henry, 1999:10). 
Brubaker's point that membership should be socially consequential, is also 
important when we consider the relationship between nationality and citizenship 
because it is worthwhile: it cannot be guaranteed to everyone except members, 
and implies the closure of membership.
Brubaker describes citizenship in the modem sense as general membership of the 
state, and entitlement to citizenship for foreigners considered on a reciprocal 
basis (1992:87). He argues (1992:30) that ’citizenship is a formal construct, in 
principle, nothing to do with ethno-cultural nationality. But formal closure 
against legal non-citizens may overlap with informal closure against ethno­
cultural non-nationals. Citizenship as social closure means social rights against 
non-citizens'. His main argument is that nationhood in Germany is an ethno­
cultural fact, whilist in France it is a civic political fact. Therefore, in France,
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nationhood and statehood are fused, while in Germany they are sharply distinct 
(ibid.,).
Joppke (1995:169) evaluates Brubaker’s way of conceptualisation as fruitful. To 
conceptualise a modem state as ‘membership organisation', ‘helps to link it to 
the analysis of nations and nationalism'. He points out, however, that ‘it has 
failed to spell out the infrastructure of nations, most notably the conception of 
membership as citizenship’. This point will be revisited later.
It is increasingly likely that the traditional concept of citizenship will become 
outmoded as more people have dual nationality. The growth of transnational 
communities has led to the acquiring of multiple citizenships as people decide 
that dual nationality is advantageous. It may be that they are increasingly using 
citizenship in an instrumental way rather than as an emotional and ‘sacred’ 
attachment.
Soysal (1996) criticises Brubaker’s idea of differentiation, rights on the one hand 
and identities on the other, but considers both as components of national 
citizenship. She regards citizenship as ‘national citizenship' exclusively, and 
considers that rights and identity are increasingly de-coupled by the globalisation 
of labour markets, the development of multi-level polities and the spread of the 
idea of the universal human rights by international organisations. Against this 
background, she sees no significance in citizenship in relation to the status of 
post-war immigrants to western Europe.
45
In his essay ‘Citizenship and National Identity', Habermas (1994) distinguishes 
citizenship which he relates to democracy, from nationalism which has to do with 
political integration. He argues: ’The notion of citizens does not derive its 
identity from common ethnic and cultural properties but rather from the praxis of 
citizens who actively exercise their civil rights’ (p.23). He sees the role of 
nationalism as a ‘modem phenomenon of cultural integration' (p.22) which lays 
‘foundations for cultural and ethnic homogeneity’ (ibid.,) and for nation-state 
formation. His views are based on observation of the unification of Germany and 
the break-up of the USSR. He seeks to develop the idea of European citizenship 
(Habermas, 1994, Meehan, 1993), as a new kind of citizenship that is multiple, 
that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but is multiple in identities, rights and 
obligations.
In a similar way, Heater (1990) explores the historical dimensions of citizenship. 
He writes of the distinction between citizenship and nationality and community 
solidarity. Citizenship is, according to him, political identity while ‘nationality’ is 
‘a feeling of cultural togetherness’. It is different from nationalism which is 
derived from a political ideology and from nationality which is to do with legal 
status (p. 185). But at the same time, he expresses the political importance of 
conflation as ‘nationality became associated in the ideology of nationalism with 
the doctrine of popular sovereignty; it became important that cultural nationality 
and legal citizenship should correspond’ (p. 185).
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However, not all researchers share this globalised citizenship. Aron (1974) 
considers the possibility of ‘multi-national citizenship’, and then rejects it. In 
other words, he considers ‘national citizenship’ as directly linked and inseparable 
from an individual state. His reasons are that in order to claim ‘rights’, one has to 
belong to one state, and ‘the nation-state’ has authority to let others agree, and 
that historical connection between citizenship, in particular political rights, and 
conscription, are 'in no way interdependent’ (p.281).
This point is similar to Lee’s. Lee (1995) criticises recent citizenship rights 
literature, arguing that ‘they quite often detach citizenship from democracy, 
consent or recognition of homogeneity’ (pp.58-9). The exclusion of aliens is 
often based on the desire for social cohesion and homogeneity. In addition, the 
will of the electorate may not wish membership of its national community to be 
granted too easily to aliens. This is the reason for the exclusion of aliens as well 
as the distinction between aliens and citizens/nationals. Lee's other criticism on 
citizenship theory is of ‘the power of the state or formal authority which makes 
the final decision such as controlling borders or considering immigration laws. 
His explanations and criticisms are based on the Japanese experience and he also 
criticises Marshall’s evolutionary theory as the order of subject status and nation­
state. For instance, in the Japanese case, the history of citizenship and nationality 
is very different from Britain. The historical background to the development of 
Japanese citizenship legislation includes the creation of the modem nation-state, 
the expansion of empire and the defeat and occupation after the World War II.
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At the same time, Lee modifies Marshall's theory to include the ‘alienation of 
immigrants' to Britain after the 1971 Immigration Act.
The descent principle retains important rights, such as the right to return to the 
territory (immigration rights) or automatic transmission of citizenship. These are 
crucial elements of citizenship rights. At this moment, some European countries 
such as Italy, Germany, and Greece maintain an extreme principle of jus 
sanguinis. In these countries, people who have ancestors of the same national 
origins in the past, can return and claim the right of entry and citizenship purely 
on the basis that they have Italian, German, or Greek ancestors. In the British 
case, patriality is connected with immigration and nationality laws, while in the 
Japan, nationality laws relate to a different national ‘registration’ law, which 
specifies the familial lineage, and citizenship. What is emphasised here is 
‘opening the border' while simultaneously ‘tightening up the immigration 
control’.
2.4 Nationality
Let us now look at some definitions of nationality. Nationality is ‘national 
quality, nation, existence as nation, ethnic group or fact of belonging, to a 
particular nation or ethnic group, cohesion due to common history etc., a 
person's status as a member of a nation, alterable by legal process’ (Oxford New 
Dictionary Vol.II, 1987). In this definition, the meaning of nationality is not 
itself clear, since it uses ‘nation' or ‘national’ in its description. In other 
definitions, nationality has two kinds of meanings. The first refers to the
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'cultural, linguistic, and ideological status of an individual or group’, while the 
second refers to ‘membership in a sovereign state, in particular with reference to 
international law’ (Encyclopaedia Americana:3). This offers two forms of 
belonging. One is cultural/ethnic, and the other is political/legal. In this 
definition, 'ideological' can include emotional or psychological feeling which has 
generated a sense of community or identity. However, it is equally important 
who decides and how it is determined.
It is also appropriate to look at some definitions in Japanese. In the Kenkyusha 
New English-Japanese Dictionary, nationality is translated and explained as 
'national identity, character (kokuminteki, kokuminteki no kannen), nationalism 
Ckokka-shugi), nationality, belonging to a state (kokuseki, kokka-shozoku), 
national independence (kokuminteki dokuritsu), nation, state (kokumin, kokka), 
race, ethnicity (minzoku). The interesting point is that it includes a very broad 
meaning-even race or ethnicity. Moreover, all these words include 'koku' 
(which signifies states in one sense). These terms in Japanese are therefore 
slightly different from ‘nationality’ in English. Membership of a nation is not 
always the same as membership of a state, and is unclear in the Japanese context 
(Stronach, 1995:89).
Let us now look at how the concept of ‘nation’ has emerged in Europe. The 
word’s origin comes from ‘nasci’ (to be bom in Latin) meaning a ‘group of 
people bom in the same place, whether that place was thought of as a few dozen 
or any thousands of square miles’ (Yabuki, 1990:88). It was very much a social
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or communal connection. European feudal territories had a certain level of 
political autonomy. At the same time, the linguistic community which existed 
across an area was more important than the groups within the area, since areas 
consisted of different groups who spoke different languages.
In medieval universities, students who came from the same linguistic background 
across feudal territory were also a 'nation'. By the eighteenth century, linguistic 
and historical factors were included in the idea, tying those educated in a 
universal Christian culture, while others were in the social (feudal) hierarchy of 
land (Kasama, 1992:242). Ethnic factors of nation gained significance after that 
time, especially in England and France. According to Hobsbawm (1992), before 
the French Revolution, 'nation' was nothing to do with territory nor people 
under the same sovereignty. Nation was seen as a social and cultural group 
formed together with a common identity, usually language. Ethnic factors of 
nation had gained significance after the eighteenth century.
It is often said that nation as a political community emerged with the French 
revolution, at the time of the birth of the modem-state. First, the basic idea of the 
French revolution is 'people’s sovereignty'. Until that time, under the Ancient 
Regime, sovereignty was in the hands of the king. During the process of the 
revolution, the Third Estate overthrew the sovereignty of monarchy, and insisted 
on the sovereignty of the 'people', claiming that the nation is sovereign (Llobera, 
1994:183). Second, the French revolution ‘equates nation with the entire people
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Finally, nation has come to be associated with a fixed boundary, which 
determines a territory. Territorial states had existed in Europe by the time of the 
French Revolution, but there were anti-revolutionary movements inside and 
outside France too, and the concept of nation is employed to utilise the power of 
people and to call for 'nationalism' (Yabuki, 1990:99). In western Europe at 
least, 'nation' implies 'consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of 
governments from other organisations, and the acquisition of autonomy and 
mutual recognition by some governments (Tilly, 1975:70-1). Wars between 
states and the recognition of boundaries helped to create allies and enemies (Lee, 
1995), i.e. citizens and foreigners. The modem 'nation-state' consists of three 
principles - territory, sovereignty and people obeying the rules (citizen subjects).
However, there are limitations within the parameters of a nation. As Yabuki 
(1990:107) argues: the basic meaning of 'nasci' is sharing a common 
characteristic of birth, and this has been the basis of the concept ‘nation’. 
Furthermore, despite its image of unity, a group named 'nation' has not always 
been composed of homogeneous members. Some members of nations have been 
treated in an inferior way because they are minorities or because they have been 
poor or female. Indeed Olympe de Gouges in Paris was executed because she 
contended that women should have equal rights with men in 1793 (Ogosi, 
1996:34).
or citizenry' (Connor, 1994:39), at least in theory. All 'people' under the same 
sovereignty were identified with 'nation' itself.
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2.5 Nationalism theories
As we have seen, historically, 'nation and nationalism were western concepts and 
western formations' (Smith, 1986:144). Nationalism, as a political ideology, can 
be distinguished from nationality, defined as a membership of nation. It is helpful 
to look at theories of nationalism in order to contrast different views of nations 
in Britain and Japan, as well as the conflation and distinction of nationality and 
citizenship.
According to Smith (1995) and Guibemou (1996), there are two ways of 
viewing 'nation'. Namely, whether nation and nationalism are modem 
phenomena (the modernist position) or whether the nation is something natural 
(the primordialist position). In addition, there is a position which stands in 
between these two. Smith (1995) considers 'ethnics’ to signify an ethnic group 
and sentiments which existed before the modem nation-states, in order to 
connect the idea of nation.
Primordialist works include Geertz (1963), van den Berghe (1978). Geertz 
considers blood, 'race' and language etc. as primordial attachments and 
emphasises that they arose ‘from a sense of natural affinity than from social 
interaction' (p.31). Van den Berghe (1978) starts from a socio-biological 
perspective, and believes that ‘ethnic and racial sentiments represent an extension 
of kin selection', whose congruity is ‘real enough to become the basis of the 
powerful sentiments such as nationalism' (p.99). However, both take their
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examples of primordial ties from ‘new states' but not from old states such as 
those in Europe.
The modernist position of nationalism theories often serves as a basis for 
citizenship theories in relation to the nation-state. For instance, Hammar (1990) 
defines ‘nationality’ as ethnicity and national identity, given that nationalism can 
invent a nation, as a political movement. The idea mainly springs from Gellner 
(1983) and Anderson (1983) (Hammar, 1990:60-68). Gellner (1983) defines 
nationalism as ‘primarily a principle which holds that the political and national 
unit should be congruent' (p.l). Hobsbawm (1992:9) and Breuilly (1985:3) 
agree with his perspective. In Gellner’s definition, the state is defined as ‘an 
institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of 
order’ (1983:4) within a given territory, following the definition by Weber. By 
considering its boundaries and/or the distribution of power, he argues that 
‘nationalism emerges... in which the existence of state is already taken for 
granted’, and 'the problem of nationalism does not arise when there is no state' 
(ibid., pp.4-5). He considers that nationalism makes nations, rather than the other 
way round (op.cit., p.55).
From an anthropological perspective, Anderson (1983) defined the nation as ‘an 
imagined political community, imagined both as ‘inherently limited and 
sovereign- (pp.6-7). He describes the factor of ‘sovereign’ or being a sovereign 
state as a ‘nation’s dream, after Enlightenment and Revolution’. He explains the 
concept of the community (nation) as ‘regardless of actual inequality and
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exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship' (p.7). Within these theories, what is emphasised is the 
power of nationalism - which tries to equate ‘nation’ and ‘state’, and helps to 
draw the line between members and non-members. Whether this is the way that 
‘cultural’ nations emerged or integrated with the idea of political nations, in 
Europe, depends on individual countries and the meaning of ‘nation’.
On the issue of the relationship between nation and nationality in east and west, 
Kohn (1946) and Smith (1991) give us some implications . Kohn’s (1946:77, 
331) famous distinction between ‘western’ nationalism with its national and civic 
character and bourgeois social base, and the nationalism of ‘east’, which is found 
in the cultural field, community-based, held together by traditional ties of kinship 
and status. Kohn argues that contemporary Germany owes its often 
‘authoritarian, mystical, and organic character to the leadership of a small 
stratum of intellectuals, in the absence of a bourgeoisie'(1946:77). Regarding 
this point, Smith (1991) theorises western nations ‘owed much less to 
nationalism as a movement to create a nation where non existed' than non- 
western nations where a ‘nationalist element as an ideological movement 
assumes greater importance' (p. 110). He conceptualises two ideal types of 
nations, namely, a western, civic-territorial model and a non-western conception, 
ethnic-genealogy model (pp.9, 11). Smith argues that in the western conception 
of nation, legal and political rights are an integral part of the nation (p.10), while 
in the non-westem conception of nation, the emphasis is on common descent and 
culture (p. 11). Thus we see the resemblance between the communitarian and
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liberal theories of citizenship so that western conceptions of citizenship are 
closer to the liberal-contractual ideal type while non-western conceptions are 
closer to the communitarian ideal. In addition, this shows the closeness of 
citizenship theories to nationalism theories.
2.6 The concept of nation in Britain
Although, it is a superficial way of viewing this area, ‘nation’ seems to be 
accepted more as cultural community in the case of Britain, compared with 
Japan. As Britain is an old state, the formation of state preceded that of the 
nation (Tilly, 1975:70), although, the concepts of nation and state themselves 
have changed over a long period of time. It is not that the nature of the ‘nation’ 
is purely cultural, rather that there is a clear division of political identity as 
British and other 'regional' (or 'national') or cultural identities, such as Welsh, 
Scottish English and Irish. The UK is a multi-national state in this sense.
According to Urwin (1982), Britain was accepted as a homogeneous society 
until the 1960s because of; the nationwide two-party system, a common set of 
values and a historical thread of continuity (p. 19), and because ‘class divisions 
[are] considered to be stronger than other regional cultural differences’. In the 
1970s, Britain’s character as a ‘multinational state’ became clearer, because of 
the rise of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and the renewal of IRA 
campaigns in Ulster. This was reflected in academic writings such as Rose’s 
(1971) book 'Governing without Consensus'-, Hechter's (1975) book ‘Internal 
Colonialism’ on English domination; and Naim's (1977) book on ‘The Break­
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up o f  Britain' focusing on the territorial dimension. There is discussion on the 
coexistence of long-established democracy, and heterogeneity in terms of 
nationality which claimed that the UK did not form a classic nation-state. In 
addition, immigration from the Commonwealth in the post-war period has added 
a new dimension to the UK as a nation-state.
Rose (1971) regards nationality as a form of national identify which emphasises 
'cultural differences concerning religion and identification within peripheral 
communities' (p.70). He emphasises that national identity is a social 
psychological phenomenon, defined by the way people feel about each other and 
about their government' (p.203). In his definition, he has in mind of 
contemporary Britain, in particular the Northern Ireland situation, where he
I
 points out the lack of a secure, homogeneous, political identity. The problem in
Northern Ireland is that the two main communities have two separate and 
distinct national identities as British and Irish.
The case of Britain’s process of national integration can be described as ‘untidy 
and as historical'. Birch (1989) explains that ‘British nationalism is essentially a 
development of the nineteenth century that grew out of English nationalism, 
which is much older. English nationalism is thought by most historians to have 
been development of the sixteenth century: it had been awakened by the 
hundred years war with the French and was consolidated by the commercial 
success of the Tudor period, by the cultural triumphs of the Shakespearian era, 
by the break with the Roman Catholic church and by the defeat of the Spanish
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Armada' (Birch, 1989:135). In contrast to English nationalism, British 
nationalism in the nineteenth century was created and consolidated by victory 
over France in the Napoleonic wars and Britain’s imperial adventures and 
successes.
Rokkan and Urwin ( 1982) considers the nation-state of the twentieth century as 
‘a norm of territorial organisation’ (pi). This is not true for Britain. Urwin 
(1982) defines the UK as a ‘Union state' where territorial space is stronger than 
membership space, or where several nations coexists within a state. In the British 
case, the difference between state-building and nation-building is often clearly 
distinguished. Brubaker (1989:10-1) argues that in Britain there is no clear 
conception of nationhood nor citizenship. There was ‘the absence of a state- 
derived conception of citizenship' (Stewart, 1995:1). Part of the reason for this 
was the experience of two revolutions in the seventeenth century. It is a country 
where rights are considered as historic, and in fact are considered privileges 
granted by parliament. In conclusion, Britain cannot be considered a typical 
European nation-state, because of its multi-national character and its experiences 
of Empire which are not common. Also Britain’s non-republican tradition by 
which its people whether inside the UK or in the Empire, were regarded as 
British subjects, again distinguished itself from other European countries which 
were more influenced by the republican tradition established by the French 
Revolution.
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2.7 The concept of nation in Japan
The concept of 'nation' as a political/legal community is accepted in Japan. In 
terms of nation-building, the Japanese situation has seen two phases - one during 
the Meiji Restoration when the modem state was formed, and the second in 1945 
when Japan lost the World War II and its empire and was then reduced to a 
'nation-state'. The modem nation-state in Japan started with the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868 (Oishi, 1977; Yoshino, 1992). In the pre-Meiji period, the 
Edo Shogunate carried out a policy of seclusion, to restrict trade and exchanges 
with certain countries. This helped to construct Japan as an ‘ethnic’ state with a 
high degree of ‘ethnic sentiment', at a time when most of Japan was united as a 
territorial entity (Smith, 1986).
After the Meiji Restoration, the nation in Japan emerged. Koseki, the official 
registration of familial relations, helps to identify who is Japanese. Modem 
institutions such as constitution and government were established, following the 
style in Europe. The imposition of unequal treaties in 1854 and 1858 led to the 
rejection of the previous regime, and ‘rich country, strong army’ became the 
national goals in order to revise the unfair treaties. Gellner (1983:57) argues that 
‘nationalism, is essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, 
where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some 
cases the totality of the population’. This is a good description of what occurred 
in Japan. Thus Japan, was recognised as separate from foreign countries.
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This position of Gellner's and, Anderson’s (1983) notion of ‘official nationalism’ 
are regarded as appropriate to explain the Japanese process of modernisation 
(Yoshino, 1992:10). Seton-Watson (1977) originally suggests a concept of 
‘official nationalism’ (p. 148) as a basis of government legitimacy, and 
distinguishes this from the previous ‘dynastic loyalty’ as a ‘moral duty to impose 
their nationality on all their subjects of whatever religion, language or 
culture...by drawing these people upwards into their own superior culture, they 
were conferring benefits on them, while at the same time, they were 
strengthening their state by creating within it a single homogeneous nation'. 
However, Ikegami (1995:188) guards against a ‘too simplistic' explanation of 
what really occurred.
The modem Japanese state was established to protect the country from foreign 
pressure so that modernisation came from above, and was intended to keep its 
own independent state framework against outsiders, unlike in the French 
Revolution. After the World War II, the word ‘nationalism' in Japan is often 
identified with fascism and militarism. A cultural (ethnic) factor of nation or 
nationality implied a taboo of pre-war and wartime experience. In addition, 
overseas territories had been lost, and only mainland Japan remained. Territory 
and nation seemed to coincide once again. Yoshino (1992) explains that the 
majority of Japanese are ‘not actively conscious’ of territory (p.68). After the 
1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, those Japanese colonial subjects, who had the 
status for about 50 years lost their Japanese nationality, on the basis of koseki. In 
1945 around 2 million Koreans were in Japan, and it is said that one third of
them remained resident in Japan. At this time, the allied forces conducted a 
process of démocratisation of Japan, a new Constitution was enforced in 1947, 
then the Immigration Order in 1950 and Alien Registration Act in 1952 and the 
Japanese Nationality Act in 1950 were imposed one after the other. It was the 
most successful case in creating a modem nationalism by the imperial route 
(Smith, 1991:105). Howell (1994:93) argues that ‘because the juxtaposition of 
Japanese and non-Japanese ethnicities was so important to the pre-modem order, 
ironically, homogeneity is so central to the contemporary political order’ in 
Japan. As we saw, nation and nationality are used and implied now only as 
legal/institutional term. The institution operates with the people taking it for 
granted. In the case of Japanese modernisation, state and nation (ethnicity) 
cannot be easily divided from each other.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter began with an examination of theories on citizenship as seen in the 
literature. If we compare the concepts of citizenship and nationality in Britain 
and Japan, it is important to take a look at the historical background of nation in 
these two countries. In Japan, ‘there is no idea of citizenship, only nationality’, 
defined as state-belonging (words by Takeda, in Shiso no kagaku, 1995), while 
in Britain, ‘citizenship in the UK is another country’s nationality' (Dummett, 
1976). As we explored earlier, discussions on citizenship in Britain and teiju 
gaikokujin in Japan, are historical and contextual rather than theoretical. These 
points will be revisited in detail in later chapters. At this moment, it is not easy to 
define nationality or citizenship in such a way as to make it equally applicable in
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Britain and Japan. For instance, in the Japanese case, nationality is considered a 
universal or neutral concept, as nationality originated and developed in various 
historical backgrounds. Hence the legal concept intertwined with imperial 
domination, becomes unclear (Kasama, 1992:262). In the British case, there is 
no sense of legal nationality in the British mind, but nationality appears rather as 
cultural/ethnic concept, suggesting one belongs to a specific national group. 
However British nationality is in fact used in legal literature, although not until 
1981, when Britain had a ‘national, post-colonial citizenship' (Brubaker, 
1989:11).
In both countries, there was an empire with large overseas territories, and subject 
status was common. However, there was a different development of the nation­
state in both countries' history, and the different processes of the disassociation 
of empire meant that the matching of people and rights developed differently.
In Britain we can describe citizenship as a legal status, and nationality as an 
individual or group ethnic or cultural identity. In the case of Japan, too, 
citizenship and nationality (ethnicity) are confused, although this is considered as 
false in academic circles, it exists still in the construction of institutions. 
Nationality is mostly used as a legal status as well as an ethnic-cultural 
phenomena.
Within Britain, people speak of citizenship rather than nationality since in reality 
it is clearly divided from ethnic/cultural or national identity. In Japan, people
61
prefer to use nationality in order to describe a legal status as well as ethnic or 
cultural membership, instead of citizenship.
I would like to say a few words in favour of incorporating the term ’nationality’ 
as a legal status used in the following chapters. ‘Nation’ originally meant a group 
of people who shared a certain level of commonality, such as language, or where 
they were from. Nation could be a reason to include some people, but also to 
exclude others. After the birth of modem nation-states, this character became 
clear. The modem nation-state emerged due to threats that nations felt cultural 
groups attempting to protect their identity, economic interests, religious 
traditions and language, by demanding that their nations have states, such as 
territory, by replacing the nation with a state, so they could govern themselves, 
defend their interests and protect their territory. In other words, a nation-state 
clearly unifies the ideal of a cultural nation and that of a political nation. At this 
stage, the modem concept of ‘nationality’ is membership of a state (Hosokawa, 
1990:190). However it is also useful to use the term nationality as a legal 
concept when we need to clarify the difference between nationality and 
citizenship.
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Chapter 3: Method and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore methodological issues and to indicate 
similarities and differences between Britain and Japan. Firstly, 1 shall consider 
comparative studies in general, then examine problems of application. After that, I 
shall contrast the similarities and differences between Britain and Japan, and discuss 
whether 'comparative analysis' can be applied fruitfully in the context of Britain and 
Japan. Finally, I shall discuss the actual research techniques which will be used in 
this study.
3.2 Comparative studies in general
There are a great many books and articles on comparative studies, and the way the 
term 'comparative' is used among academics varies considerably. Moreover, the 
meaning of 'comparative' is fairly ambiguous. For instance, Vedung argues that 
'comparison seems to denote an extremely general human activity and that it makes 
it very difficult to give the term a more specific connotation which would be 
particularly fruitful in a methodological perspective' (1976:201). Furthermore, 
comparative study sometimes means the study of other countries. For instance, in 
Britain, the study of American politics is classified as part of comparative politics, 
and in the United States, the study of British politics then becomes comparative 
(Rose, 1991:446). Hereafter, the term 'comparative studies' will be used to denote 
'comparative method'.
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Secondly, there are a few direct comparative studies (i.e. with comparative methods) 
between Japan and Britain despite the fact that these two countries share many 
similarities. However, as we shall see later, there are some works on comparative 
governments or policies which include both Japanese and British chapters, as well as 
comparison on specific topics such as education or industrial relations. It is therefore 
worthwhile discussing the relevance of the comparative method to this research and 
whether it can be applied in practice.
There are several advantages in comparative studies. For instance, knowing a 
country in depth is only possible by contrasting it with others; unless we are aware 
of what happens elsewhere, we are unable to claim what is unique to the country 
under study. Comparison gives us the potential for prediction. It enables us to draw 
some lessons from other countries' experiences. Comparative studies can 'look 
beyond the single case, the formal institution, and beyond the countries of Western 
Europe’ (Verba, 1967). In the case of Britain and Japan, the merit of comparison is 
considerable, since these two countries have had experience of learning from each 
other through history. Therefore, the contrast should be significant. In addition, 
comparative studies allow us to test general hypotheses. Although by comparing 
only a few countries, the generality of the hypothesis may be low, comparison 
improves our classifications of political processes (Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1992; 
Sartori. 1994).
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Nonetheless, there are some problems with comparative studies. Firstly, comparative 
studies do not necessarily undertake 'comparative methods'. Comparative study 
indicates 'the how but does not specify the what of the analysis' (Lijphart, 1971:682). 
Lijphart even states that comparative method is a basic and simple approach and that 
the methodology of comparative political analysis does not exist. Secondly, there 
seem to be two kinds of approach for comparative method. One is exploring 
similarities and differences throughout the analysis, and to stress the in-depth 
description and understanding of various nations taken at a particular period of time' 
(inductive). The other is to explore the 'same phenomenon', subject to the similarities 
and differences which are given (words by Kohli at symposium in World Politics, 
1995:48).
An example of the former can be found in Bendix (1978:15):
'Comparative analysis should sharpen our understanding of the contexts in 
which more detailed causal inferences can be drawn. Without a knowledge of 
contexts, causal inference may pretend to a level of generality to which it is 
not entitled. On the other hand, comparative studies should not attempt to 
replace causal analysis, because they can only deal with a few cases and 
cannot easily isolate the variables (as casual analysis must)' (quoted in 
Axtmann, 1993:69).
Bendix investigates the same or at least similar questions in very different contexts 
and thus allows for divergent answers, in order to preserve a sense of historical 
particularity while comparing different countries (ibid.,). This approach stresses 
contextualisation. The problem of this approach is that it tends to deny the feasibility
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of generalizing, since it places greater emphasis on uniqueness while stressing the 
specific context. In particular, when the cross-national comparison is conducted, this 
contextual approach leans towards a description of each country’s specific situation 
rather than offering general concepts across national borders (Mayer, Burnett and 
Ogden, 1993:2).
The latter approach is to 'transform the field into one with scientific respectability, 
stress the effort at generalizing across national and cultural boundaries as defining 
what comparative politics has to contribute to political science...in order to develop 
cross-nationally a valid explanation of political phenomena' (ibid., p.2) An example 
of this approach can be found in what Przeworski says (symposium at World 
Politics, 1995:17). He tries to 'emulate experiments by finding 'matches', between 
cases that are 'comparable'. For instance, Przeworski suggests that to 'find cases that 
are as similar as possible, in as many aspects as possible and then find a crucial 
difference that can explain what one wants to explain' or find most different cases 
and do the same. This is much more quantitative, as contrasted with experimental or 
case studies and statistical methods (Lijphart, 1971).
The problem with this type of comparative method is that there are 'many variables', 
and only ‘small numbers' of cases to compare (ibid.). Within political science, we 
cannot control all of the variables as we can do in natural science. Furthermore, the 
'same' phenomenon can have different meanings in different countries. This makes it
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difficult to compare like with like. Moreover, problems of bias and political values 
arise when looking at politics in contrasting countries (Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 
1992). These are related to the selection of countries for testing initial questions, and 
more substantially, problems in defining what is similar or different. For instance, as 
Sugimoto and Mouer (1995) note, there is always a danger that culture may be 
easily used for both an 'explanatory factor as well as issues to be explained'.
Problems of non-comparability are well-defined in Sartori(1994). They are: 
-parochialism, which 'ignore the categories established by general theories and/or 
comparative frameworks of analysis’,
-misclassification, when classifications are not 'orderings derived from a single 
criterion’,
-degreeism, which ‘the abuse of the maxim that differences in kind are best 
conceived as differences of degree, and that dichotomous treatments are invariably 
best replaced by continuous ones’,
-conceptual stretching, or definition without a clear standard (ibid., pp. 19-21).
Additionally, there are two different kinds of comparison: simultaneous, varying in 
places at the same time and historical, varying in period/time. In their attempt to 
integrate two different types of comparative approaches, Mayer, Burnett, and Ogden 
(1993:8) propose organising the country studies into common topics and to use 
some common concepts in order to facilitate comparison, although they rather
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favour the conceptualising approach. This common topic with a common concept 
for different countries is accepted by other authors, such as Harrop ed.(1992) on 
power and policy or Roskin (1995) on 'what people quarrel about' in different 
countries, which is his definition of politics. He considers three factors, namely, 'the 
impact of the past', 'key institutions' and 'political attitudes'. He then analyses 
'patterns of interaction' and finally 'what people quarrel about'.
The approach taken in this study will be closer to that of Bendix, since the number 
of countries relevant to the study is limited to two. In this case, it will take a more 
flexible and contextual approach instead of scientific, quantitative approach, but at 
the same time, the study will be aware of 'common topics with common concepts' 
being the principle.
3.3 Comparative studies between Britain and Japan
This section considers similarities and differences found in recent literature, in other 
words, academics' view of similarities and differences existing between Japan and 
Britain. Before doing that, it may be helpful to briefly point out similarities and 
differences between Britain and Japan in popular discourse and historical context. 
Similarities shared by Britain and Japan are insularity, the notion of self­
distinctiveness of popular discourse and geographical location, experience of 
imperial tradition with subject status, and emphasis on overseas trade. Although 
both countries are island nations with limited resources, they both shared a great
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vision of empire. Historically, there was a significant role played by the elite from 
religious circles and the monarchy. In addition, at the institutional level, these two 
countries share the character of a 'centralized state' with parliamentary democracy as 
well.
Significant historical differences between Britain and Japan exist in the experience of 
' s e c l u s i o n ' c l o s u r e  of Japanese territories during the Edo period) and the 
outcome of the Second World War. There are also significant differences between 
the relationship between the individual and the state (Harrop ed., 1992:9). These 
major differences do not mean they cannot be compared, however. Britain was once 
a model for Japan after the Japanese opened up the country in the nineteenth 
century. Here is a clear example: with reference to Japanese overseas expansion, 
Kume Kunitake made a telling comparison: 'Japan has sufficient power to become 
the Britain of the East'1. Regarding this point, Japan was the first 'non-western’ 
country which went through the process of modernisation as well as westernisation, 
and apart from war-time and just after the war, it has been relatively successful.
When comparative studies are conducted, they are frequently limited to countries 
within Europe. The United States or Japan are usually not included and until very 
recently, Japan was treated as 'incomparable', because it was seen as alien (Rose, 
1991) in English political science literature. However, as mentioned above, there are 
some works which do not use comparative methods, and which include chapters on
1 Toyo no cikoku to naruni fusoku ha nashi', in  Shimaguni A fo n /o O n su la r lism ) q u o te d  in  
Ogumal 1995:93-4).
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both Japan and England2. Harrop ed.(1992) discusses four areas of public policy in 
industrial, health, ethnic minorities and law and order within four countries (France, 
Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom), which for the purposes of this 
study on ethnic studies issues and politics, is quite useful.
Moreover, 'homogeneity/uniqueness of Japanese' (termed Nihonjinron) which 
prevailed in Japan until the 1980s and has exaggerated the ‘incomparability' of Japan 
with other countries. It may be useful to discuss 'Japanology' a little in this section. 
There is a significant amount of Japanese literature which emphasises Japanese 
uniqueness/ homogeneity, which is quasi-academic but popular such as Nakane 
(1967); Doi (1971). Gradually, around the late 1970s, critics of Nihonjinron 
appeared (see for instance, Sugimoto and Mouer, 1995; Dale, 1988), including some 
criticism on Nihonjinron' s ideological position, which is mentioned in the 
introduction to this study. Furthermore, as Yoshino (1992) reveals, even this idea of 
‘uniqueness' of Japanese has some similarity with the idea of ‘race’, which is a 
familiar topic in British literature. Nowadays, Japanese political scientists as well as 
'foreigners' are prepared to write about the political system using generic concepts 
or comparative methods.
Apart from that, there are some comparative studies covering Britain and Japan 
which were conducted in the 1960s. There are, for instance, Bendix (1964) on
2 See for example, Moore (1966); Pye and Verba eds.(1965) on modernisation; Castles ed.(1989) on the 
history of political economy; Kotkin(1992) on ethnic groups and globalisation; Jones (1993) on welfare 
state and social policy.
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modernisation, Shipman (1971) on education; and Dore (1973) on industrial 
relations. As in earlier works of comparison which include Japan, Bendix(1964) 
compares Germany with Japan in its experience of transformation. He starts his 
analysis from the experiences of Western European societies, including Britain, and 
the developmental view is explored in Japanese 'preconditions of political 
modernisation'.
In contrast, in the field of industrial relations, there are a number of good studies 
from different comparative perspectives from the opposite direction- Japan to 
Britain. In the 1960s and 70s, manufacturing exports from Japan to the United 
States and to Europe increased. During the 1980s, in order to avoid trading conflicts 
and to find cheaper production costs, the establishment of Japanese factories 
overseas accelerated. Along with this economic situation. Dore (1973) contrasts 
Japanese success with British decline, and considers the possibility of Britain 
adopting the Japanese model in future, thus reversing the earlier situation when 
Britain was Japan's role model. In the 1970s, Dore was convinced that the Japanese 
model was understandable as well as efficient, provided that its cultural and 
historical scene were taken into consideration. Sugimoto and Mouer (1995) support 
Dore's work in refuting the 'uniqueness' theory. Adaptation of the Japanese model 
in other countries has been examined recently and termed 'Japanisation' in some 
works (Eiger and Smith eds., 1994) and in other fields (for instance, Gould, 1993 in 
social policy). In Jones's view (1993:198), the increasing attention paid to Japan on
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welfare issues has arisen because Japan 'commands serious attention as an economic 
success story because, for all the prosperity, its government still spends 
proportionately too little on welfare to be accorded a western-style welfare state'.
In the education field, British academics show a keen interest in the educational 
system of Japan. They assume that there is a strong correlation between Japanese 
economic prosperity in the post-war period and the high standard of general 
education, and attempt to learn from the Japanese experience(see for instance, 
Howarth, 1991; HMSO, 1991; and Goodman, 1993). This interest now appears to 
have an additional impact in that a Japanese scholar informed me that ‘education in 
Britain is now a fashionable topic for Japanese scholars of British studies'. The 
following section considers specific areas of similarities and differences between 
Britain and Japan, which may be relevant to the fields of law and politics in 
particular. Some of these examples are found in 'comparative politics' or 'sociology 
of law' fields, as well as in comparative legal literature.
3.4 Common law/continental law
Ehrmann’s (1976) comparative legal cultures classify four different cultures from a 
western point of view working on the assumption that law emerged from the 'west'. 
They are:
-Romano-Germanic family 
-the family of Common Law
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-the family of Socialist Law,
-the non-Westem legal family including Japan, as a country of Confucian thought.
He describes Japan, since the beginning of the Meiji Era in 1868, as having the most 
thoroughly westernised law. This is not surprising since the body of law has been 
frankly based on French, German, and lately Anglo-American law (p. 18). The first 
contrast between constitutional law in the Roman continental system and the English 
judge-made law within the common law tradition was provided by Weber (1978). In 
his view there is a dichotomy of common law which he describes as 'irrational' and 
Continental (codified) law as 'rational' but this view is too simplistic, and for 
instance, Turner (1992) points out that Weber overlooked common law's common 
nature approach to (individual) rights.
Yet the framework of Continental law vs Common law is still useful for 
understanding the relationship between law and society. The field of the sociology of 
law 'seeks to discover patterns from which one can infer whether, and under what 
circumstances law affects human behavior and conversely how law is affected by 
social change, whether of a political, economic, psychological or demographic 
nature - to discover causal relationship between law and society’ (Zweigert and 
Kotz, 1992:10). Although it is still weak as a theory, it is of some use for 
comparative studies.
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Common law has several meanings: it denotes the totality of the law of the Anglo- 
American legal family, as opposed to 'civil law' which denotes the law of Continental 
legal systems, influenced by Roman sources. In a narrower sense, it refers only to 
that part of the law which was created by the King's court in England, as opposed to 
'statute law'-'equity' and the enactment of parliament' (Zweigert and Kotz, 
1992:195). Hereafter unless stated, I use the word common law in the former, 
broader sense.
3.5 Codified-Uncodified constitution
Blondel (1995) states that: 'constitutions have introduced ideas and precepts about 
the organisation of governments which have deeply affected both theory and 
practice, even where there is no formal constitution. Constitutional developments 
which have occurred since the end of the eighteenth century have resulted in a 
universal debate about the principles of the organisation of governments and about 
how best to implement those principles' (p.217).
When we talk of rights and entitlements, one important aspect is to consider what is 
the last resort for their guarantee, namely, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of 
law for Britain, and the Constitution for Japan. The difference between a codified 
constitution and one which is uncodified (and partly written) is certainly one of 
interest. The British uncodified constitution appears to offer less protection to 
individual rights, although the case is not straightforward. In Britain, constitutional
74
debate is explained as historical rather than legal. This can be found for instance, in
Dicey (1885): The rights are based not upon abstract constitutional statements but
upon the actual decisions of the courts' (in Lively and Lively eds., 1994). In
comparison with Belgium (the Continental system), the same author writes:
In Belgium, individual rights are deductions drawn from the principles of the 
constitution, whilst in England the so-called principles of the constitution are 
induction or generalization based upon particular decisions pronounced by the 
courts as to the rights of given individuals (Dicey: 1885, quoted in Lively and 
Lively eds., 1994:180).
Although these statements are rather old and may not be strictly applicable to the 
present English system, especially when we consider the expansion of administrative 
work since the war, nevertheless, the relationship between the uncodified 
constitution and the guarantee of individual rights in Britain offers an interesting 
comparison with the Japanese system. This point is elaborated by some Japanese 
researchers of English law, such as Ito (1963) or Kuramochi (1995), in order to 
draw comparison. In particular, works of Dicey are often referred to by Japanese 
scholars for their comparative ideas with Japan.
After the Meiji Restoration, the modem Japanese legal system borrowed a number 
of ideas from different European countries, for instance, the Meiji Constitution from 
Prussia, the Civil Code from France and the cabinet system from Britain. After the 
Second World War, common law especially that of the United States had influence 
upon Japanese law, for instance, upon the present Constitution and Immigration law.
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The Japanese post-war written Constitution is an enlightened document in some 
ways (Ito, 1963). Since there is no revolutionary struggle for individuals’ rights 
against authority, the passive nuance of rights as 'given from above' is quite strong. 
It is difficult for imported legislation to become living law and to become embedded. 
With this background, unlike Britain, without the tradition of the 'rule of law', it 
makes the role of the (codified) Constitution important for the guarantee of rights in 
Japan (Kuramochi, 1995) especially after the war. Therefore, the comparison seems 
to be between the codified constitution which emerged as a fa i t  accompli in Japan, 
and a wealth of historical background in Britain which has no single constitutional 
document (Kuramochi, 1995).
A further point which singles out the British system from others is that 'virtually all 
British civil liberties stem from a fundamental principle: that people may do what 
they like so long as no law prevents them' (Coxall and Robins, 1994:316). This is in 
contrast to continental countries where people are prohibited from actions unless the 
law permits them (Owers, 1994).
There is another major difference between Britain and Japan in the relationship 
between the constitution and international aspects. The supremacy of European 
Community Law to Britain (over domestic law) has no equivalent in Japan. Nor is 
there a similar body to the European Court of Justice for Britain in Japan, in the 
sense that its judgment has direct effect. On the other hand, the effect of the
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European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on British judgment has some similarities 
with the ICCPR (or Human Rights Committee of United Nations) for Japan. With 
relation to ECHR:
Unlike the other countries who have signed the document, it has never 
incorporated the convention into British Law. British citizens cannot use the 
Convention to appeal to British courts when their rights are infringed. They 
can appeal to the European Court, but only after they have tried and failed to 
find remedies in the British court (Coxall and Robins, 1994:327-8).
In general, the courts in Japan are said to be not so sympathetic to international 
conventions. Choe Chang-hwa, who was active on Koreans’ rights in Japan, recalled 
that he was advised to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee after he had tried all the court procedure in Japan. This was done 
finally in 1979 (Choe, 1995:54).
3.6 ‘Race’ vs kokuseki
Issues relating to the former empire subjects- Commonwealth citizens in the British 
case and Koreans and Taiwanese in the Japanese case, are often described and 
conceptualised as 'race' in Britain and as 'nationality' (kokuseki) in Japan 
respectively, as we saw in the discussion on 'nationality' of Britain and Japan in the 
previous chapter. With regard to the 'race vs kokuseki' perspective, Neveu (1989) 
points to a similar comparative perspective between France and Britain. She 
considers that the experience of maintaining an empire affects the issue of citizenship 
and nationality in France and Britain. She argues that they ‘have built such 
considerable empires overseas and for which those empires played a very important
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role for their societies at large, reaching all parts of the population and giving birth 
to specific ideologies and policies (p.6), that this also influences the two countries 
afterwards. Neveu describes two indicators of difference between Britain and 
France, namely, ‘immigration rules and the legal rights available to ethnic minorities’ 
and ‘the way relationships were to be built with them’ (p.7), in other words, 
ideology and institution. In the British case, 'the fact that ethnic minorities from the 
Commonwealth enjoy civil rights in Britain is due directly to the existence of the 
category of ‘British Subject' (p.7) on the one hand, while on the other, to ‘the 
development of the use of such terms as ‘black' and ‘white- to designate people’ or 
‘racialisation' (p.8). Neveu (1989:6, 8) points out that the reason for distinction by 
'race' largely depends on the fact that everyone (British or Commonwealth citizens) 
is (or was) given 'equality before the law', even though in practice, ‘it is not really 
taken into account' (Neveu, 1989:6). In the French case, at the institutional level, ‘in 
spite of some feeble attempts to integrate colonies into the mainstream political 
system, colonies and their inhabitants have always had a second-class status as far as 
citizenship was concerned" (p.7), and at the present ideological level, ‘the 
terminology used is not a racially connoted one, but one in terms of ‘French’ and 
'immigrants’, partly because 'the line was clearly drawn between those who were 
French nationals and had rights, and those who were not and had no rights’ (p.8). In 
this respect, the Japanese experience is similar to that of France, and similar points 
have been noted during comparisons between Japan and Britain.
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In his chapter called 'The attempt to integrate the Empire', Chen (1984:241) 
contends that Japan, as a late-industrialized and late-expanded empire, developed a 
'legal compromise between the British and French systems regarding relationships 
between the mainland and overseas territories’, and tried to accommodate the 
assimilationist style of France and the differentialist style of Britain. This has resulted 
in a gap between ‘consciousness’ and 'the institution'.
On the ideological level, Oguma (1995:364) highlights an interesting issue on the 
difference between western (colonial) thought and that of Japan, saying that there is 
no representation of the 'Other' in the case of Japan. Rather, within Japanese 
thought, 'the Japanese do not want to make the existence of the Other, who is 
different from them' (p.368) in their Japanisation. He bases his arguments on the fact 
that Japan extended into surrounding areas and colonised them, and these areas had 
a similar cultural and religious background and their people looked similar to the 
Japanese. Because of this, it was possible to see these colonized people, mainly 
Koreans and Taiwanese as 'members of the family', or as 'adopted members’ (p.372). 
Once the war ended, and the empire was dissolved, the line was drawn between 
those who were Japanese and those who were not, based on koseki (the house 
registration).
Therefore, in the Japanese case, with regard to the former empire subjects, a 
statement such as 'despite their former status as empire subjects...' makes sense and
has significance in the historic context to argue for the improvement of rights for 
these former empire subjects. Moreover, there was no 'equality before the law' 
before or after the Second World War with the Koreans and Taiwanese. In order to 
argue against their existing (legal) inequality, which is explained at present as the 
distinction between 'aliens' and 'nationals', the above statement is useful (for 
instance, Tanaka, 1974). In other words, the statement of 'racism' is not effective 
enough to argue against the present situation.
Furthermore, the application of the concept of 'race' has not paid enough attention 
to the difference between Japan and other countries. For instance, the application of 
'race''’ cannot explain well the difference between ’race’ which is visible, or need not 
to be contested, or ’race' which is invisible and needs to be contested to be 
recognised as a 'minority'. As far as these works are concerned, the emphasis is on 
the deconstruction of the myth of the Japanese 'race' or homogeneity (for instance, 
Armstrong. 1989, and Weiner ed., 1997). However, the critique of the myth of 
homogeneity starts as early as the late 1970s (such as Ubukata, 1979; Onuma, 
1986). In addition, application of ‘race’ issues to the Japanese context seems to be 
concentrated before the war (such as Abe, 1989; Weiner, 1994), and has not 
expanded to the 'post-war' period. But as Yoshino argues, on 'ideological discourse, 
there is clear division between pre-war and post-war' (Yoshino, 1992).
' Armstrong (1989); Weiner (199*1) on Koreans; Siddle (1996) on Ainu; De Vos and Wagatsuma (1966) 
on Burakumin. for instance.
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As the link between ‘racism and nationalism’ in the Japanese case is not similar 
compared with the British case, clearly there is a perspective which cannot be 
explored in 'race' discourse (Kasama, 1988). For instance, Howell (1996) admits that 
‘’Racism’ is not as serious a problem in Japan as it is elsewhere. Japanese society is 
in no immediate danger of collapsing under the weight of ethnic conflict, nor are 
minorities the targets of the sort of raw hatred and physical brutality seen so 
disturbingly throughout much of the world in recent years... it also reflects the fact 
that most minority individuals are not readily recognizable as such upon incidental 
contact’. However, significantly, ‘ethnic and racial discrimination is institutionally 
sanctioned to a degree in Japan that would be unacceptable in most western 
countries' (1996:185).
In Japan, groups such as Burakumin, Ainu, and Ryukyuans were incorporated as 
Japanese subjects in the same way as other ‘Japanese' after the modernisation period 
and kept their status as Japanese nationals. Because of this, at least from the 
Japanese government point of view, it is not easy to recognise these groups as 
'minorities', as mentioned before. Therefore, we can say that there are two types of 
groups in Japan. The first has to do with people who are ’equal before the law' but 
not in practice, that is Japanese, Ainu, Burakumin, Ryukyuans, and women. 
However, in case of Burakumin, there is debate about whether to 'preserve 
distinction' or to aim for complete assimilation within the mainstream. The situation 
for these groups is similar to groups who experience 'social discrimination' in
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Britain. The second type is excluded from the notion of 'equality before the law', and 
covers aliens including Koreans, the former empire subjects. In the latter case, 
discussion on the grounds of ’nationality’ in law makes sense, since the problem will 
depend on whether, or to what extent, this 'inequality' before the law is 'reasonable'.
Neary (1992) attempts to compare 'ethnic minority' issues in the United States, 
Japan, Britain and France. He contrasts 'immigrants' in Britain and France and ‘the 
former slave group' in the United States and 'Burakumin' in Japan. In relation to 
minority administration policy, he defines the first two countries as 'anti- 
discrimination' type, while the last two as 'affirmative action type', according to the 
nature of their legislation. Burakumin are not the focus of this study, and not all 
types of minorities fall into this classification (for instance, Koreans in Japan do not 
have 'affirmative action type' privilege and the Race Relations Act 1976 in Britain 
has only just been extended to Northern Ireland). Yet his indirect comparison of the 
'race-relations' issue in Britain with 'affirmative action' in Japan together with its 
constitutional reference is helpful for the framework. The idea of 'affirmative action' 
with relation to Burakumin in Japan is initially found in (Upham, 1987), in which he 
thinks the closest analogy of the programme for Burakumin are the programmes 
administered by the 'Bureau of Indian Affairs' in the United States.
Without specific anti-discrimination legislation, the Constitution (Article 14: equality 
before the law) is the general protection clause for equality in Japan. However, as
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will be explained, in relation to Koreans, the former empire subjects, this clause is 
not automatically applicable, as 'nationality' is not included in the clause itself.
In the case of Britain, with relation to the Race Relations Act, a statute law, Lester 
and Bindman (1972) argue that common law does not provide enough protection 
for equality before the law, and that the Race Relations Act was a positive attempt 
to change this situation. 'The Race Relations Act was a significant step in that 
direction - an attempt to influence social behaviour and attitudes by a statutory 
declaration that everyone in Britain was henceforth to be treated on the basis of 
individual merit, irrespective of colour or race, and to provide an effective legal 
remedy for the most unfair and degrading types of discrimination’ (ibid., p.15). They 
regard the concept of equality before the law as also being limited by common law.
As a result of colonialism and also in order to justify it. some British writers 
developed 'the concept of ''race" into racist theory', and 'it purported to offer an 
explanation of and justification for the subordination of blacks by whites in terms of 
those origins' (Mason, 1986:95-6). A pioneer of British 'race' issues, Banton (1977) 
argues that 'racial doctrine' was formulated in the 1850s, when 'the growing and the 
rather diverse utilization of the race[sic] idea has to be set against the whole social 
background of Victorian England' (p. 169). He places emphasis on the 'significance 
of psychological and cultural determinants of racial 'visibility' (1967:368), saying that 
'British colour values have been heavily influenced by the country's imperial
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experience, post-war immigration has occurred in an era of decolonisation when 
people have been much more conscious than before of the international implications 
of racial issues' (ibid., p.368) and that the 'implications of racial difference cannot be 
disentangled from the aspects that stem from the newcomers' handicaps and 
reception as immigrants' (ibid.,). However, historian Rich (1986) is rather cautious 
regarding the influence of imperialism on the post-war 'immigration/racial' issue. He 
argues that while it is possible to establish some continuity both in imperial ideas and 
policy in the field of ‘race’ and colonial development, the tradition was by no means 
absolute (1986:10). He does not, however, completely deny the effect of Victorian 
thought.
In the critique of 'new racism', which relates to immigration issues after the 1970s, 
Miles (1989) explains the difference between 'nationalism' and 'racism', as lying ‘in 
between the former's additional claim that the 'nation' can only express itself 
historically where it occupies exclusively a given territory wherein the 'people' can 
govern themselves. No similar political project is explicit in the ideology of racism' 
(p.89). In the case of Europe, 'the discourse of Europeans to define an Other beyond 
the boundary of Europe as biologically inferior was first used by certain political 
forces within Europe to differentiate populations, to constitute Self and Other 
dialectically as separate nations'...(p.l 13). By understanding 'racism' broadly, he 
points out the utility of the concept as well as a danger that everything can be 
conceptualized as 'racism'.
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3.7 The role o f courts
Courts and legal systems are consistently given the least attention by introductory 
texts and comparative studies of political science in Britain. However, within legal 
studies, the neutrality of law is presupposed and these tend to focus on mere law- 
interpretation (Fitzpatrick and Hunt eds., 1987). For instance, in Hague, Harrop and 
Breslin (1992) out of more than 400 pages on "comparative government and 
politics", only 6 pages are about the judiciary. Mahler (1995:128) admits that courts 
maybe the most system specific, by which he means the most unique institutions in a 
country, and the generalizibility is therefore low, since in many political systems, 
courts are excluded from the political arena. Even a political scientist deplores the 
distinction between legal and political studies in Britain, and suggests browsing 
among those journals classified as legal' (Drewry, 1991).
Nevertheless, the role of the courts is important for maintaining individuals' rights, 
resolving conflicts between different institutions or levels of government, and what 
is more, for judicial review - 'ruling on whether specific laws are constitutional' 
(Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1992:282). Due to its tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty, British judges cannot decide that legislation is unconstitutional like in 
other countries. Rights are secured, at least in theory, through the representation of 
interest in a democratic parliament, elected by universal suffrage (Meehan, 1993:38). 
Yet, judicial review offers remedies for individuals.
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Judicial intervention in Britain has been subject to greater scrutiny recently, with a 
positive change being noted (Mahler, 1995:136). Judicial review, however, is most 
influential in some other countries, including the US and Japan, with respect to 
certain minority groups, who lack electoral strength and also find it more profitable 
to resort to litigation rather than legislation (Ehermann, 1976:10). However, there 
is also the case that when litigation goes to the upper part of the court structure, 
judges limit themselves and are reluctant to intervene in the work of administration. 
Furthermore, both Britain and Japan are centralised states, which 'concentrates 
power in either the legislative's hands or the executives' and so 'the broader the 
range of governmental intervention, the more numerous the occasions in which 
disputes between citizens and government arise...the more disputes involve 
governmental agencies, the greater the potential involvement of courts or court­
like tribunals in the political arena’ (Jacob et al., 1996:9).
3.8 Impact on public policy
In order to analyse case laws, this study will incorporate literature on the impact 
upon public policy. In the area of public policy, comparison can help to expand 
policy options and give clues about what might work elsewhere (Harrop ed., 
1992:4). The merit of learning comparative public policy is that ‘it illuminates the 
various and subtle ways in which politics works to produce choices of a collective 
and social nature’ (Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1990:2). There are good
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comparative studies between Britain and the United States on immigration 
(Legomsky. 1987), and racial discrimination in the UK (Lustgarten, 1980) seen from 
a legal perspective. On politics and law, although not comparative studies, there are 
some good examples for analysing court cases. Meehan (1993) investigates 
European citizenship by court decisions as well as legal documents. Griffith (1991) 
explores the relationship of judges and politics by citing judges' statements of court 
cases.
In the literature, it seems that the role of courts is represented in two ways: the first 
approach regards courts as an integral part of government, and the second regards 
courts as marginal to governmental structures, the court as 'legal institution’ as 
distinct from 'political institution' (Wasby, 1970:16). Being politically neutral, for 
example, the court is able to arbitrate in political disputes. In the former case, 
consideration or analysis of impact is concentrated in the decision of court rulings 
while in the latter case, the effect of court rulings depends on other governmental 
bodies such as the legislative and the administrative (Grant, 1995).
Literature on the 'impact of public policy' is found in pressure group politics and also 
in some aspects of public law and the sociology of law. A pressure group is roughly 
defined as 'an organisation which seeks as one of its functions to influence the 
formulation and implementation of public policy. Such public policy represents a set 
of administrative decisions taken by the executive, the legislative, the judiciary, and
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by the local government and the European Union' (Grant. 1995:9). Within the 
literature on pressure group politics, traditionally most research is from the United 
States while the British contribution towards this area, is less significant (Jacob et 
al., 1996). Scheingold (1974), in the context of the United States in the early 1970s, 
points out that litigation as a pressure group activity has only limited effect. In 
addition, pressure politics concentrates on pressures on the legislative and the 
administrative, and in most literature, the judiciary is considered as too unimportant 
in the power making process to be a target for pressure group activities (Allum, 
1995:248).
In the case of Japan, Upham (1987) considers the impact of group litigation for 
social change including the areas of discrimination against minorities. He argues that 
litigation plays important role for social change in Japan, but also argues that 
'bureaucratic informalism' (ibid., p22) the way which the Japanese government deals 
with important social change when it faces a problem. Rikumoto (1991) agrees with 
his view. Apart from that, there is a good report by Kobayashi (1996) who himself 
supported an HIV court action (yakugai aids sosho) with the help of the media.
There are, however, a number of problems in applying these methods. Firstly, it is 
difficult to measure impact (Grant, 1995, Wasby, 1970), although some of this could 
be measured by interviewing those involved in disputes. Secondly, specifying 
'groups' as representatives sometimes causes difficulty. For instance, in this study,
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the fieldwork chapters dealt with 'individual status for one chapter and with 
'entitlements', which are more like group rights for the other chapter. It is also the 
case that the researcher may 'either theorise at a level so general for application or 
theorises produced are a form of premature generalisation' (Lustgarten, 1980:xi). 
Discussions on group actions are difficult to maintain in this case, since it does not 
focus on groups, but on the broad category of 'the former empire subjects’, and in 
the section of patriality, the targeted law suits are more individual-based, which 
makes it difficult to categorise them as a group. Moreover, in addition to the limited 
effect of courts, there are already many negative results reported for the court case 
strategy, in particular within British contexts. In Britain, especially in the social 
securities and immigration cases, going to court does not help improve the situation. 
As Prosser (1983) says: 'The most important problem in bringing British test cases, 
particularly in the field of homelesses and supplementary benefits where a case 
which might have created a precedent unfavourable to the administration could be 
neatly headed off by giving the individual affected accommodation, so preventing 
any more general effects' (p. 10). There are also key differences between Britain and 
Japan in legal and governmental structures, as we saw earlier.
For this study, the area of public policy focused on in Japan should be internal 
control, while in the UK, the corresponding part of public policy should be 
immigration policy, where the issue is whether to accept immigrants as future
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citizens. There are also different styles of post-colonial administration, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, and parliamentary sovereignty vs separation of powers.
It would appear that there are more differences than similarities prevailing in the 
context of this study. Whilst dependent on the level of analysis, similarities found 
above and in previous chapters, relate more to ideological and historical issues. In 
this section, the differences found relate more to institutional/systematic issues. As 
the main chapters focus on the impact of politics, it is more appropriate to adopt a 
flexible approach and search for 'contrast' between the areas of study.
3.9 Translation note
In discussing comparative studies, Jones (1985:7) argues that no one comes 'culture- 
free' to comparative studies and we need to decide whether 'to ask our own' or 
‘other people’s questions'. The framework here is set from the Japanese perspective, 
which places a strong emphasis on 'kokusekf (nationality) as a legal concept. 
Although Jones (ibid.,) refers to the context of 'social' policy exclusively, as a frame 
of reference, there are methodological issues to be considered on this, as 'cultural 
factors deriving from varying histories are extraordinary difficult to 
manipulate'(Lipset, 1994:210). In this study, I will ‘ask my own questions’, 
therefore, the comparison perspective is to analyze the British situation from the 
Japanese perspective, rather than applying a British viewpoint to the Japanese 
situation.
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One of the problems here is that there may be limitations in applying the Japanese 
perspective to the British context, as there may be issues which are difficult to 
explain clearly. For instance, 'racial' issues are not significant nor theoretical issue in 
Japan compared with the British context. Nonetheless, applying the Japanese 
perspective to the British case is worthwhile. It will offer a different comparative 
perspective and help bridge the gap where the British perspective is inadequate, and 
therefore, contribute to mutual understanding between Britain and Japan.
Secondly, regarding the target of comparative study as well as the positions of the 
researcher and researched, as Ota (1994) points out, we need to clarify whether we 
are 'critiquing Japanese society or western discourse on such construction’. In the 
former case, my main materials on Japan, for comparative purposes will be ones 
written and spoken in Japanese. Therefore, in order to ’compare British and 
Japanese issues in 'English', I regard translation as an important part of my 
methodological problem. Translation involves 'the transfer of 'meaning' with a 'whole 
set of extra-linguistic criteria' (Bassnett, 1980:14). Firstly, the context between these 
two countries is quite different compared with the comparative studies within 
European countries. We need to compare relationships and change over time within 
and across systems and to seek out theoretical equivalence in comparing the 
behaviour of whole system (Teune, 1990:54). There are different kinds of 
equivalences namely:
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-the lexical meaning of words 
-the syntactical content of words 
-the availability of translated words
-the cultural context of words, all of which can be divided as 'functional' and 
'formal; equivalence (Marsh, 1967:272-3).
For instance, a pair of (counterpart) words with surrounding connotation has 
similarity and dissimilarity between two languages (Uchida. 1977:16). Bearing this 
in mind, I need to harmonises the translation of words as much as I can. It is not a 
matter of wrong or right specifically, but to what extent is it wrong or right. 
Secondly, there is a contextual problem. It is a difficult task to keep the sharpness of 
the concept as well as keeping the specific contextual connotation (Uchida, 
1977:35). Moreover, not all words in a language are translatable into another 
language. We need to compromise somewhere to make the translation meaningful 
and comparable in English, as well as to create 'unnatural' English to retain the 
Japanese connotation (Inoue, 1990).
Therefore, I shall keep the definition of the concept as simple as possible, and try to 
show the Japanese corresponding word with possible synonyms. In addition, I shall 
look at Japanese documents as much as English documents written on Japan, in 
order to avoid variation of meanings, and in the case of English materials on Japan,
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be conscious of the difference of translation of Japanese to English and where 
necessary, show my own alternative translation.
In comparative studies, the way we choose the relevant variables is also an 
important methodological problem, in addition to data collection. In order to make 
simple comparisons, I will consider variables as 'differences' between the two 
countries. In this case, variables are based on contract/communitarian tradition, 
variations in Continental and common law, and historical experience. In the area 
under study here, all three variables, relating to culture, the application of the law 
and historical experience will have an effect direct or indirect on nationality and 
citizenship.
3.10 Method in practice
The following four research chapters explore two kinds of topics, ‘rights and 
residence', and ’patriality' in Britain and Japan. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the ‘rights and residence' chapters correspond to the examples of separating 
the concepts of citizenship and nationality, while the ‘patriality’ chapters set out to 
connect the two concepts.
In the ‘rights and residence' chapters, I shall discuss to what extent the status of 
permanent residence is stable in Britain and Japan, and assess the criteria of 
entitlement to rights. In the ‘patriality’ chapters I shall discuss what kind of rights or
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privileges are attached to the 'right of descent’. This framework comes from what is 
called 'the function of nationality’ (kinoutcki kokuseki) in Japanese. This divides 
‘functions of nationality' between its function as a criteria entitling various rights 
and its function as entitling state membership or citizenship itself (Onuma, 1979b, 
1985, Kidana. 1996). This method of distinction is shared by other Japanese authors 
(such as Tanaka, 1974, Kondo, 1996a). There are two premises for this approach. 
First, there is a clear distinction between the statuses of aliens and citizens. Second, 
having citizenship status in the Japanese case, 'Japanese nationality' is important as 
an entitlement to rights and duties. This is not necessarily true in the British case.
In the British case, it would be difficult to use a clear-cut distinction between 'alien' 
and 'national'. For instance, the object of external control (immigration) and the 
object of internal control (alien registration) does not coincide. Furthermore one of 
the crucial differences between Britain and Japan is that in the latter case, most of 
the former empire subjects in question are already resident in Japan and became the 
target of alien registration/immigration control; in the British case, the former 
empire subjects were domiciled outside the British Isles. However, it is also true that 
immigration and nationality issues are strongly connected in the British case.
The research techniques I shall use are secondary sources (library work) such as 
books and official publications, and some primary sources such as law reports, news 
paper archives, and some supplementary interviews by those who are active in
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disputes or specialist academics where possible. In order to select similar cases 
between two countries, the style is likely to be similar to ‘case studies’. In the 
following, I shall examine the use of law reports and how to select or match similar 
cases in particular.
There are useful frames of reference on impact analysis by Wasby (1970), who 
divides areas into; the legal systems and political culture, the power of interest 
groups, and court and communication (media reports) (p.58). This study will 
examine the last two sources in particular. On case selection, the study will refer to 
the criteria set by Legomsky:
...whether the issues were reasonably susceptible to differing solutions, 
whether the language of the opinion reveals useful information, whether the 
decision is representative or aberrational, and whether the problems posed by 
the various cases are sufficiently similar to permit the spotting of patterns 
(1987:8).
As I mentioned above, my contrasting perspective is set out from the Japanese 
perspective and I shall bring it into the British context. Firstly, on the Japanese part, 
I consulted publications on 'aliens' in Japan and their legal status. There, I listed the 
most important and relevant cases regarding Koreans and other former empire 
subjects. Then I collected some information about those cases from authoritative 
digest such as; Jurisuto. for the up-date and short-note information, Horitsu Jiho 
(Japanese monthly legal periodicals), and law reports such as Hanrei Jiho, and 
Hanrei Taimuzu (hereafter, Hanji, Hanta), as well as newspapers, and whenever
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possible, obtain first hand materials and information from some lawyers involved and 
academics.
For the British case. I also consulted literature on immigration and nationality issues 
first, then identified important cases. I then collected information about those often- 
cited or well-known cases from law reports, newspapers and periodicals, and at the 
same time, some official publications. Regarding the characteristics of ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty' of Britain, 1 referred to parliamentary debates which was not 
necessarily the case in the Japanese context, in order to provide a better 
understanding of Britain.
3.11 Summary
This chapter has discussed comparative methods and methodology. It explored 
comparative studies in general, comparison of Britain and Japan and then examined 
similarities and difference between Japan and Britain within the literature related to 
this field. Given a number of similarities and differences, it then considered whether 
comparative methods could be applied in a strict sense, or as a more flexible 
methodological approach. The similarities can be found in historical and ideological 
issues, while the differences are found at an institutional level. While there are a 
number of works which include chapters on Britain and Japan respectively regarding 
a topic, not many consider the comparative method. In this case, it is not possible to 
attempt to establish scientific/proper comparison, due to the many differences in
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institutional/organizationa! levels. However, as the focus is about impact on public 
policy by the minority litigations, it will set out to contrast the effect or style of 
influence which emerged in both countries.
This chapter also examined methodological issues such as the limitation of scope 
and problems of translation which are related to these comparative studies. Finally, it 
noted that in adopting the style of comparing ‘case studies', there may be some bias 
in selecting and matching ‘similar' issues. Wherever necessary, the study will 
provide an explanation as to why it is appropriate to compare and contrast the 
evidence selected.
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Chapter 4 : Rights and residence - Britain
4.1 Introduction
In the following four chapters, I shall explore case studies for Britain and Japan 
in order to compare the issues relating to citizenship and nationality. In this 
chapter, a couple of themes will be explored. They are: the meaning and 
significance of ‘nationality’ in the British context, immigration status as a major 
criterion for entitlement to rights and residence, so as to compare with the 
Japanese situation, as well as examining the significance of the concept of ‘race’ 
in the British context.
In addition, the meaning and function of nationality in both countries, together 
with the stability of the status of permanent residence will be examined. As the 
focus of this study is on the former empire subjects - in Japan, they are treated as 
‘aliens’ altogether, while in Britain, although they have citizenship, because of 
discrimination, they are treated as ‘second-class’ citizens. Thus, it is not easy to 
make a precise comparison between the legal or formal status and the actual 
situation in Britain and Japan; it is more effective to explore what kind of rights 
and duties exist in these countries which depend on a residence criterion, and to 
explore which groups of people are affected by them, and the implications of this 
situation.
This chapter thus explores issues of ‘rights and residence’ in Britain and is in two 
parts. Firstly, it examines the meaning and function of the term ‘nationality’ in
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Britain in particular, as indicated by an analysis of domestic legislation, and 
whether nationality in Britain is linked with rights and duties. In Britain, it is said 
that ‘civic privileges do not stem directly from the law of nationality’ 
(Cmnd.6795, 1977:22), but from the status of being a British subject. In 
addition, with reference to the existence of different ethnicity or nationalities 
within Britain, the meaning of ‘nationality’ is often strongly linked to the idea of 
'race' rather than to ‘citizenship’. Nevertheless, it is beneficial to discuss the 
meaning of ‘nationality’ within Britain, as this term sometimes plays a role of 
exclusion, and it will help provide a good comparison with the Japanese case, 
where the 'functions of nationality’ or linkage between nationality as a status and 
entitlement of rights has been quite a significant issue, as we shall see later.
Secondly, this chapter briefly considers the status of ‘settlement’ in comparison 
with the 'alien' status in Japan. As the status of permanent residence is both 
stabilised and has substance in the British case, the emphasis will be mainly on 
the comparative points with the Japanese case. Also considered are the kind of 
criteria that are linked to the entitlement of rights in Britain. The examples taken 
here are ‘political rights', namely the right to hold public office, voting rights in 
elections etc. and ‘social rights’, social benefits and other entitlements which are 
also explored in the following chapter on Japan.
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4.2 Nationality rules
First of all. let us start by exploring the issue of nationality rules which exist in 
the recruitment for the civil service, and which seem to have a similar criteria to 
the recruitment and selection of public servants in Japan.
’Nationality rules’ can be found in the published Civil Service Commissioner's 
reports, within the General Regulations under the Order in Council from time to 
time when they are revised. The historical circumstances around nationality rules 
during and just after the war are well explored by Harris (1991), in particular, the 
question of to what extent the idea of nationality rules is close to the idea of 
‘race’. According to the Order in Council (1920), which made a ‘nationality rule’ 
in order to clarify the eligibility of becoming civil servants after the British 
Nationality and Aliens Status Act (1914), ’every candidate must a)be a natural- 
bom British subject, b)have been bom within the UK or within one of the self- 
governing Dominions, to parents both of whom were also bom within the UK or 
one of the self-governing Dominions’. Before and during the Second World War, 
only the service departments and the Foreign Office required both parents to be 
natural bom British subjects while other departments only required one parent to 
qualify. At that time, the Dominions were predominantly the white dominions of 
South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. However, during the war, 
this rule was gradually relaxed. After 1940, aliens were permitted to take 
temporary positions as technicians and scientists (T215/709, 19/10/1946), and 
there were two revisions of this rule in 1944 and 1946, so that in 1946, 
‘naturalised British Citizens may...be appointed to permanent appointments in the
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Civil Service on the same terms as other British subjects....except for 
appointments to the Foreign Service, Admiralty, War Office, Air ministry or 
Ministry of Supply...’(T215/709, 19/10/1946) which also applied to non-whites 
resident and bom in Britain.
Following the end of the Second World War, some problems arose with the 
nationality rule. For the enactment of the 1948 British Nationality Act, the 
nationality rule had to be relaxed. Colonies like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
became independent and joined the Dominions. Some of those working in civil 
service positions in these countries wanted to gain similar work in civil service in 
Britain. Among those, there were ‘Anglo-Indians with British Nationality, who 
had been recruited to the Indian civil service’, or 'Indian and Pakistani candidates 
who sought to enter the civil service posts by competition in Britain' (Harris, 
1991: 6-7).
According to Harris (1991), the contradictory factors at play were the need to 
keep India and Pakistan within the western or within the Commonwealth circle, 
as they insisted on equal treatment (p.7) while some departments did not want to 
have a rapid increase of coloured civil servants within Britain. For instance, the 
service departments argued against the appointment of ‘citizens of India or 
Pakistan’, because of their 'the conflict of loyalties’ (T215/710, 7/1/1949).
An interesting point for the comparison with Japan is that the qualification of 
wives for those serving in the Foreign Office at this time, required the service to
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‘veto ‘unsuitable- wives because they regarded the representational side of 
diplomatic work as a man-and-wife job’ (E.6869/8, T215/709, 9/10/1945). In 
Japan, until very recently, those employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
to have a 'Japanese spouse’, so that for instance, when a prospective wife was a 
non-Japanese, either she was asked to naturalise or he had to resign the job. 
Perhaps the idea of this ‘Japanese spouse’ rule may come from the similar idea of 
the 'man-and-wife' job in Britain, though in the latter case, this was the position 
before and just after the war.
While waiting for the 1948 Act, the revised regulations included the nationality 
rule published in September 1947. It referred specifically to candidates for the 
Foreign Office and service departments that they should be natural-bom British 
subjects and bom within the United Kingdom or in one of the self-governing 
Dominions, of parents also bom likewise - except with justifiable circumstances.
Since the nationality rules had been published, the rules were clear. There were, 
however, several ways of practising indirect discrimination. As for instance, ‘any 
overt discrimination against Indians or Pakistanis might cause great political 
embarrassment and might well be unacceptable. We feel that much the simplest 
solution would be to prevent the appointment of ‘natives' of India or Pakistan to 
the Admiralty by covert administrative action...’ (CSC 5/918, quoted in Harris, 
1991:7). The Civil Service Commissioners ‘should preserve their [i.e. the Civil 
Service Commissioners’] impartiality (and their reputation for impartiality) in 
selection to public appointments on the question of colour no less than those of
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politics or religion.' (CSC 27453/49, 25/10/1951 in DO 35/2593). It was also a 
matter of giving the appearance of consistency with the 1948 British Nationality 
Act and the nationality rule, relating to equal citizenship of Britain and the 
Colonies and the Commonwealth, while in practice attempting to exclude some 
of those.
In time, the nationality rule changed the form of discrimination from that on the 
grounds of 'citizenship' to the grounds of ‘race’. As Harris (1991:10) argues, 
‘the shift from de jure to de facto discrimination had now been achieved through 
'the mystic link between colour and security” .
The case was quite different from that in Japan, where the concern for loyalty 
had great importance because of the threat of communism and the need to 
maintain the integrity of the regime just after the war. The pressure for 
naturalisation for those who 'recovered' their original nationality was 
encouraged by the nationality criterion not only for civil sendee entrants but also 
in the many entitlements of rights. As we shall see later, however, the civil 
service ‘nationality criterion' in Japan was created after it lost the war. In Britain, 
concern for loyalty was of minor significance, compared to the issue of race (for 
instance, T215/710, 7/1/1949, and C0886/82/71794/110772). In the case of 
Japan, due to its assimilation policy, there were Taiwanese and Koreans in the 
civil service at the end of the war, but when Japan restored sovereignty, they 
were asked to 'naturalise' if they wanted to keep their positions. In Japan, the de
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jure discrimination factor is still predominant over the de facto discrimination, 
while in the case of Britain, it seems it is the opposite.
In the 1983 Civil Service Commissioner’s report, advertisement of recruits 
declared that the Civil Service is an ‘equal opportunities employer’ (1983:13). 
After the 1968 Race Relations Act, the government formally adopted the policy 
of equal opportunity, the report specifically mentions the promotion of the 
recruitment of ethnic minorities in 1986 (1986:7). In 1991, some posts within the 
civil service were opened to EC nationals in line with the Article 48 of the Treaty 
of Rome.
With regard to political rights in Britain, these entitlements are linked to the 
status of British subject, and these have not been significantly changed even after 
de-colonisation or restrictive immigration and citizenship law enforcement. It is 
worth looking briefly at the ‘nationality’ criterion after the 1981 British 
Nationality Act in the following. The White paper (Cmnd.7987, 22/7/1980) says 
that 'establishing a British citizenship will make available a ready definition by 
which those duties and entitlements may be defined in the future. It would not 
necessarily follow that these would always be attached to the holding of British 
citizenship, there might be instances in which the present wider definition would 
remain desirable' (Section 110). Following the enactment of the 1981 British 
Nationality Act, are there any entitlements linked to the status of ‘British 
citizen’? Nicol (1993) cites three areas where nationality in the British context
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matters: 'immigration control, eligibility for jury service and government 
positions'.
In the case of the diplomatic services, it is explicitly stated in the nationality rules 
after January 1983 that a candidate has to be a British citizen. In the case of the 
right to vote, the Representation of the People Act 1983 maintains the existing 
rights of Irish and Commonwealth citizens (i.e. former British subjects) after the 
promulgation of the 1981 Act:
‘we feel that there is an important distinction to be made between preserving 
the existing rights of Irish and Commonwealth citizens, which arise out of the 
historic links between their countries and our own, and conferring new rights 
on those who have never been regarded as British subjects... we do not think 
it is unreasonable to insist that, if they wish to enjoy all the rights and 
privileges afforded to British subjects, they should still be required to apply 
for naturalisation' (HC32-I, 1982-3, quoted in Lardy, 1997:79).
The newly created right to register for overseas voting which was effected in 
1985, is limited to British citizens (Lardy, 1997:79). Until this time, overseas 
voting was limited to 'service voters', who were members of ‘the armed forces 
and their spouses, Crown servants mainly in diplomatic services, and employees 
of the British Council and their spouses’ (Tether, 1994). Another area in which 
the status of British citizen matters, is the right of free movement, and the right 
to look for a work in the European Union.
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The status of British citizen is significant in a few areas, but not many. In 
addition, existing rights are reserved in political rights. This stance is quite 
different from that of the Japanese government position, as it removed voting 
rights and eligibility from the former empire subjects just after the war, and has 
maintained this position ever since.
4.3 Race relations and nationality
In this section, we will examine the importance of 'nationality' in other areas. We 
will examine one court case which discusses the definition of national origin or 
nationality. It clarified whether ‘national origin' in the previous 1968 Race 
Relations Act includes 'nationality' in the sense of 'citizenship' or not. 
Furthermore, this 'Ealing' case [1972] AC 342 has been frequently mentioned by 
Japanese authors when comparing 'nationality discrimination issues’ in Britain 
with those of Japan, so that it is worth consideration here.
Mr. Zesko was a Polish national who came to Britain in 1939, joined the Polish 
Air Force and fought in the Second World War. Since then, he has lived in 
Britain. Later, he married a Polish woman, and they had lived together in the 
Borough of Ealing for 14 years. He submitted a housing application to the 
council in 1966 and again in 1968, but his name was not transferred from the 
register to the housing waiting list, as rules for transfer from the register to the 
housing waiting list stated that ‘an applicant must be a British subject within the 
meaning of the British Nationality Act 1948'. Through the association of Polish 
Air Force Veterans, he was notified that his application was rejected, as he was
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not a British subject. The association complained to the then Race Relations 
Board, and the RRB considered that Ealing Council ‘had unlawfully 
discriminated against him on the ground of his “ national origin” , which was 
prohibited in the 1968 Race Relations Act section 1 (1). The council disagreed 
and sought judicial review (ibid.,).
One of the points presented in the Ealing case is whether the terms ‘national 
origin’ in the 1968 Act section 1 (1) includes the meaning of ‘nationality’ in the 
sense of citizenship or not, as the rule restricted the waiting list for council 
housing to British subjects. The judgement of the court was that ‘the council is 
not discriminating against such foreign nationals ‘on grounds of their national 
origins' (ibid., 1972:367) and that it should 'be recognised that ‘nationality’ and 
‘national origins' do not have the same meaning’ (op.cit., 1972:360). As Griffith 
(1991:171) argues, this approach was quite ‘linguistic and formalistic'. During 
the proceedings, he made an application for naturalisation as a British subject, 
and was successful. In this case, if the appeal had been dismissed, Mr. Zesko’s 
application will have to have been treated as if 'he had been put on the waiting 
list when he first applied' (p.355), rather than when he was naturalised. 
However, Mr. Zesko lost his case. In order for him to qualify for a council 
house, he would have to become a British subject. This is an unusual case in 
Britain, for many social welfare entitlements, permanent residence is all that is 
required.
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Two points are indicated by Hucker (1975) on the Zesko case. In his view, it 
shows that:
'an insistence on possession of British nationality as a pre-condition would, if 
generally adopted, exclude from council housing a significant class of persons - 
non-British immigrants who had retained their alien status. The fact that other, 
more germane, criteria might have highlighted an entitlement to such 
accommodation among many members of this group was ignored by judicial 
recourse to formalistic techniques of statutory construction, which obscured 
rather than illuminated the social dimensions of the issue presented’ (p.299).
Hucker also states that 'it is difficult to see why the functionally irrelevant 
criterion of nationality should have operated per se to exclude a particular group 
from access to a basic commodity. In particular, is this the case when the 
disqualification was imposed at the municipal level by an authority whose 
familiarity with the policies underlying nationality laws was likely to be peripheral 
at best' (1975:303). In comparison with Japan, these two remarks suggest the 
following one, that nationality as a criterion in domestic legislation is generally 
irrelevant in Britain, and two that, 'aliens' in the sense of British legislation 
always means non-British subjects, which is quite different from that of Japan, 
where 'aliens' include the former Japanese subjects of Koreans and Taiwanese.
In the context of comparison with Japan, Ogawa (1978a) cites the Zesko case 
and compares it with the case of Mr Shiomi, a naturalised Japanese, who claimed 
the national pension, but was refused because of two nationality criteria, which
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state that firstly, a claimant ‘must be a Japanese national at the time when the 
necessity of pension arose, and secondly, ‘when s/he receives it’. Although the 
restrictions on the grounds of ‘nationality’ had existed both in Britain and Japan, 
in the Japanese case, the restriction was further tightened up by including the 
criterion of nationality ‘at the time when the necessity arose’, which was hard 
enough for the newly-naturalised, and impossible for long-standing ‘formerly, 
resident aliens'. Yet at the same time, as Ogawa (1978a:258) concludes, the 
equal protection of social rights should have been considered for aliens as well as 
Japanese nationals, particularly when those Koreans in Japan as well as other 
aliens in Japan are assimilated into Japanese society.
In the 1975 White Paper (Cmnd.6234) Racial Discrimination, this restrictive 
definition of ‘nationality’ was taken into consideration and it proposed to the 
inclusion of ‘unlawful discrimination’ that was conducted on the grounds of 
nationality and citizenship (col.57). It gave the reasons as:
'it is not unlawful to discriminate against someone because he is an Indian 
national but it is unlawful to discriminate against him because he is of Indian 
national origins (i.e. of Indian descent). It is contrary to the Treaty of Rome 
to discriminate against an EEC worker or his family on the basis of 
nationality. It is unclear to what extent the courts would regard a person’s 
place of birth as constituting his national origins. Moreover, the distinction 
between nationality and national origins creates obvious pretext for 
discriminating on racial grounds' (1975:col57).
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At the same time, it made clear that ‘there will be appropriate exceptions where a 
person's nationality or citizenship is a justifiable ground for consideration’ 
(ibid.). The 1976 Race Relations Act includes the term ’nationality’ in the 
definitions of ‘racial grounds' and ‘racial group' (Section 3 (D), and provides the 
definition of 'nationality' in Section 78 (1) as including citizenship but maintains 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality or citizenship with justifiable 
reasons.
One of the exceptions placed on the extent of the effect of the 1976 Act is that in 
which ‘discrimination on the basis of that other’s nationality or place of ordinary 
residence or the length of time for which he has been present or resident in or 
outside the United Kingdom or an area within the United Kingdom', is related to 
the acts concerning a minister of the Crown’ (Section 41 (2). Immigration status 
has been an important condition, in practice, for the application of Race 
Relations Act.
As we saw above, ‘nationality’ in Britain cannot be a crucial or restrictive 
criterion by itself most of the time. However, what about other criteria such as 
residence? Or on what occasions, will nationality and ordinary residence help to 
clarify other qualifications for entitlements? In the following, we shall turn to the 
immigration issue, and see when it, in particular the 1971 Immigration Act, has 
had a combined effect on civic entitlements and privileges.
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4 .4  Immigration and rights
Before we start looking at the relation between rights and residence in Britain, it 
is helpful to look first at the importance of the 1971 Immigration Act. First, by 
the creation of ‘patriality’ status, it made clear who was free to enter and those 
who were subject to immigration control, depending on their connection with 
Britain, in particular, their descents and residence. In the 1971 Act, immigration 
status and qualification to entitlements began to be linked, since it imposed some 
restriction to entitlements on those who were not free to enter, depending on the 
stability of their immigration status, even when these people were not aliens.
In the 1971 Act, apart from the most important ‘patriality’ clause, it added 
specific meaning to the question of residence within the UK. In the text originally 
enforced, it said: '... references to a person being settled in the UK and Islands 
are references to his being ordinarily resident there without being subject under 
the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which he may remain' 
(Section 2-3-d, later as Section 33-2A). Here, ordinary residence is defined as 
‘settled’, or without any immigration restrictions (or) specific provisions of 
immigration regulations. Moreover, there must not have been a breach of 
immigration laws at anytime prior to registration (Section 33-2), for instance, in 
the case of Marqueritte[1983] QB 180 :’when the words of ordinary residence 
were first used in the 1948 Act, there were no such persons in existence such as 
‘illegal entrants’ or ‘overstayers’. Il
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As the issue of 'the right of abode' or patriality will be the topic in the following 
chapters, I shall concentrate on the aspect of the relationship between 
immigration control and rights. In general, social security regulations have a 
strong correlation with the criterion of 'residence' as well as immigration status, 
since the source of these welfare benefits comes from the taxpayers’ 
contributions. In Britain, regarding immigration status, the most important 
criteria is the right of abode, rather than ‘nationality’. While private relationships 
within the UK depends on ‘domicile’, such as marriage or inheritance, on the 
other hand, ordinarily residence is an important criterion for social benefits 
qualification, where s/he stays within the UK. But this ordinary residence has 
different meaning in the different statutes. In relation to immigration status and 
social benefits entitlement, two concepts are said to be formally important: 
‘public funds' and ‘ordinary residence’ (Takegawa, 1991:192). The former 
concept relates condition of asking social benefits to a requirement of 
immigration control, while the latter concept is a criterion for receiving social 
benefits.
According to Gordon and Newnham (1985:6), immigration control which firstly 
aims to prevent immigrants from accessing social benefits goes back to the 
introduction of the 1905 Aliens Act. The Act, responded to the mass inflow of 
Jews from Russia in the 1880s and 1890s, by making it clear that 'the intention 
was to allow aliens to come to Britain to work, but that if they became a burden 
on the rates or on relief from the local parish, they should leave’ (ibid., p5). In 
the 1919 Alien Restriction Act, it states that ’permission to enter the country was
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not to be given to an alien unless ‘he is in a position to support himself and his 
dependants' (Article 1) and in Article. 12, he could be deported when he had 
been in receipt of ‘parochial relief or been found wanderingfi.e. homeless), 
without ostensible means of subsistence' (p.6). However, 'immigrants who were 
British subjects were not, subject to immigration control or deportation if they 
became a ‘burden on the state', until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 
(p.6). Since the 1962 Act, entry of Commonwealth citizens’ was subject to 
immigration control. This is the tradition of excluding immigrants from recourse 
to public funds. In the 1971 Act, an important criteria for those without right of 
abode in Britain is, that s/he shall be ‘without recourse to public funds’, where a 
qualification of (the traditional) social benefit entitlement met a specific 
immigration condition of ‘without recourse to public funds’.
Now' we shall move on to some court cases concerning the entitlements of rights 
in Britain, relating to ‘public funds’ and ‘ordinary residence', according to the 
framework given above by Takegawa (1991). Here, although it is clear that 
discussion can be expanded not only to those settled in Britain, but to asylum- 
seekers as w'ell as illegal immigrants, in order to make a simple comparison with 
the Japanese case, it is more appropriate to concentrate mainly on those who are 
in Britain already and their rights and residence, rather than those who are 
attempting to become immigrants.
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4.5 Public funds
People who visit the UK for a limited period are not entitled to claim state 
benefits if they are admitted on the condition that they will not have ’recourse to 
public funds' (HC394, para.38). However, the specific details of 'public funds’ 
were only defined in the 1980s. This point was argued in court in 1981 in the 
case of Ved (The Times, 14/5/1981). Within this judgement, the judge separated 
two kinds of state aid, on the one hand was classified 'matters of public funds 
such as employment benefit, supplementary benefit (income support), while on 
the other hand, facilities provided by the state, such as state-aided education, a 
result of compulsory education, and the NHS, which could not be regarded as 
‘recourse to public funds in any fair case’. However the judge added that it also 
depends on ‘people resident in Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
claimant's immigration status or citizenship'.
For instance, people with a right of abode in the UK are eligible for full income 
support, but people subject to immigration control ‘may still’ have full 
entitlement if they are legally 'settled' in the UK and have indefinite leave to 
remain' (OECD, 1997:394). However, the meaning of ‘public funds’ is becoming 
clearer, as well as more restrictive to those who want to claim. According to 
Shutter (1997:180), the contents of ‘public funds' were first listed in 1985 as, 
‘income support, housing benefit, family credit and housing as homeless 
persons’. Since April 1994, council tax benefits and other allowances were added 
to the list, and in November 1996, child benefit, ‘part II housing’, and income- 
based jobseeker’s allowance are included in the meaning of 'public funds’.
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Changes after April 1994 were enacted as part of the policy to cope with the 
increasing number of asylum-seekers.
The 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act includes as part of its aim ‘to reduce 
economic incentives, which attract people to come to this country in breach of 
our immigration laws', and will 'provide powers to restrict entitlement to 
housing assistance and child benefit' (Michael Howard, Commons, vol.268, 
col.699, 11/12/1995). Within this Act, is a restriction of entitlement to 'housing 
accommodation and assistance, child benefit, income support and other social 
security benefits'. Because of the expected effects of the Bill on the entitlement 
of welfare benefits to asylum-seekers as well as to those who have a restriction 
on their immigration status, the government met with strong opposition. For 
instance, the House of Lords defeated the government four times. Since the 
context of the 1996 Act and changes to the asylum law were discussed in 
Stevens (1998), it is not necessary to repeat the details but just highlight the 
point relevant to this discussion.
There is one amendment concerning 'immigrants’ which it is worthwhile looking 
at here, as its possible impact would have been not just upon asylum seekers, had 
it been enforced. In the original Bill, Clause 8 (criminal sanction against 
employment of 'immigrants' who is not entitled to work in immigration law), and 
Clause 9 (restriction to entitlement to housing accommodation and assistance). 
Clause 10 (restriction to entitlement to child benefit), used the word ‘immigrant’, 
who may be subject to restrictions. The definition of the word was given in
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clause 12 (2) as ‘a person who under the 1971 Act requires leave to enter or 
remain in the United Kingdom (whether or not such leave has been given)’. As 
the Bill defines 'an immigrant in that broad way’ (Lord McIntosh, Lords,vol.571, 
col. 1785, 2/5/1996) people would ‘mix up legal and illegal immigrants’, and 
‘have sensitivities about it’ (Baroness Garder, Lords, ibid., col. 1788). Later, the 
word ’immigrant’ was amended to ‘person subject to immigration control’, in the 
sense of the 1971 Immigration Act. JCWI evaluates this change as ‘the definition 
[which] makes clear that settled people and those with refugee status or 
exceptional leave to remain are excluded [from the restriction]' (JCWI Bulletin, 
1996/summer).
By the third reading of the Bill, the Court of Appeal ruled on a court case, which 
argued that the validity of the regulations which removes the entitlement of 
income-related benefit, was judged as ultra vires (The Times, 27/6/1996). The 
effect was therefore nullified by the government's later amendments (JCWI 
Bulletin, 1996/summer).
4.6 ‘Ordinary’ residence
The term ‘ordinary residence' is not given clear definition within statute law, 
unlike the term 'right of abode' which is clearly defined in the context of 
citizenship, nor ‘settlement’ or ‘indefinite leave to remain’ of ‘specific 
provisions' of Immigration Act (Macdonald and Blake, 1995:116). But it plays 
quite an important role in immigration status.
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‘Ordinary residence' featured first in the Income tax Act in 1806. Not 
surprisingly, without a fixed definition, the interpretation of ‘ordinary residence’ 
is the task of courts, since in Britain, case law is part of British law. The meaning 
of ordinarily resident therefore varies from case to case, and Supperstone 
reminds us that 'decided cases give broad guidance, but are not to be regarded as 
‘decisive precedents’ (Supperstone, 1994:14).
In relation to issues of nationality and immigration, the 1948 British Nationality 
Act, refers to 'ordinary resident’ as a condition of acquisition of nationality (such 
as 6-I-a-l). In the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962 and 1968, these 
include the term ‘ordinarily resident', but this did not yet have specific 
connotations with immigration. These acts used this clause as a reason for 
'exemptions from the deportation (such as 1962 Act 7-2-a), or exemption from 
the refusal of admission (such as 1968 Act 2-2-a), but neither has restrictive 
direction. Neither provided a definition for ‘ordinary residence’.
After the enforcement of the 1971 Act, most immigration cases on ordinary 
residence, were about the relationship to ‘illegal entrants' or 'illegality' where the 
discussion of those former empire subjects really became the ‘former’ or were 
placed in the same category as aliens.
In relation to the entitlement of rights and ordinary residence, there is a case on 
educational grants in c.v parte Shah [ 1983] 2AC 309. Although the context and 
the case itself was extensively discussed in Beale and Paker (1984), it is worth
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considering along with the following, as it offers a good example of rights in 
relation to immigration status, and that it may be helpful to consider comparison 
with the Japanese case. The point of dispute in this case was the meaning of 
ordinary residence in the UK, for the 1962 Education Act and Awards 
Regulation (LEA awards Regulations, p.8) indicating ‘wholly or mainly 
education purpose' can or can not constitute ordinary residence for the purpose 
of LEA awards. The phrase in Section 1 of the 1962 Act and regulation 13 of the 
1979 Regulations made no reference to any restriction on the award of grants 
based on an applicant's place of origin, domicile or nationality.
In this case, three students were citizens of the UK and its colonies, one was 
from Kenya, one from Bangladesh and the other from Pakistan, and all had 
student visas. Another was a citizen of Iran, who was granted indefinite leave to 
remain when he was in preparatory school. All of them had been in the UK more 
than three years prior to their entrance into higher education. All of them were 
immigrants, and none of them was a national of a member state of the EC 
([1983]2 AC 312). The High Court dealt only with the first two students, the 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords dealt with six students and the conjoined 
appeals.
By distinguishing ‘resident’ from ‘ordinary resident', the local authorities’ 
attempted to apply a ‘real home test' for ordinary residence, trying to connect it 
with domicile. They argued, that ‘it does in fact, have the same meaning for both 
the Immigration Act and the Education Act’, but they said it was not part of the
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respondent's argument (ibid., p.319). The students' argued that ‘there is no 
justification in linking the concept of ordinary residence under the Education Act 
and regulations with concepts of presence, either free from control or with 
unlimited leave under the Immigration Act of 1971 or indeed, its predecessors 
(op.cit., p.313). Residence, they argued, included being resident in the UK, as 
well as wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving education as well.
In the lower courts, only the claim of students with indefinite leave to remain was 
allowed, and the requests of others were dismissed due to their restricted 
immigration status. The High court held, ‘Why is he in this country? to be a 
relevant question. If the answer is for a specific or limited purpose, rather than 
for the general purpose of living here, he will not be fall within the meaning of 
this award regulation ([1980] 3 All.ER.685). The Court of Appeal (1982) 
affirmed this decision and stated that a student cannot be entitled to a grant in the 
UK unless he becomes entitled to remain in the UK indefinitely: ‘He will not 
cease to be an overseas student or become ordinarily resident in the UK unless 
and until he becomes entitled to make a home in the UK' ([1982] 1 All.ER. 729).
However, the House of Lords allowed all students’ appeals and dismissed the 
government appeal. A speech delivered by Lord Scanman criticised the 
judgement of the courts :
They attached too much importance to the particular purpose of the residence, 
and too little to the evidence of a regular mode of life adopted voluntarily and for 
a settled purpose, whatever it be, whether study, business, work or pleasure, in
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so doing, they were influenced by their own views of policy by the immigration 
status of students, ([1983] 2AC 348).
Therefore, students who came to Britain for educational purposes, and resided in 
Britain for at least three years immediately before entering a higher educational 
institution, could qualify since immigration status had no direct connection with 
this (The Times, 17/12/1982).
According to Beale and Parker (1984:2), before this case came to court, there 
had been some attention paid to the idea of ‘ordinary residence', in relation to 
the applicability of the 1976 Race Relations Act. By applying Section 40 (1) and 
41 (2) of the 1976 Act. the DES attempted to prevent claimants bringing the 
cases to court by declaring themselves exempt from ‘discriminating on the basis 
of 'nationality or place of ordinary residence’ or the length of time someone had 
been ‘present or resident in or outside the United Kingdom'. It also attempted to 
draw a distinction between ‘residence’ and 'ordinary residence' for fees and 
admission purposes by DES Circular 8/77.
The Shah case proceeded to court in January 1983 at the time of the enactment 
of the 1981 British Nationality Act and in the process of adjudication in 
parliament of the Nationality Bill. After the enactment of the 1981 Act, residence 
was connected with the 'right of abode’, and disputes also appeared in relation to 
nationality status. Although the Shah case was limited to the definition of 
ordinary residence for the purpose of educational grants, its influence on other 
areas was significant. To the specified exclusion areas, overseas student fees was 
added alongside NHS charges for overseas visitors which had just been
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introduced in October 1982. The former exempted a number of students from 
health charges introduced in 1982 for overseas students ‘on the first year of the 
course' (THES, 24/12/1982). In the NHS (charges to overseas visitors) 
Regulations 2 (1989 SI/306), ‘overseas visitors’ are liable to be charged after 
October 1982. Usually hospitals interpret the term 'overseas visitors’ to mean 
people who intend to remain less than six months (Shutter, 1995: 180).
The case of Orphanos [1985] AC 761 is another which went to the House of 
Lords. After the Shah case, it was uncertain whether this precedent would apply 
to 'tuition fees as well as to awards’, since grants are subject to LEA’s 
regulations, and governed by an Act of Parliament, whereas fees have no such 
legal basis’ (THES, 21/1/1983). Orphanos was a Greek Cypriot who had been in 
England since 1979 and was a postgraduate student when he filed his suit. When 
he entered college, he registered as an overseas student and paid the overseas 
rate. He paid the first half of his fee at the overseas student rate in October 1982, 
and after the Shah ruling, he was not required to pay the second instalment of the 
overseas fees for that year, but he was not reimbursed any part of the fee which 
he had already paid. His LEA later gave him an award in July 1983, and he 
received it for the academic year 1982-3. The court held that the later established 
meaning of 'ordinary resident’ did not affect the contract between himself and 
the college regarding his overseas student status and dismissed his contractual 
claim to be reimbursed the difference between the two fees, as the college had 
proved that the initial residence requirement had not been applied with the 
intention of treating him unfairly ([1985] AC 762-3).
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4.7 A comparison with Japan
One of the significant differences between Britain and Japan is whether the 
relationship between immigration and nationality is or is not, easy to separate, 
and the contents of immigration disputes in that these are largely designed for 
internal (residential) control, as Britain focuses mainly on immigration control. 
Interesting issues on internal and immigration (external) control can be found in 
Gordon and Newnham(1985). In his 1985 work, he pays attention to who is 
‘illegal' and the definition of illegality but not the definition of legal and its 
control. In the UK case, residence and patriality are related.
In the Japanese case, the former empire subjects are a quite distinctive group in 
relation to the descendants or relatives of Japanese emigrants who went outside 
the empire at different periods. As regards the control of people who were 
‘already inside’ Japan, the country used immigration law as well as alien 
registration law. In Britain, the control of people coming from outside Britain is 
regulated by immigration law and rules and later by nationality law so that the 
areas of settlement or other entry classifications as well as citizenship categories 
are quite important for patriality.
Lastly, let us consider the status of ‘settlement' in comparison with the status of 
aliens' in Japan. This perspective was first indicated by Ishida (1985) in which 
she introduced the issues of ‘racial discrimination in Britain' to Japan. According 
to Ishida (1985), ‘the status of settlement’ is fairly close to the ideal status of
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Koreans targeted in Japan which they have sought for a long time' (p.201). She 
gave the reason for this as the status of settlement in Britain permits people to 
keep their original citizenship, yet places no restriction on their right to remain in 
Britain or to work. Furthermore, in the case of Commonwealth citizens, they are 
entitled to full political and civil rights (p.201). The status of settlement means, 
‘being ordinarily resident without being subject under the immigration laws to 
any restriction on the period of stay’ (Macdonald and Blake, 1995:98). The 
advantages of having a settlement status include a right to permanent residence 
in the UK, liability to deportation in only limited circumstances, a right to 
register or to be naturalised, the ability to change jobs without permission, and 
full benefits of the welfare state unless waiting for family unification’ (ibid., 99- 
100). In 1995, about 56,000 people were accepted for settlement, and more than 
80 percent of them were dependants and spouses of residents or citizens of the 
UK(as show in Table 4.1), and were accepted as they complete qualifying 
periods of residence in the UK (OECD, 1997:167).
Table 4.1 Acceptances for settlement
1993 1994 1995 1996
Acceptances for settlem ent (000s) 55.6 55.1 55.5 61.2
By region o f origin
European Economic Area 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.1
Other European countries 3.6 4.0 4.0 7.4
Americas 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.5
Africa 10.9 11.9 12.0 13.0
Indian Sub-continent 14.1 14.1 14.5 14.6
Middle East 2.8 2.6 2.9 4.8
Remainder of Asia (mainly East Asia) 8.9 9.2 9.0 9.5
Oceania 2.7 2.9 3.5 3.5
Other 3.6 1.9 1.3 1.4
By category o f acceptance
Accepted in own right 7.3 7.8 6.4 6.7
Spouses and dependants 44.3 43.4 44.9 48.6
Other 4.0 3.9 4.2 5.9
OECD ( 1997) SOPFML Trends in International Migration
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The differences between the status of ‘settlement’ and ‘patrial’ and right of 
abode are that in the case of settlement status, people could be deported in 
certain circumstances, and are not able to be absent from the UK for longer than 
two years (Cohen, 1981:12). However, not all patrials had a right of free 
movement in EU countries, only British citizens. In the 1972 Declaration of the 
definition of ‘nationals' for the treaty, it included 'patrial citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies, patrial Commonwealth citizens without the citizenship of 
the United Kingdom or any other Commonwealth country, and Gibraltarian 
citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies' but did not include ‘patrial citizens 
of independent Commonwealth countries’ (Evans, 1982:512). After the 1981 
British Nationality Act was enforced, this was changed to ‘British citizens, 
British subjects with right of abode in the UK, and British Dependent territories 
Citizens by a connection with Gibraltar' (1983, Declaration), which, Simmonds 
(1984:686) describes as ‘(again) an ad hoc statement to the Community’ .
As we see later, by the mid 1980s in Japan, there was no coherent status for 
those Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan as ‘permanent residents’, which 
recognised their historical ties with Japanese society. Rather, they had a 
segmented status which politically distinguished kyotci eiju as well as tokurei eiju 
and other categories. Even with the status of tokubctsu eiju in the 1990s, though 
there is no limitation on their leave to remain in Japan, alien registration Ls 
required which used to include compulsory fingerprints. In Britain, the degrading 
act of finger-printing became obligatory for asylum seekers in 1993, ‘for the
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purposes of identification, of asylum-seekers and their dependants, in order to 
tackle the problem of multiple social security applications made by asylum 
seekers who arrive with unsatisfactory documentation' (HC Official Report, SC 
A col.193, 19/11/1992).
In Japan, only permanent residents are now exempt from finger-printing. 
However, the nationality criterion restricts their occupation, and political rights 
are still withheld even from those former empire subjects. On the other hand, in 
Japan, rights related to immigration are fairly relaxed compared with those in 
Britain. The right to return to Japan lasts for up to five years in the case of 
tokubetsu cijusha, compared with up to two years for those with settlement 
status in Britain. Today, to acquire the status of tokubetsu cijusha, permission 
for descendants is ministerial, compared with the discretionary grant for those in 
Britain. Both countries do share the restriction of deportation for limited 
circumstances. In a sense, it appears that Japanese immigration measures against 
Koreans and Taiwanese living in Japan are not as severe or restrictive as internal 
controls, but they are treated less as 'citizens' than those permanent residents in 
Britain. Of considerable significance is the difference between Britain and Japan 
in relation to 'permanent residence’: the second generation of ‘settlement’ can 
acquire the status of citizen in Britain, while in Japan, they still remain as 
aliens.(see Chart 4.1 for settlement by region of origin in Britain).
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Chart 4.1 Acceptances for settlement 1979-91
1991
1 9 9 0
1 9 8 9
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 6
19 8 5
19 8 4
1 9 8 3
19 8 2
1981
1 9 8 0
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, the theme has been the distance between citizenship and 
nationality, and to what extent these two can be separated in practice. Prior to 
the independence of India and Pakistan, nationality meant almost the same as 
‘citizenship status’, but since then, nationality has changed through a connotation 
with 'race', clearly shown in the preference given to the white dominions as well 
as the redefinition of citizenship status by the 1948 British Nationality Act. 
However, as the definition of nationality was clarified in 1972, and later 
incorporated in the 1976 Race Relations Act, it seems that discrimination on the 
grounds of 'nationality', has not yet developed as a serious issue as it has in 
Japan.
Compared with the Japanese nationality criteria, the qualification of 'residence' 
in the UK seems to be rather open. However, as Takegawa argues, when the
1 9 7 9  I  
0 20 4 0 6 0 8 0
OECD (1997) SOPEMI, Trends in International Migarion,
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residential criteria are joined with the broadness of those holding British 
nationality because of its imperialistic history, this residential criterion restricts 
the numbers of those who qualified for social benefits. At the same time, when 
the restriction of 'without recourse to public funds’ is placed on Immigration 
Acts, it 'excludes immigrants from social securities' (1991:211), Takegawa 
argues, 'the purpose of entry as well as the country where s/he is from (ethnicity 
in practice) has important indicators for entitlements as a result (ibid., p.212-3).
Touched upon briefly has been the question of whether the status of 'settlement' 
(in the sense of immigration) is comparable with the status of ‘aliens' in Japan. It 
appears that those with 'settlement' (immigration) status with some citizenship 
(ex-British subjects, for example) status have more rights than those with 
tokubctsu cijusha, and political rights in particular. However, the linkage 
between rights and legal status (of British citizenship) which gradually began 
after the 1981 British Nationality Act appears to be heading in a different 
direction. In addition, the protection and privilege to which EC nationals are 
entitled from the Treaty of Rome works both against those former empire 
subjects of different ethnicity as well as for them.
According to Brubaker's model (1989), the socially consequential principle can 
be fitted to the nationality rule, and the egalitarian principle can be fitted to the 
stability or substance of permanent resident status. Furthermore, to a limited 
extent, the democratic principle can be related to the entitlement of political 
rights. In a rough comparison with the Japanese case, the socially-consequential
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principle is less significant while the egalitarian principle is more conspicuous in 
the case of Britain. The democratic principle, for political rights, is affected by 
EU issues, which are broader than the UK’s concern. The contrast between the 
situation in the UK and Japan is explored further in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5: Rights and Residence - Japan
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will explore the ‘nationality clause’ (kokuscki joko) in Japan, its 
varieties and impact on former empire subjects, namely Koreans and Taiwanese. It 
will give some idea of what it means to be an alien in Japan, and also what ‘post­
war colonial adjustment' meant in practice. By doing so, we shall explore the 
distance between the two concepts of citizenship and nationality in Japan.
In the Japanese context, the so-called ‘nationality clause' existed within most 
entitlement legislation for a long time, and there is still some entitlement legislation 
which is closed to aliens. It is easy to miss the historical perspective when we 
discuss rights relating to immigration status in the Japanese context. This is 
because, firstly, former empire subjects were not ‘immigrants' when they came to 
Japan, and immigration control was imposed on them long after their entry. The 
status of Koreans and Taiwanese since 1952 has been based on a ‘special’ law, 
instead of ordinary immigration law. Although alien registration law is applied to 
Koreans and Taiwanese by regarding them as ‘aliens’, the Japanese government 
could not apply the Immigration Order to them directly (Onuma, 1986). However, 
once Japan restored its sovereignty, immigration control was applied to Koreans 
and Taiwanese ‘in Japan' as well as those seeking ‘entry to Japan’ after the war. 
‘Immigration’ means in the Japanese context, ‘new comers', who in most cases 
entered Japan after 1980s. For former empire subjects in Japan, the immigration 
policy through which they are affected, is ‘internal control' (alien registration), as
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well as ‘nationality criterion' existing in entitlement legislation. In addition, there is 
a strong acceptance of the distinction between aliens and the Japanese, though 
historically, most of Japan's aliens are Koreans and Taiwanese. They are the 
former empire subjects, who became Japanese and lost their nationality regardless 
of their wishes. Therefore, to treat all aliens as immigrants, was at least, from the 
perspective of Koreans and Taiwanese, not acceptable. Moreover, most of the 
time, these former empire subjects and other aliens are regarded as a single 
category of aliens.
Until recently, the main campaigning aim of these former empire subjects' was to 
remove the nationality clause which restricted them from receiving various 
entitlements. A number of books have been written in Japanese on how and why 
the ‘nationality criterion' came to exist and whether it could be removed or has 
already or retained in various entitlements legislation. In this chapter, I shall 
explore rights of entitlement regardless of status, in comparison with the British 
case. This means examining cases or problems where restrictions are imposed when 
there is no explicit nationality criterion, and considering to what extent the 
restriction or prevention could be removed. I shall examine this in connection with 
the discussion on 'teiju gaikokujin ’ (settled aliens), to see whether this academic 
category is significant, or whether it blurs the distinction between aliens and 
Japanese nationals. I will then examine some Japanese court cases where the 
disputed legislation does not directly include a ‘nationality criterion'.
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It is helpful to look at the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 and the impact that 
it has had on subsequent events and on functional nationality. In order to describe 
'teiju gaikokujin ’ as a historical issue, we need to take a brief look at the history of 
subsequent events after 1952, such as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 
problems with taking fingerprints of aliens, and 1991 Special Immigration Law. By 
discussing this in relation to 'teiju gaikokujin', it will also provide some 
background to the Son and Chong cases which are discussed in detail later. The 
Son Jin-du case of 1978 can be seen as a focus for social rights and the Chong 
Hyang-kyon case of 1976, as one which highlights political rights. Son is an ‘illegal 
entrant’ from Korea who was a victim of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, where he 
worked during the war. He filed for the right to receive free medical treatment in 
Japan, as his right to ‘state compensation'. Chong is a second generation Korean in 
Japan. She works for a local government office but was refused permission to take 
examinations for a managerial post. She filed for the right to take the exam, as part 
of her right to choose a job. While related legislation in both cases does not have a 
‘nationality- restriction, the results of these two files are significantly different. The 
two cases are themselves useful for highlighting the kind of problems that are now 
posed for former empire subjects in Japanese society.
5.2 A demographic overview
Charts 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 provide some current figures concerning the number of 
Koreans in Japan. Historical statistics on Koreans in Japan can be found in Morita 
(1996).
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Aliens are required to register at the municipal office within 90 days after arrival in 
Japan or within 60 days after birth. Koreans and Taiwanese have been regarded by 
the Japanese government for the purpose of this alien registration, as ’aliens’ since 
1947 (when the initial Alien Registration Order was enforced) even though they 
were still Japanese nationals. The total alien registered in 1995 was 1,362,371, 
around 1.08 percent of total population of 125,668,504. It is said that there would 
be around 300,000 overstayers and clandestine workers. Among those aliens 
registered, 48.9 percent (666,376) are nationals of North or South Korea, although 
the percentage of Koreans among all those registered has been decreasing yearly as 
shown in Chart 5.1. Although there are no diplomatic relations between Japan and 
North Korea, Korea was divided after many Koreans in Japan came to Japan (as 
former empire subjects), and some of them have become affiliated with North 
Korea since then.
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In addition, there are also significant numbers of Chinese (222,991) and Brazilian 
(176,440). They are referred to as ‘new comers’ and have increased their numbers 
since the 1980s. The age distribution of aliens in Japan is shown in Figures 5.1. As 
it shows, the structure of the South/North Korean in Japan is similar to that of the 
Japanese shown by the line and is a stable population. Other nationals show a 
higher concentration on working age1.
Of the 1,362,371 aliens registered in Japan, 626,606 (around 46.0 percent) are 
‘permanent residents’. Of these permanent residents, Koreans account for 92.6 
percent (580.122). Amongst those with permanent resident status (626,606), there 
are 563,050 who have ‘special permanent resident' status: Koreans and Taiwanese 
and their children who have been in Japan before the Second World War (regulated 
in Special Immigration Act, Law 71 1991). Of this group holding special 
permanent resident status, Koreans make up the overwhelming majority (557,921 
out of 563,050). The percentage of non-permanent residents is increasing yearly, 
54.0 percent (735,765) were non- permanent residents in 1995.
According to the Annual Report o f  Statistics on Legal migrants (Homusho, 
1996c), the number of aliens who entered Japan in 1995 was 3,839,240. Among 
those, 798,022 were ‘re-entry’ (those with re-entry permission). In contrast, the 
number of Japanese going overseas was 15,298,125 (both long and short stay). 
When the Immigration Control Order was enacted in 1950, its model was the
1 Zahyu Gatknkujm Tokci, Statistics on aliens in Japan. Homusho. I996c:22-3.
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United States, which incorporates ‘immigration control' to screen its future citizens 
(see Hirowatari, 1992). At that time, most of the aliens (so regarded) were 
Koreans and Taiwanese, both of whom were still former subjects of the Japanese 
empire, but the object of alien registration was clearly targeted towards Koreans in 
Japan, especially those who were affiliated to the communists. The target of 
internal control (by alien registration) was matched by the target of immigration 
control (external).
5.3 The historical background
We now need to explore the 'teiju f’aikokujin ’ (settled aliens) issue further with 
regard to its context and the contents of this discussion, so that it can be compared 
with settlement status in Britain, which was covered in the previous chapter. As 
explained in the literature review section, the definition of who may be counted as 
‘teiju f ’aikokujin' is subject to change. Nor is there an exact translation which can 
be distinguished from the existing legal terms in immigration legislation. This is 
partly because the word ‘teiju f’aikokujin' was originally used by an academic on 
behalf of Koreans who were trying to achieve a better status. Therefore, although 
‘teiju f’aikokujin' is quite weak as a concept, it has emerged and developed over 
time.
It is now helpful to consider a number of events which have had an effect on ‘teiju 
f’aikokujin ’ in order to provide some background information on Koreans in Japan. 
These events were:
-the period in 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective
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-the Japan and South-Korea Agreement of 1965 
-the ratification of international conventions in the 1980s 
-the partial abolition of fingerprinting in 1993 
-the 1991 Special Immigration Law
5.4 The 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty
When we discuss the status of former empire subjects in Japan, the most important 
event to date is the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty (28/4/1952). Through this, 
Japan recovered its sovereignty and renounced its overseas territories so that, for 
instance, in the Japanese government’s view, Korea became independent within 
international law. At the same time, the Japanese government circulated a circular 
(Minji Ko -438, 19/4/1952) which explained and gave internal effect, inside Japan 
to the renunciation of the former territories which made non-Japanese empire 
subjects aliens in Japan. Strictly speaking, this process of deprivation of the 
nationality process by the koseki (house registry) system is much more complicated 
and meant that the system of dual nationality which prevailed between the United 
Kingdom and the newly independent countries after the World War II did not 
occur in Japan, although the possibility was discussed. The idea behind this 
Japanese decision was stated by Premier Yoshida (29/10/1951, quoted in Tanaka, 
1991) so as ‘not to leave an unwanted minority problem for the future'. An 
alternative interpretation is that the Japanese government wanted to wait for 
conclusion to bilateral treaties, but the real reason for not offering the former 
Japanese subjects their choice of nationality is not known.2
2 In his study of the Japanese government policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on San 
Francisco Peace treaty, Matsuinoto (1988) argues that one of the background of the restoration
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A number of important pieces of legislation were enforced one after another 
around this time: Alien Registration Order in 1947 (revised in 1949), Nationality 
Act in 1950, Immigration Control Order in 1951 and Law No.126 in 1952. This is 
often referred to as 'the 1952 regime’ (Onuma, 1986). Koreans and Taiwanese 
residing in Japan became subject to the Immigration Order 1951 on 28 April 1952, 
when the Peace Treaty came into effect. However, their status was not as 
'permanent residents' as regulated in the order. Instead the provisional Law 
No.126 (the Law for Disposition of orders under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
based on the Imperial Orders concerning the Orders to be issued in Consequence 
of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration’ (hereafter Law No.126) was 
effective. This law gives the continuous effect of the 1951 Order, which was 
originally enforced as Potsdam provisional Order after 28 April 1952. It states 
under article 2-6, that Koreans and Taiwanese and their children who were 
continuously resident in Japan before the surrender could reside in Japan without 
specifying the status of residence under the Immigration Order, 'until another act is 
passed', that is, until an agreement was reached between Japan and South 
Korea/Taiwan. However, the talks between Japan and South Korea were broken 
off several times, concerning other issues of post-war adjustments, such as war 
reparations. As a result, the conclusion of the agreement was not reached until 
1965, and the status of Koreans was not changed until that time (see, Iwasawa, 
1986).
of their original nationality ami encouraging their naturalisation was to 'restrain the activities 
of Koreans in Japan who were at that time predominantly regarded as Communists' (p.675). 
See also, footnote 10.
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Since the making of Koreans and Taiwanese aliens in 1952 comes the starting point 
for the area of immigration control and alien registration and the rise of substantial 
entitlement legislation. The dichotomy of aliens and Japanese was established and 
at the same time, a 'subtle erasure of history' (Tanaka, 1991:68) took place. In 
practice, the 'nationality clause’ or ‘koseki clause' in most entitlement legislation 
has the function of excluding aliens from its entitlement conditions. This 
formalistic/legalistic attitude of the Japanese government has been accepted by 
most people.
An often quoted example is the 'suspension' of the suffrage right in December 
1945. The revision of the Election Act of the House of Representatives was 
proposed to the then Imperial Diet in November. The Minister of Home Affairs, 
Horikiri, explained the proposal that with the acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration. Korea and Taiwan would soon be detached from the Empire, thereby 
losing Japanese Nationality, and we should not allow them to participate in 
elections as imperial subjects. However, he said, ‘until the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, they are still regarded as holding Japanese Nationality... therefore until their 
Nationality is fixed under international law, we shall suspend their suffrage right for 
the time being...’ (Gikaiseido 70 ncnshi, shiryo-hen, 1960:281). In the ‘additional 
clause’ of that Act, it had read : 'if the Koseki Act is not applied, the voting and 
eligibility rights to those who it does not refer to, shall be suspended for the time 
being'.
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5.5 The 1965 Kyotei eiju (Agreement permanent residence)
As far as Koreans in Japan are concerned, the 1965 Agreement1 was the first time 
that their status as ‘permanent residents’ was secured, although partially. By way 
of the Japan-South Korea agreement, Koreans in Japan who applied for ‘South 
Korean’ nationality, were allowed ministerially ‘agreement permanent resident’ 
(kyotei eijusha) status, if they were first and second generation (South) Koreans in 
Japan and had resided continuously in Japan prior to 15 August 1945. Neither 
those who were affiliated with North Korea, nor those who came in after 1945 or 
went back and re-entered Japan, nor those from Taiwan were given this permanent 
resident status (Yamazaki, 1991). At that time, issues relating to Koreans in Japan 
were mainly treated as diplomatic (that is, inter-state) issues. A registration period 
was granted, from 1966 to 1971, and about 250,000 Koreans had achieved this 
status. However, there were many who were left out or not willing to take this 
status. By 1989, there were 446,389 permanent resident status holders following 
this agreement (Homusho, 1991).
Apart from the status itself, the main privileges allowed to these ‘agreement 
permanent residents' were the application of the National Health Insurance Law, 
the Livelihood Protection Law, and relaxed conditions of application against 
deportation.
' Nihonkoku ni Kyojusuru Daikanminkoku kokumin no liotcki chii oyabi taiguni ktmsuru 
Nihnnkoku ti> Daikanminkoku tono aida no kyotci, 1965 (Agreement between Japan and South 
Korea on legal .status and the treatment of South Korean Nationals in Japan)
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5.6 The removal of the nationality criterion in 1982
At the end of the 1970s, there was a considerable flow of refugees from Vietnam 
to Japan, and Japan ratified the International Convention on Human Rights in 
1979. In 1981 the Revised Immigration Law created the status of ‘exceptional 
permanent resident' (tokurei eiju) for those first and second generations of 
Koreans in Japan, including those from Taiwan and North Koreans who did not 
acquire South-Korean Citizenship in 1965. The registration period for this 
exceptional permanent resident status was set for five years from 1 January 1982. 
With the creation of this tokurei eiju status, there were three different types of 
status for Koreans in Japan with the same historical circumstances - those with 
Law 126, 'tokurei eiju ’ and 'kyotei eiju ’ existing for the status of Koreans in Japan 
(Yamazaki, 1991:6).
In 1982, Japan ratified the Refugee Protocol. As this obliges equal treatment for 
refugees as for nationals in host countries, Japan had to alter domestic legislation. 
The amendment had also necessarily to apply to Koreans in Japan, and in this way, 
most nationality criterion was removed. At the same time, this shows how 
incomplete the status of ‘agreement permanent residents' was. There are, for 
instance, some cases before 1981 relating to eligibility for the national pension 
scheme which included the Japanese nationality criterion. Unaware of the 
nationality criterion, Koreans joined this scheme for more than 10 years, only to 
find when reaching pensionable age, that they were ineligible as they were not 
Japanese nationals (cf. Hanji: 1092:31). In these cases, courts ruled in favour of the 
Koreans, but there was still a problem to be solved. As, seen in Figures 5.2 and
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I5.3, the National Pension Act did not include any transitional measures for those 
Koreans in Japan until 1985, except in case of Okinawa residents, who were 
incorporated in 1972, and for whom transitional measures were included, there had 
been some who were left out. The status of 'tokurei eiju ’ grants the same status of 
permanent residence set in the (ordinary) Immigration Act (4-14) to certain 
Koreans and Taiwanese with continuous residence in Japan (other than those who 
re-entered Japan after the war) but they have fewer privileges compared with the 
‘kyotei eiju ’ status holders (Tokoi, 1981). Within five years of registration, around 
270,000 acquired this status, and by 1989, there were 275,626 with this 'tokurei 
eiju ' status (Homusho, 1991).
5.7 Fingerprinting and alien registration
By the beginning of the 1980s, after the removal of the nationality clause and the 
achievement of various ’social rights' entitlements, the main point of dispute for 
Koreans in Japan shifted toward the registration of aliens which included 
controversial fingerprints.
The requirement for aliens to register their fingerprints was first included in the 
Alien Registration Law enforced on 28 April 1952, on the same day as the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, when Japan recovered its full sovereignty. In practice, the 
requirement of fingerprinting began three years later, delayed by massive 
opposition. Since 1956, every three years these aliens (mostly Koreans and 
Taiwanese) had to present themselves to the immigration authority to renew their 
alien registration card as well as give new fingerprints.
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In 1980, for the first time a man refused to give his fingerprints. He is a first- 
generation Korean in Japan, who refused to provide fingerprints at time of renewal 
of his registration. Prior to 1980, he had renewed his registration and his 
fingerprints several times. Han Jong-sok was prosecuted for what was deemed a 
criminal offence (i.e. refusal to give his fingerprint), but thereafter, many aliens 
began to refuse to submit to fingerprinting. Interestingly, it is said that this is the 
first time the word 'tciju gaikokujin ' (settled aliens) appeared in the court 
judgementdmamura, discussion in Horitsu Jiho, 1985). Han's counsel used the 
word 'tciju gaikokujin ’ in order to argue that fingerprint obligation is 
unconstitutional in that it is forced against those ‘teiju gaikokujin ’ who are 
‘Koreans in Japan, yet bom in Japan, lead a life like Japanese, bear the same burden 
of taxation etc. with Japanese, and entirely become members of Japanese society' 
(Hanji: 1125:103).
The Alien Registration Law was revised several times and in 1982, the renewal 
needed to take place every five years, and the required age was raised from 14 to 
16. In 1987, a further revision meant that those aliens who stayed more than a year 
needed to be fingerprinted just once, when applying for first-time registration 
(Homusho, 1992). Fingerprinting is to restrict the freedom of 'aliens’ as well as to 
link their 'immigration status’ with their ‘residence in Japan'. In other words, on 
the application of fingerprints (and alien registration), the Japanese government Ls 
able to identify those Koreans and Taiwanese and other newcomers alike, and does 
not consider the former's closeness to Japanese society. Since the autumn of 1982, 
if aliens refuse to submit to having their fingerprints taken, they may face criminal
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punishment as well as refusal of a re-entry permit (so that, while they can go 
overseas, they may not be allowed to come back to Japan). For instance, in May 
1994, a 'kyotei eijusha' who refused fingerprinting, could not obtain her re-entry 
permit to Japan. She went overseas to study, and when she came back, she lost her 
status of her 'kyotei ciju' but was given a less secure immigration status (Honda, 
1994). Another 'kyotci eijusha' who refused to give his fingerprints, was arrested 
and imprisoned, though he had no intention of escaping; however, at his appeal 
against the decision, the judge ruled that to sanction criminal punishment for a 
fingerprinting offence is, as far as it is applied to the Peace Treaty relating to those 
who lost Japanese nationality (i.e. tokuhetsu eijusha) ‘might be unconstitutional', 
which was an unusual event (Hanji: 1513:71). This measure received great 
opposition, including opposition from other countries until eventually, in January 
1993, after the Japan-Korea Memorandum, fingerprinting was partially abolished. 
Those who have the status of special permanent resident and permanent resident 
are not obliged to provide fingerprints, but now have to provide registration with 
photos, signature and familial registration. After the struggle over fingerprinting, 
there is in one sense a clear division within the previous-single 'aliens’ category.
5.8 The Special Immigration Law, 1991
As the 1965 Japan-South Korea agreement only included the first and second 
generation of (South) Koreans in Japan, it required re-negotiation 25 years later 
with South Korea. The new agreement was reached in January 1991, and includes 
the following points;
1) To ease the processing of permanent resident permission
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2) The further limitation of deportation practices
3) The extension of re-entry (up to 5 years)
4) The abolition of finger-printing for the third generation onwards as well as the 
first and second generations (Homusho, 1991).
In the same year, Japan regulated a special immigration law which was exclusively 
for those Koreans in Japan, or those who lost their Japanese Nationality by the 
1952 Peace Treaty. Within the Special Immigration Act 1991, the category of the 
special permanent resident (tokubetsu eijusha) was integrated ministerally with all 
the existing categories of Koreans (South as well as North) which related to 
permanent residence (Law 126-2-6; kyotei eijusha; tokurei eijusha: and persons 
who ‘left' the Japanese nationality for peace treaty [heiwa joyaku kokuseki 
ridatsusha]) and they were granted a single ‘tokubetsu eijusha ’ status.
The advantage of this 'tokubetsu eijusha ’ status compared with other immigration 
status (permanent residence) or Korean-related status, is that it entails less strict 
deportation (for public safety only), and a privileged period of permitted re-entry 
(up to five years, compared with up to two years for others). In addition, those 
special tokubetsu eijusha as well as other permanent residents (in the ordinarily 
immigration law category) are exempted from fingerprinting for their alien 
registration. The status of Koreans and Taiwanese are based on ‘special’ law, 
instead of ordinary immigration law since 1952.
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5.9 When is teiju gaikokujin ?
There are some specific factors that should be borne in mind in considering 
Japanese court cases. Firstly in Japan, court cases are only examples of interpreting 
statutory law, but not law itself. As mentioned above, there exists a so-called 
‘nationality clause' for most of the entitlement legislation and when law suits come 
to court, they are mostly rejected because of the existence of this clause.
Although there are many books and articles in Japanese on rights and residence, 
especially on 'settled aliens' (teiju gaikokujin)'', the definition of 'teiju gaikokujin’ 
is not always the same. This is not itself a legal concept, but an established fact in 
statutory law, and not used in the constitution (Annen. 1993:168). Furthermore, in 
order to discuss this concept, the emphasis is on the 1965 Japan-Korea Legal 
Status Treaty (Takasaki, 1995:17), which ‘formulates the categories of 'permanent 
resident aliens' and other ‘general aliens’ (Nakahara, 1993:58) and was the first 
time the category of permanent residents was applied in relation to Koreans. 
However, the number of those who have this 'kyotei eiju' category is restricted, 
and what is more, this agreement is quite political.
More substantially, Ebashi (1995a) argues that the period when the 1991 Special 
Immigration Act was enforced is the most significant period for the existence of 
'teiju gaikokujin ’, as the special permanent resident (tokubetsu cijusha) integrated 
all the existing categories of Korean (South as well as North) related to permanent 
residence as one. Alternatively, it is possible to consider the Japanese joining the 4
4 see for instance, So od., 1992; Kendo, 1996a; and Ashibc, 1993 for the leading academics on this 
issue.
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international conventions (in 1979 and 1982) as the most important period as 
shown above, when most social rights were granted to aliens in Japan.
As we saw, the actual point when the distinction between teiju gaikokujin and 
other aliens began is disputed even among academics. It is important to realise that 
the terms 'settled aliens' (teiju gaikokujin) and ‘permanent resident aliens’ 
(cijusha) are not interchangeable (Kondo, 1996a) as they might be in European 
countries. In addition, the Japanese government's reluctance to create 'permanent 
residence' for Koreans and others in Japan, and the struggle to achieve secure 
permanent residence which has lasted for more than 40 years, shows in part, the 
distinction between aliens and nationals in Japan. Some academics are wary of 
adopting the concept of 'teiju gaikokujin ’ as it can easily omit the historical 
connection between those Koreans and Formosans in Japan with Japanese society 
(see for example, Tanaka, 1996).
When we compare the development of teiju gaikokujin’s status in Japan with those 
'settlement status’ in Britain, it seems that the substance of entitlements and the 
stability of permanent residence in Japan moved from the initial precarious stage to 
that of a stabilised status gradually. Besides, the Japanese emphasis on control over 
aliens is based on internal rather than external or immigration controls, unlike in 
Britain.
Having considered the historical development, the focus now moves to current 
issues which teiju gaikokujin or those with permanent residence have at this
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moment, by looking at some court cases. As mentioned in Chapter 3, to bring a 
case before the court is potentially effective for aliens, especially former empire 
subjects in Japan who do not have any other form of legal protection. The first case 
and the first successful one, which was argued by Koreans after the Second World 
War, was that of Park Jong-sok, who in 1970 went to court against employment 
discrimination (Yokohama District Court, 19/6/1974, Hanji:7AA:29). Park Jong- 
sok is a second generation Korean in Japan, who was bom in Japan and resident 
there. He applied for a job in a large company, was short-listed and then received 
informal notification of his success. Throughout the application process, he used 
his ‘Japanese' name, and gave a false domicile and address. As he was about to 
move into the company-owned accommodation, he was asked to submit the copy 
of his koseki (house registry), but was unable to do so as only Japanese nationals 
have this (as will be explained in Chapter 7). When he told the company that he 
didn't have a koseki, he was dismissed. He then brought his case to the court and 
won. Although there had been many discriminatory incidents before 1970, Park’s 
case is considered significant (Kim, 1996, lecture) as he was the first to bring a 
discrimination case before the court, and he showed that it was worth doing so. In 
addition, his case is noted because many Japanese supported his suit and there was 
organised ‘grass-roots’ activity against the national discrimination which it 
engendered. These groups support law suits in various ways, such as encouraging 
people to ‘watch trials, write to mass media, exhibit videos, and fund-raising’ 
(1995, Minzoku Sabetsu to Tatakau Rcnraku Kyogikai, founded in 1974).
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Next, it is worth examining two court cases which mainly concern rights in relation 
to residence but not directly to nationality. One is Son Jin-du case of ‘illegal 
entrant’s social rights, the other is Chong Hyang-kyon case of ‘teiju gaikokujin’ 
and political rights. Each of these is a leading case in the field.
5.10 The Son Jin-du Case (30/3/1978) and social rights
This case, heard in the Supreme Court, is often cited as the first case concerning 
the equality of Japanese and non-Japanese social rights. It is covered in many 
books and articles as an example of ‘alien’ and social rights (cf. Minami, et al. eds., 
1996 and as an example of ‘state compensation’5). The information on this case 
was obtained from materials presented at court, an interview with a witness, and 
related books and articles.
Between the end of the Second World War and 1982, most social security 
legislation was not applicable to aliens as shown before in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
During this period, ‘the Law for the medical treatment of atomic bomb victims 
(Genshibakudan Hibakusha no Iryo tou ni kansuru Horitsu) enacted in 1955 was a 
rare act in allowing aliens to receive benefits. The purpose of this Act was to offer 
necessary medical benefit to atomic bomb victims from public funds. The 
precondition for receiving treatment was a victim’s pass book, which required 
official recognition as an atomic bomb victim in meaning of the 1955 Act.
5The concept of .state compensation is contended in the ruling, but this does not have fixed legal 
definition and is theoretical. See Ogawa (1978b), Hokama (1979) fix the case reference, or 
Ucmatsu ( 1981 ), Yamamoto ( 1985) for the background of the case itself.
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Son Jin-du is a Korean who lives in South Korea. According to his plea, he was 
bom in Japan in 1927, graduated from school, and worked until he was injured. In 
1951, he was charged with an offence under the Alien Registration Law, and was 
deported to Korea. His father died in Japan in 1948, his sister and mother still live 
in Korea. They are also A-bomb victims and suffer sequelae. Son attempted to 
enter Japan illegally several times and again in 1970, he became an illegal entrant 
and was accommodated in a deportation camp. His application for an A-bomb 
victim's pass book was refused, due to his illegality. He filed suits for his right to 
receive the medical benefit as well as the cancellation of the deportation order in 
Japan.
Those who live in Japan continuously, can receive free treatment regardless of their 
nationality, if they can prove they are victims of the atomic bomb. Within the 1955 
Act (3-2), no qualifying requirements were included vis-à-vis the applicability of 
that legislation to aliens except that applicants should have Japanese residence. 
Therefore, it was fully accepted that the 1955 Act was open to aliens. The extent 
of the application was contested. The points of dispute were first, whether this 
legislation belongs to the fields of 'social security' or ‘state compensation’, and 
second, whether the entitlement criterion in the Act, ‘must have residence' includes 
illegal entrants or not. In his oral pleadings, Son’s side contended that :
- his illegal entry was a response to the government’s oppressive deportation policy 
(22/5/1973)
- South Korea restricts emigration in order to save foreign currency, and it Ls 
almost impossible to enter Japan in a regular way’ (29/1/1974)
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- by immigration procedure, the Japanese government does not allow entry for the 
purpose of medical treatment under the atomic bomb legislation. Moreover, the 
Immigration Order (1950) 5-1-3 expressly forbids entry of a person ‘being a 
burden of the country or the local authority on one's life’ (Son's argument, 
15/2/1974).
The government argued that for the A-bomb legislation to apply, applicants must 
have residence in Japan legally and they should live life as 'a member of Japanese 
society' (the government's argument, 24/1/1974).
If the main purpose of the Act was social security, as the government contended, 
then free treatment was only appropriate to people who were lawfully resident in 
Japan. The idea that aliens' social securities were the responsibility of 'the 
countries where they have their citizenship prevailed, at this time. If, on the other 
hand, the principle of the Act was state compensation, as Son’s side argued, it 
should be applicable to anyone who was a victim of the bombings, whatever is 
his/her status.
The District (30/3/1974, Hanji:736:29) and the Appellate Courts (17/7/1975, 
Hanji:789: \ \ ) ruled in Son's favour to receive medical treatment. In fact after 
these two judgements, the Ministry of Welfare changed its policy and offered 
medical treatment to those who enter Japan 'legally' but not directly for the 
purpose of ‘medical treatment tAsahi Shinbun, 2/9/1975). The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the lower courts’ judgements: ‘Although the appellant is an illegal
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entrant, as long as he is a victim of atomic bombing, the ‘Law for the treatment of 
the A-bomb' should be applied' (The Supreme Court judgement, 30/3/1978).
Within the judgement, the purpose of legislation was considered as humanitarian. 
But at the same time, with regard to illegal entrants (i.e. immigration control’s 
concern) economic consideration was also shown in the ruling as ‘the burden for 
the economy is but only a small number (of illegal entrants), which the state can 
ignore'. The immigration control issue was considered but 'Even if the application 
of that is allowed to A-bomb victims who are illegal entrants, the deportation order 
(the remit of immigration control) is not touched’ (ibid., p.5). In this case, the 
deportation order was cancelled after the Supreme Court’s ruling for Son.
Two interesting points are made by Araki (1975) after the Appellate Court 
judgement. Firstly, the area of social rights was quite new at that time in Japan, and 
it is dubious to emphasise residential qualification for its applicability without a 
close definition/limitation of that content. Secondly, for the purpose of this case (as 
humanitarian support), it was not important whether this 1955 Act was a social 
security act or not. Apart from a strategy to be used in the court; the point of 
dispute is whether 'social security' or 'state compensation' itself signifies the 
influence of Japanese xenophobia at that time. There was an interesting debate at 
the Social-Labour committee at the House of Representatives (8/8/1972), when the 
Son case was argued in court. A Member of the Diet pointed out to the 
government that 'A man who was bom in Japan and had worked in Japan 
altogether for more than 20 years, had been deported to Korea, then he re-entered
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Japan illegally. Only because of that, can you say that he doesn't have any 
relationship with Japanese society?'
With regard to this judgement, the result was 'rarely perfect' (compared with other 
suits brought by Koreans in Japan) (interview with a witness, November 1996). As 
part of post-war compensation trials, this case opened the way for victims outside 
Japan to claim medical treatment. For example, in 1979 an agreement was made 
between the Japanese and South Korean (leading) political parties for the A-bomb 
victims in Korea. In 1990, after the A-bomb compensation claims from Korea, the 
Japanese government decided to pay substantial money to the victims (Takasaki, 
1995:21). In 1994, the Special Measurement Act (1968) and the Medical 
Treatment Act (1955) were replaced by A-bomb Victims Support Act (Hibakusha 
Engo Ho) (Aiahi Shinbun, 7/8/1994, and a recent article written in English by 
Weiner, 1995).
Soon after this judgement, social rights for aliens in Japan were secured by 
international conventions (Human Rights in 1979 and Refugee Protocol in 1982) as 
explained above. Much social rights legislation became applicable to aliens after 
1982, such as a national pension, national health insurance and some child 
allowance acts, as we saw before. In other words, residential criteria has increased 
its importance compared with the 'nationality' requirement in social rights in 
general, through the unexpected flow of refugees and other international pressures 
such as conventions.
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However, at present there is still some social security legislation which is not open 
to aliens, including the former empire subjects. This includes Seikatsu Hogo Ho 
(the Life Maintenance Act, which includes application on an unequal basis) and 
several different Engo Ho (Assistance Acts, which often involves post-war 
compensation-related legislation). As shown on Figure 5.3 before, the nationality 
clause still work on these.
Therefore, the central issue for the former empire subjects has shifted from the field 
of 'social rights' to ‘political rights', unlike in Britain. Additionally, cases of social 
rights concerning former empire subjects have now been extended to 
Koreans/Taiwanese living in Japan to those living outside Japan. These disputes 
concentrate on what is called sengo hosho (post-war compensation)6. Yet social 
rights for those who are not lawfully resident in Japan are still not allowed (such as 
1995/9/27, on Health Insurance'. Rights relating to immigration qualification,
h Recently, former empire subjects who were forced to act as military sex-slaves, labourers and 
soldiers (and civilian employees) filed for post-war compensation against the Japanese 
government as well as companies. The Japanese government sought a diplomatic solution for 
the compensation for former empire subjects. That is, in relation to Korea, the Mutual Treaties 
in 1965, in relation to China, the 1972 Joint Communiqué. According to the Japanese 
government, this is why most legislation have included Japanese nationality criterioa AERA 
(18/12/1995) shows a view that in order not to intervene domestic affairs of another country, 
the Japanese government avoids the post-war compensation issue.
However, with regard to Taiwanese and Koreans in Japan, they have been left out of diplomatic 
treaties (apart from whether this diplomatic solution was sufficient for former empire subjects 
or not). The first series of post-war compensation suits was begun by Sakhalin Returnees 
(brought in 1975), and Taiwanese soldiers/civilian employees' wartime claims (brought in 
1977). In a recent judgement within these series (the Osaka District Court, 1/5/1995), the 
notorious ‘nationality/house registry’ criterion was for the first time after the war. judged as 
'heavily discriminative and against the constitution Article 14 (equality before the law), within 
the context of post-war compensation legislation. However, the claims of the plaintiffs were 
rejected. It took more than half century for a Japanese court to accept 'alien' as 'the former 
empire subjects' and as 'equal with Japanese' (see Hanta:901, Japan Law Joumal:\995:vo\.S- 
6). cf., Onuma (1993), Takano (1995).
7 The only criterion for entitlement is 'being a resident' in Japan. Illegal entrants are not 
‘residents' for the purpose of Health Insurance. In this case, the plaintiff was told that until her 
status Is regularised, she cannot be a 'resident' (The Tokyo District Court ruled that 'regarding
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including legal/illegal, permanent residence and other restricted status are 
considered in Ebashi (1995b).
Apart from that, at the time of the Son case, there was no disagreement over his 
description as an 'Alien A-bomb victim', or a ‘South-Korean A-bomb victim’; no 
attention was paid to his status as 'a former empire subject’ or the connection 
between him and Japanese society, except one plaintiff argument. Obviously, in 
Son's case, he could not be called a 'teiju gaikokujin ' at the time of the case since 
he had repeatedly re-entered and been deported. Equally, however, he was not a 
complete alien who had no ties with Japanese society at all. The fact that the 
framework of state or inter-state relations came first for the consideration (even in 
a dispute of nationality-free entitlement legislation) shows the strong influence of 
nationality-oriented ideas at the time. We shall see how this changed or did not in 
the second case on political rights in 1990s.
5.11 Chong Hyang-kyon case and political rights
When political rights are broadly defined, they can include voting rights, standing 
for political office, becoming a civil servant and sometimes such quasi-political 
rights as the rights to receive some forms of state compensation. Here, we shall 
see a case on the right to be a public servant and some debates about political 
rights.
National Health Insurance system as mutual assistance and social solidarity, the automatic 
membership is at least conditioned as a member of our society...' (Hanta\901:153). Although it 
is regarded that ‘leave to remain' and aliens' residence maybe irrelevant in other legislation 
(ibid .) The toint of disputes argued in this case is similar to that of Son's suit.
The right to be a public servant is quite an important matter in Japan8. There is no 
legal restriction which prohibits an alien from becoming a public servant in the 
constitution nor other statutory legislation. Restrictions may be placed by ‘Orders', 
however, in application forms for recruitment examinations. The exception is the 
Diplomat Act (Guimu Komuin Ho, 1952) and indirectly, for specific occupations 
such as members of the Diet. The guideline (from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau) 
which bars aliens from being government officials, is the requirement that Japanese 
nationality is necessary for 'exercising public power or participating in the 
formulation of state will' (25/3/1953, Takatsuji answer). This is called Komuin ni 
Kansuru Tozen no Hori (Natural legal theory on public servants). As background, 
this was the answer to a question asking ‘among those who lost their Japanese 
Nationality, whether they also lose their status as public servants or not’. In 
practice, the Koreans and Taiwanese already in those public servant positions at 
national level, were asked to naturalise around 1952 (Tong-Il-Il Pao, 19/3/1996). 
The problem begins when this answer is generalised and extended to actual facts. 
According to Okazaki (1996), after the 1965 Agreement, nationality criterion was 
included in the National Personnel Authority’s rule (Jinjiin kisoku) 8-18, 8. This 
says that those who do not have Japanese Nationality, cannot sit for the (national 
level public servants') recruitment examinations. For the local level, when a 
kindergarten employed a Chinese national in 1973/5, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
replied to a prefectural authority that ‘when the job involves to the exercises of 
public will of local authorities, aliens should not be permitted to sit for the
8 On the right to be n public servant, Okazaki (1978,1996) has worked with this from the 
earliest time, especially on the employment of alien lecturers in public/national universities. 
This is achieved in 1982, by special measurement legislation, historical background and other 
court cases such as the right to sit for teacher's qualification exams can be found in Nakahra 
(1993) and Nakai (1989).
158
recruitment tests (Okazaki, 1996, Chong’s argument, 22/3/1995). The employment 
of aliens at municipality level varies. In particular, administrative jobs are in most 
cases closed to them (above that level) after that9.
First, of direct significance is that the central/loca! government as well as its related 
organisations offer many work opportunities, often very good ones. For instance, 
jobs as law practitioners (1977), Japan Telecom and Telecommunications and in 
nursing (1982) originally had a nationality clause for their employment or some 
restriction but later the condition was removed (Nakahara, 1993). Moreover 
outside Tokyo, officials in local authorities are regarded as having the same status 
as central government officials. Second, of indirect significance is the fact that the 
restriction of government-related work opportunities discourages and even justifies 
the private companies' discrimination against aliens. A good example of a court 
case on private company employment discrimination against a Korean is Park 
Jong-sok’s case, mentioned above. According to Kim Kyeung-duk (1996) who 
became the first Korean lawyer in Japan, the reason why Park’s employment 
discrimination case (1974) could win was because it was after ‘informal 
notification- (saiyou naitei) which the plaintiff received and was promised already, 
but if it had been before that notification (i.e. before the company’s decision had 
been taken or if the decision had not been delivered to him), he would lose even 
today (November 1996, lecture).
9 At the time of my writing (10/96), there are two popular ways to employ aliens at the local 
level which try to work within the principle. One is Kawasaki city style, which opens its 
employment to aliens fix- most kinds of jobs (for instance, firebrigade) but restrict arrangement 
and promotion (Yumiuri Shinbun, 13/5/1996). The other is Kochi Prefecture's style which 
restricts the nature of jobs which aliens' can be employed in, but in principle open for their 
promotion after that (Tong-ll-ll Pao, 14/3/1996 , Asa hi Shinbun, 27/4/1996). However, this 
Kochi style has not yet put into practice. This classification is that of Okazaki (1996).
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Finally, as the right to hold public office is regarded as part of suffrage in the 
broader sense, this will have an impact on voting right of aliens, a subject on which 
the Supreme Court offered judgement (28/2/1995, Saikosai ruling)10 1. Although 
similar suits on suffrage also brought by a Briton (firstly in November 1989), it 
seems that the courts distinguish ‘those with a historical connection with Japan’ 
and 'others', and their reasoning on this case is less enthusiastic. The suffrage of 
Koreans was first ‘halted’ (but not ‘abolished') after the war (December 1945, 
alteration of the Election Act of the House of Representatives11, as mentioned). In 
other words, the first entitlements which the former empire subjects had lost after 
1945 was suffrage12. In that sense, political rights are the last ones to ‘recover’ 
symbolically1 *. However, not everyone shares the desire for suffrage. Of those who 
support the North Korean Government, for example, Kim Chang-son (1986) thinks 
that as the right to live in Japan but retaining ethnicity (i.e. being different from the 
Japanese) has not been secured, to ask for suffrage might lead to ultimately to 
assimilation. In addition. North Koreans considers themselves as aliens(Koreans
10 The importance of this judgement is that although it rejected the claims of appellants, it went 
further and said that ‘for those aliens who have close connection with local authorities, it is not 
prohibited in the constitution to legislation and entitle voting rights in order to reflectithose 
aliens') will... however, whether to react or not is within the authority of legislative power' 
{Hanji: 1523:51). This ruling is accepted positively in general {Asahi Shinbun, 1/3/1995). After 
this judgement, some political parties started to consider the possibility of entitling suffrage to 
aliens at local level. (Teiju gaikokujin no chiho sanseiken wo motomeru renraku kyogikai, 
1995).
11 According to the recent study by Mizuno (1996), it is likely that the Japanese government 
halted Korean and Taiwanese suffrage (by inserting a koseki criterion within the revised act) in 
order to preserve the monarchy. Mizuno found a presentation paper in 1945, which showed 
concerned about the communist influence on the Japanese regime, (reported in Asahi Shinhun, 
5/2/1996).
12 However. Tanaka (1974) sees the suffrage rights entitled to former empire subjects as much 
lighter and rather symbolic compared to the obligation (sueh as eonscription) imposed on them. 
"  In the 1990s. the political rights of aliens' is a timely topic and the recent discussion on 
'teiju gaikokujin ' given the above, concentrates on suffrage, in particular at local level. These 
academics take part in (or influence) actual suits directly as well as indirectly.
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Overseas) with their independent home country and at least, they are given a 
chance to raise their opinions in their home country.
5.12 Chong Hyang-kyon( 1996/5/28) case
As mentioned above. Koreans can take exams for certain specific jobs for local 
authorities. In spite of the direction of the Ministry of Home Affairs, some local 
authorities are gradually trying to open up posts to aliens. The case of Chong 
Hyang-kyon is the first suit relating to an administrative post for an individual 
already working for a local authority. A ruling was made by the Tokyo District 
Court, against her. Chong appealed to the Tokyo Appellate Court, and she won. 
The government side appealed to the Supreme Court in time, but the final outcome 
is not known yet.
The plaintiff is employed as a full-time public health nurse. A tokubctsu eijusha, 
she was the first Korean employee for that position in the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Office (local authority) after the ‘nationality’ criterion was removed from the job 
application form in 1988. After she was promoted to the present position, she 
received an application form for a management position. However, she was even 
refused permission to submit her application form, let alone take the examination 
itself, as she was told that she does not have Japanese nationality (an important 
condition for the Ministry of Home Affairs, which supervises local authorities’ 
matters). She filed a suit for recognition of her right to take the examination for 
managerial posts (this suit only asks for ‘recognition of the right to sit the
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examination’, i.e. she has not yet taken it or been discriminated against by way of 
the result).
The plaintiff's side argued that the right to take the exam was part of the (civil 
right) to choose an occupation, according to Article 22-1, the Constitution. Chong 
contends the following:
-There is no Japanese nationality restriction clause in the present public servants’ 
act (at state or local level) and therefore, to prevent aliens becoming managers by 
‘the principle' is unconstitutional. Furthermore, this rejection of the exam 
application is contrary to the right to choose an occupation and against the equal 
protection of law, according to Articles 22-1 or 14 of the Constitution.
-Many ‘special permanent resident' (tokubetsu eijusha) status holders like herself 
have exactly the same life-style as Japanese nationals, and have a closeness to 
Japanese society, which are not taken into account.
-Judging from the Supreme court ruling on voting rights on 28/2/1995, new 
legislation (or revision) is needed to extend entitlement to aliens. Regarding the 
right to work as a public servant in local authorities, there is no clear restriction of 
aliens within the related acts, and therefore the new legislation is not required, 
entitlement to hold public office should be easier to obtain than suffrage 
(Hanji: 1566:23).
-Furthermore, the defendant (Tokyo Metropolitan Office) does not indicate that it 
considers alien managers to be unsuitable for managerial posts (in the local 
authority), nor does it express any argument that the nationality criterion is 
necessary and a minimum condition for holding managerial positions (argument,
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22/3/1995). The defendant’s side argues that the issue is one of ‘political right’. It 
says that according to the principle of the exercise of public will (‘local authorities 
have many (state level) delegation jobs,) with regard to aliens' employment, has no 
rational reason to distinguish local level from the national level (argument, p29).
The result of this case was entirely unlike that of the Son case. The Tokyo District 
Court dismissed Chong’s demand and ruled in favour of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Office (and also the Ministry of Home Affairs). The ruling says that ‘the 
Constitution requires that those working in the position of public servant (which is 
related to sovereignty) must hold Japanese nationality...’ (the judgement, 
16/5/1996:43).
Although the point of dispute was similar to the Son case (in the way that there is 
no clear requirement which refers to Japanese nationality), the Chong case was 
dismissed on the grounds of the circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
which prohibits ‘exercises of public power and participation for the formulation of 
public will. The evaluation of this judgement is however, accepted ‘within the 
framework' of the 28/2/1995 judgement on suffrage (Asahi Shinbun; Mori 
Yasunori, verbal communication, 1996). Part of the reason for the difference in the 
ruling between the Son and Chong cases may lie in whether ‘judges have historical 
recognition of Koreans’ existence in Japan at present’ (Azusawa, 1996); other 
reasons could depend on the extent of the importance to sovereignty, or the 
question of how many people share the same situation with those who make 
complaints. Chong argued at the court as ‘...Neither at the time I was offered this
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job nor after starting to work, I have ever been explained (about my Korean 
Nationality). And one day, when I work in the same way as others do, all of a 
sudden, I am told that I am a foreigner and that the labour conditions are different 
from others. I cannot agree with it.’(argument, 6/12/1995). Chong’s case received 
the Appellate Court ruling in November 1997, which she won. It has now gone to 
the supreme court for further ruling.
Before the Chong case, there were a couple of court cases which focused on the 
right to take the ‘employment selection’ exam. For instance, there is an 
examination to be a postman, and until 1984, when it was withdrawn, there was a 
nationality criterion on the qualification to sit for the recruitment exams. Until 
1991, aliens could not sit for the examination to be a teacher, because there was a 
nationality criterion for the qualification for the examination guidelines, as 
mentioned above. In 1991 March, after Japan-South Korea Memorandum, this 
criterion was removed from the examination application forms. Nowadays, aliens 
can sit for entrance exams to enter the teaching profession, but without promotion. 
These were regulated by the National Personnel Authority's rule 8-18, which only 
speaks of restriction for ‘qualification for entrance examinations’, but not 
mentioning of nationality clause.
5.13 Conclusion
This chapter has explored, to what extent rights and nationality in Japan can be 
separated. It has looked at the gradual development or emergence of 'teiju 
gaikokujin’ and at the many nationality clauses which restrict the right of
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entitlement to aliens. Though these have in some cases been transitional measures, 
in most cases pending diplomatic negotiations or agreements, they have helped to 
exclude aliens. In addition, although these nationality clauses have gradually been 
abolished, we see by the two cases detailed here that it is quite hard to argue on 
behalf of (settled) aliens even when there is no explicit nationality clause.
We have also seen that the concept ‘teiju gaikokujin ' is historic, gradual, and 
grass-roots orientated, and that it has not yet been accepted as an official concept. 
At the same time, it has taken quite a long time to have substantial permanent 
resident status, to become those 'special permanent residents (tokuhetsu eijusha)’. 
It signifies that different categories of 'permanent residence' had been insecure for 
a long time and shows that the dichotomy between aliens and nationals in Japanese 
society is quite strong. In the Son case, for instance, his previous ties with Japan 
are completely forgotten by the fact of his illegal entry from South Korea.
Furthermore, when it comes to making a distinction, most of the time the dividing 
line falls between nationals and aliens, rather than between nationals, settled aliens 
and other aliens. This partly comes from the weak concept of aliens' rights within 
the theories. There is clearly a mismatch between the traditional framework of state 
vs state (or Japan vs Korea or China, for example) and legislation which recognises 
the existence of teiju gaikokujin to some extent.
The two cases discussed in this chapter are about social rights and political rights 
(the classification of political/social is the Japanese concept) and both concern
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former empire subjects. Where ‘nationality clauses’ survive in Japanese society, 
there can be different interpretations over their continued existence. The most 
benign view is that requirements for 'nationality clauses' were intended to promote 
the naturalisation of certain aliens in Japan, such as Koreans and Taiwanese ex­
subjects who were already working in central government just after the war. Or, 
the menace against tc/wo was a real issue, in particular, when communists activities 
were dominant just after the war. However, after aliens are settled, or become 
'denizens', nationality clauses or the difference of citizenship status is the only 
thing which can distinguish those teiju gaikokujin, in particular, tokubetsu eijusha 
(special permanent residents) and Japanese nationals.
As a short summary of Chapters 4 and 5, in these two chapters, the theme was the 
distance between the two concepts of citizenship and nationality. Concerning issues 
around 'nationality', such as the meaning or significance of a nationality criterion, it 
appears that the areas in which nationality matters are much broader, and that the 
meaning is more fixed in Japan than in Britain. On issues of permanent residence, 
however, internal entitlements are overall more stable in Britain than in Japan, 
while notably, rights of permanent residence relating to immigration is relatively 
more tolerant in Japan than in Britain. This may be due to the different emphasis on 
policies within Britain and Japan, the former focusing on immigration, while the 
latter focuses on internal control; in Britain, issues relate to 'citizens', while in 
Japan, they relate to 'aliens'. In regard to the status of former empire subjects, it 
appears that in Japan, whilst legislation was originally lacking, the situation for
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aliens is improving, whilst in Britain, measures are becoming increasingly 
restrictive, as it tries to rid itself of the legacy of the empire.
When we attempt to apply these issues to Brubaker's six ideals of nation-state 
membership models (1989), nationality criterion can be regarded as a 'socially 
consequential- aspect, the stability of permanent resident status as 'egalitarian', and 
entitlement of political rights as a ‘democratic’ aspect. In the case of Japan, it 
appears that, as far as this chapter is concerned, aspects of social-consequence are 
very much dominant, while democratic and egalitarian aspects are less clear, in 
comparison with the British case. It is also quite symbolic, though that the rights of 
eligibility as well as past conscription compensation are still matters of dispute in 
Japan. In the British case, it seems that egalitarian and democratic aspects are 
much stronger than the socially consequential aspect.
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Chapter 6: Patriality - Britain
6.1 Introduction
This chapter and the one following examine how close the concepts of 
'citizenship' and 'nationality' are. by examining the issue of 'patriality' and its 
relationship to the status of full citizenship. In the British section, the discussion 
will be centred on the patrial clause in the 1971 Immigration Act and the 
transition of its status until the enforcement of the 1981 British Nationality Act. 
The comparative Japanese section will focus on koseki (house registry) and its 
relationship with the status of Japanese nationality. As we have seen before, in 
the case of Britain, the emphasis is derived from aspects dealing with 
immigration, while in Japan, the emphasis is on ‘nationality’, so that direct 
comparison may be complex. Having said that, as the ‘patrial’ and koseki issues 
in Britain and Japan involve post-colonial adjustments which relate to issues of 
both immigration and nationality, it is hoped to show some similarities in both 
countries.
Firstly, let us start by examining the literature which relates to patriality. This 
covers the 1971 Immigration Act as well as the 1981 British Nationality Act, so 
that issues of 'immigration policy' can be considered as well as 'nationality' 
issues such as self-identification. We will then turn to parliamentary debates, as 
well as some court cases, and explore the nature and characteristics of British 
patriality and how it works in practice.
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6.2 Comparative aspect
The concept of patriality is critically important in any analysis of citizenship and 
nationality. All countries have legislation defining who ‘‘belongs" to the country, 
who has nationality or citizenship and who are aliens or foreigners. Given the 
importance of patriality, it is surprising how little this concept is defined, 
analysed and discussed. The concept of patriality provides an important way of 
comparing citizenship and nationality issues in Britain and Japan. It will highlight 
areas of contrast as well as similarity.
First of all, having a patrial status or having a koseki is the important prerequisite 
of having nationality status (that is, being a British citizen, or a Japanese 
national). According to Fransman (1989), ‘patriality’ (the immigration status), 
and ‘Citizen of UK and Colonies’ (the citizenship status, hereafter CUKC), were 
the two prerequisites of the acquisition of British Citizenship. It ’determined 
those who were free to enter and settle in the UK ...but... also it will generally 
continue to govern the rights of entry of certain existing Commonwealth 
nationals’ (Fransman, 1989:115). In the Japanese case, depending on the status 
of koseki, nationality status was clarified after the 1952 Peace Treaty and the 
circular.
In addition, Fransman (1989) gives the actual effect of the 1971 legislation and 
emphasises the importance of the patriality clause. In drawing the line between 
patriáis and non-patrials, Britain succeeded to draw lines similar to other 
countries’ distinction between ‘nationals/aliens’ (ibid., p i21). Until then, there
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was a traditional distinction between British subjects and aliens, but since 1962, 
some British subjects have been subject to entry control and lost their right of 
abode in the UK. The function of the 1971 Act, in particular the patrial clause, 
appears to be similar to the deprivation of Japanese nationality from those former 
empire subjects who had acquired Japanese nationality through colonialism, by 
way of the 1952 Peace Treaty. Therefore, the effect of the 1971 Immigration Act 
which created the status of patriality is similar with the Japanese arrangement 
after 1952.
Secondly, both being a patrial and having a koseki is related to the principle of 
jus sanguinis (right of descent). Some Japanese academics indicate, however, 
that it is possible to contrast the period of the 1948 British Nationality Act and 
the 1952 Peace Treaty to argue the difference of post-colonial adjustment of 
subjects' status (Tanaka, 1991:64, Kibata, 1992:283). However, as a turning 
point, it seems fairly clear that the 1971 Immigration Act is also important, when 
we think of the fact that the Japanese system of nationality is mainly based on jus  
sanguinis, patriality can offer a good criterion for comparison. At the same time, 
before the grand-parent clause was introduced for the first time in the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the predecessor of the patrial clause was 
introduced, British immigration and nationality were traditionally based on the 
principle of jus  soli. Therefore, as a framework for comparison, the emphasis on 
the 1971 Immigration Act is not irrelevant.
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With regard to this point, the significant difference between Britain and Japan 
maybe that the overwhelming majority of those affected by the arrangement (i.e. 
those directly affected by the 1971 Immigration Act and the 1952 (Japanese) 
Peace Treaty is that, in the former case, most were outside mainland Britain, 
while in the case of the latter, the majority affected were within mainland Japan. 
That is why, the issue of ‘post-imperial’ or the adjustment of the former empire 
subjects is discussed mainly in connection with immigration in Britain, while in 
Japan, it is mainly dealt with as an issue of nationality. In addition, in the British 
case it was claimed that ’half of the population of the British Commonwealth are 
Indian' (Reginald Maulding, 30/3/1971') while in Japan, the majority of ‘aliens’ 
have been, Koreans. This, as mentioned previously, is a difference which the 
effect of, is hard to measure: the issue of colour and race, a matter which could 
not be concealed in relation to Britain’s former colonies in the Asian 
subcontinent, is in strong contrast to Japan, where the presence of Koreans does 
not reveal itself in the visible form.
The following section examines the relationship between ‘patriality’ and ‘British 
citizens' and considers whether it is parallel to the relationship between 'koseki' 
and ‘nationality’ in Japan.
6.3 The areas of patriality
To begin, it is worthwhile taking a look at the secondary literature to find out 
how the experts regard patriality. Firstly, a patrial clause can be an important part 1
1 Standing Committee B, Official Report, Session 1970-1, col. 163
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of immigration policy. In other words, patriality can link the immigration policy 
and population policy of a country, by giving preference to people who are 
descendants of existing citizens. This can be seen as a strategy to maintain its 
physical and cultural attributes of the population in a conservative way. It is 
perhaps only likely to be successful in countries from which substantial 
emigration has taken place, so there is a large external group some of whom may 
be attracted to return to the country which was the homeland of their ancestors. 
Here, the relationship between patriáis and non-patrials can be seen as that of 
'ethnic migration' and of the 'guestworker system', or one group has privileges 
and the other is subject to strict control (Sivanandan, 1982:131-2). The 
requirements of ethnic migration are usually: first, sufficient connection of 
ancestry, second, an idea of belonging, such as sufficient knowledge of language 
etc., and third, a question of loyalty (Groenendijk, 1997:479-80). In some 
countries where they impose strict immigration control as well as conditions 
which restrict the right to work or the right to settle, ethnic migration can offer a 
flexible labour reservoir - which is easy to handle by the host country’s 
authorities, as well as less likely to expect conflict with host society citizens. In 
this way, you are ensuring that the ethnic composition of the population stays the 
same or changes slowly. This links with the European view of countries as 
nation-states. For instance, 'ethnic migration' exists in other European countries 
such as Germany, Greece, and Italy, as I mentioned before. These countries 
allow people whose ancestors were of the same national origins the right to 
return and to regain the citizenship of their forebears. A significant proportion of 
post-war migrants to these countries have been 'patriáis' in this sense. In the
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Japanese case, to a limited extent, nikkeijin (descendants of Japanese emigrants) 
is a kind of ‘ethnic migration' (for instance, Kajita, 1998). Although as will be 
explained later, they are also regarded as part of a ‘legally introduced labour 
force' when Japan’s economy was expanding, and nikkeijin's ties with Japan - 
language or frequency of contacts - was not strong initially.
However, in the British case, the government’s intentioas in this area were 
unclear. During the 1960s and 70s Britain was in recession, and the introduction 
of the 1971 Act brought about a contradictory result: it ‘increased the total 
number of people with the right to enter Britain quite independently of economic 
considerations' (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984:70). Furthermore, as far as 
immigration policy is concerned, Britain may be regarded as having lacked a 
coherent ‘immigration policy’ and its legislation having been enacted in an ad hoc 
manner. In addition, compared with the other European countries, the definition 
of ‘ethnic factors' for ‘ethnic migration' has been a difficult topic for Britain for a 
long time, partly because of its imperial past.
Thirdly, there is an aspect of exploring patriality relating to the topics of 'racial 
discrimination' and ’nationalism'. Both need to be examined since the distinction 
between them is often unclear. The ’patrial clause’ of the 1971 Act was intended 
to give precedence to people with a close connection to the UK, in practice this 
meant white people over all non-white settlers who were the majority of British 
subjects. For instance, Goul bourne (1991:118) points out the function of the 
patriality clause as discriminating between ‘people outside Britain who were able
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to claim close connection with the UK by virtue of having had a grandfather who 
was bom in this country, and could gain entry, while people outside the UK who 
could not make this claim but held British passports, could not automatically gain 
entry'. Goulboume also attempts to explain that ‘nationality and immigration 
laws in the perceptions of the British nation are articulated by politicians rather 
than in the legal provisions per se' (ibid., 1991:90). His basic argument is that 
post-war Britain gradually achieved ‘post-imperial’ (nation-state) by removing 
the right of settlement/entry of new Commonwealth immigrants, a process which 
was completed by 1981 British Nationality Act. In a similar way, Miles 
(1993:74) argues that this post-imperial adjustment process can be read as a 
‘nationalistic’ framework as well as ‘racist’, since specific categories of ‘British 
subject' are often chosen by colour to constitute membership of an 'imagined 
community' of the nation.
Dixon (1983) explores the construction of British national identity within the 
context of British Nationality Bill debate and observes that ‘the 1981 Act... is 
designed to define a sense of belonging and nationhood which is itself a 
manifestation of the sense of racial superiority created along with the Empire, 
while simultaneously it cuts the ties of citizenship established in that same 
historical process'. When we think of the fact that the basis of the 1981 Act, 
British citizenship was formed at the time of the 1971 Act of patrial status, these 
insights are useful in setting the history of ‘patriality’ in context.
This frame of reference for emphasising ‘nationalism' as a style of ‘post­
imperialism’ is quite useful, as it facilitates comparison with the Japanese 
experience after 1952, which quite often focuses on its ‘nationalistic' framework 
rather than the framework of ‘ethnic migration’ or ‘race’ which often lack the 
sense of historical connection.
6.4 Patriality: context and background
Now, let us examine the background and the context of ‘patriality’ as a concept. 
In Britain, the concept of ‘patriality’ is relatively new in immigration and 
nationality law. ‘British subject' status prior to 1949 arose by virtue of a 
connection with the Empire as a whole. It was linked to birth on the territory 
rather than descent from earlier generations of British subjects. Everyone who 
owed their allegiance to the Crown was a British subject until the 1948 British 
Nationality Act came into force. The 1948 Act created the status of ‘Citizen of 
the UK and Colonies’ which arose by a connection with the ‘UK and Colonies’. 
This status was separate from that of the citizenship of an independent 
Commonwealth country, but citizens of both categories constituted British 
subjects. There were no immigration restrictions posed by the Act. In the 1948 
British Nationality Act, Clause 5 allows citizenship by descent in limited 
circumstances, mainly for the first generation by paternal descent. In other words, 
lineage had only a limited significance until the series of immigration control was 
enforced.
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By the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, entry control was imposed for the 
first time on Commonwealth citizens, depending on the kinds of passports they 
held. Those not subject to immigration control were:
1) those bom in the UK,
2) those holding UK passports issued by the UK government,
3) those included on the passport of a person exempt from immigration control 
under 1) or 2).
The government would be able to deport Commonwealth citizens from the UK if 
they had lived in the UK for less than five years and had a criminal record. 
Similarly, the right not to be deported from their home country became restricted 
for the first time (Ishida, 1985). Those immigrating for the purpose of 
employment but subject to control had to obtain an employment voucher first and 
issuing the vouchers became the main criterion of immigration control. Foot 
(1965: 140-1) considers that unemployment was not the reason for control but 
fear of the escalating cost of social services. However, the employment voucher 
was regarded as the only acceptable excuse which the government found possible 
(Foot, ibid.). This was the basis of the first Commonwealth Immigration Act but 
in practice, it was said that its implementation was fairly relaxed. Foot (1965:253) 
estimates that from July 1962 to December 1964, 49,915 voucher-holders were 
admitted to the UK.
In the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, ‘the grandparental connection 
clause' or the first lineage restriction clause was introduced in order to restrict the 
immigration of British Asians from Africa. This was a kind of a population policy.
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Although restriction of British subjects/Commonwealth citizens had already 
begun with the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, in the case of the African 
Asians, their connection to the UK arose by the independent arrangement after 
the 1962 Act. As Lester (1975) notes, 'they are not connected by birth, descent, 
marriage or residence here, but the independence arrangements made by the 
British Government in East Africa, and their reliance upon the rights conferred by 
those arrangement, made them 'belongers" (p. 11). Under the 1968 Act, the 
linkage with the UK was prioritised - the distinction was drawn within UK 
passport holders: those for whom at least one of their parents/grandparents had 
been bom, naturalised, registered or adopted in the UK, were exempted from 
control. Under pressure in parliament and from society, the 1968 Act ‘broke the 
promise' and thereafter they were British citizens in a legal sense, but citizens 
now reduced to second-class status formally, because of their lack of a close 
connection with the UK, but in reality because of their colour (Lester, 1975:12-3) 
and fears that they would be difficult to integrate and assimilate with the host 
population. They were only allowed to enter Britain under the ’special voucher 
scheme' thereafter, which was controlled and regulated by means of a voucher 
granted at administrative discretion under a world-wide quota and other 
conditions of eligibility determined by the UK government from time to time 
(Shah, 1994:62). This was only issued to the ‘head of household', which by and 
large meant, men. By inserting this grandparental connection to the Immigration 
Act, 'citizenship of the UK and colonies is separated from ‘right of entry' and 
‘right of abode' (Ishida, 1984).
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Apart from this emergency measure, until 1964, traditionally the conflict or 
confrontation on immigration policy had been understood as the framework of 
the 'Little England policy', which opted for immigration restriction and for 
European co-operation and ‘the preservation of the British empire' between the 
two parties (Rose et al., 1969). In particular, the subject of immigration policy 
was a sensitive one within British politics (ibid.,) and until the first piece of 
legislation (the 1962 Act) was introduced, there was much confrontation. 
However, just before the election of October 1964, the Labour government 
clearly shifted towards a tougher line on immigration control, which was later 
spelt out in the 1965 White paper.
The 1965 White paper (Cmnd.2739, August/1965) was the first indication of the 
Labour government’s opinion on immigration policy, and was controversial 
because of its unexpected tough line, but welcomed by the Conservatives. It 
proposed significant steps removed from the 1962 legislation, namely, reducing 
the number of vouchers (and abolition of unskilled category C). possible future 
restriction of dependants, suggestions of a repatriation scheme, police registration 
for Commonwealth citizens, and the increased power of the Home Secretary for 
deportation. After the White paper, "Commonwealth immigration' means 
particularly those from the New Commonwealth countries', who are subject to 
restriction (Dummett and Nicol, 1990:194). The 1971 Immigration Act was also 
very much a political Act and was not a response to economic circumstances or 
to a thought out labour position or population policy, but was a response to 
Enoch Powell's anti-immigration campaign.
178
The 1971 Immigration Bill was brought to the Parliament in February 1971. In 
the following section, two areas need to be explored:
a) the question of who, within the debate, was defined as being a 'patrial’, which 
may be found through an analysis of Hansard, i.e. how extensively can jus 
sanguinis be applied and who may be considered ‘patrials' in practice.
b) what effects the Act made to non-patrial, patrials and aliens. This point will 
connect later to the discussions of some well-known cases, when the Act was put 
into practice.
Particular attention needs to be paid to Clause 2 of the Bill - the definition of 
patriality. The question arises as to why it was included in the Immigration Act, 
but not in the Nationality Act. It is also necessarily to examine the extent of 
patriality and which groups were explicitly considered as non-patrials.
The meaning of patriality, according to Fransman (1989), is ‘those with a ‘right 
of abode' in the UK, who are ‘...free to live in, and to come and go into and 
from, the UK without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and 
in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be established’ (1971 
Immigration Act, Section 1(10)). It includes UK citizens and Commonwealth 
citizens bom to, or adopted by, a parent who, at the time of the birth or adoption, 
had UK citizenship by virtue of their own birth in the UK (1971 Immigration Act, 
Clause 2).
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Those who were not patriáis but intended to work in Britain, were required to 
obtain a work permit (which was renewable, subject to conditions) first. This 
‘work permits' replaced the employment vouchers which existed previously. 
Without the right of permanent residence or the right of entry for dependants’, 
the rights of non-patrials, who were Commonwealth citizens were greatly 
reduced. Non-patrials could only enter and ’...live, work and settle in the UK by 
permission and subject to such regulation and control... as is imposed by this 
Act...’ (Immigration Act 1971, Section 1(2)). The ’patriar clause therefore 
provides a clearer definition of patriality and nationality compared with the 
’grandparental clause’ in the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
Reginald Maulding attempted to justify the introduction of the 1971 Immigration 
Bill on the grounds of ’the existence of a problem of community relations’. ‘Free 
admission of Commonwealth citizens over generations’ lasted, he stated, so that 
‘control became quite necessary, because of the scale of immigration which took 
place, because of the speed at which it took place, and because of the way in 
which it was concentrated in certain areas where whole districts changed their 
character rapidly’ (Commons, vol.813, col.42-3, 8/3/1971).
Rose (1973a, 1973b) analyses three reasons for the introduction of the 1971 Bill. 
First, there was a need for the fulfilment of the Conservative party's manifesto for 
the 1970 election which promised ‘no further large-scale permanent immigration’ 
(Rose, 1973a: 184); in other words, there was a continuation of the ’numbers 
game’ as part of the election strategy. This point was emphasised in the debate:
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’...there should be a further reduction in the number of unskilled and semi-skilled 
people coming from all sources for permanent working immigration here. Under 
the Bill the total who come in future will be such as will carry out our 
undertaking of the election that there will be no further large-scale permanent 
immigration’ (Reginald Maulding, Commons, ibid., col.56, 8/3/1971).
Second, in Rose's view, there was a need for preparation in joining the European 
Economic Community. 'Britain's responsibilities to those placed in untenable 
positions by the liquidation of her colonial role which is what the now difficult 
combined citizenship reflects must be accepted - and have to be accepted also by 
Britain's European partners in the context of the Community's policy on the free 
movement of labour' (Rose, 1973a: 193). Although within the debate, the 
European issue was not significant, some authors think that the introduction of 
the patriality provision at this time coincided with Britain's access to the 
European Economic Community (Dummett and Nicol, 1990:219, for example). 
Most members of the EEC had similar ethnic migration provisions in their 
citizenship legislation, so while European Community membership was not a key 
factor, the change of legislation could be more easily defended as a necessary 
form of harmonisation with its European Community.
Finally, there was in Rose's view a need for the unitary immigration control of 
aliens as well as (new) Commonwealth citizens (Rose, 1973a: 186), so that the 
distinction was made between patrials and non-patrials regardless of their 
citizenship status. For example, Richard Sharpies, the Minister of State at Home
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Office stated that ‘...the whole complex of law [relating to alien and 
Commonwealth immigration] should be brought into harmony in a single piece of 
comprehensive and permanent legislation’ (Commons, ibid., col. 155, 8/3/1971). 
Until this point, there had been the 1914 Alien Act, the time-limited 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and its amendments of the 1968 and 1969 Acts 
which coexisted. This meant in practice, that matters were ’seen as an individual 
issue, and a matter of the ‘levelling down’ of the rights of immigrants’, to the 
level of permission and to the level of rules (Rose, 1973a). For instance, the 
introduction of ’alien registration' for Commonwealth citizens was considered in 
the original draft of the 1971 Immigration Act, but soon removed by the 
opposition from pressure groups (Moraes, 1993). This is noteworthy when the 
purpose of the 1971 Immigration Act was to distinguish patrial from non-patrial, 
or more symbolically, belongers from non-belongers.
In the initial Bill, ’patrial' is explained as conferring ’the right of abode on citizens 
of the United Kingdom and Colonies who themselves are connected with the UK 
by birth, adoption, naturalisation or registration; who have a parent or 
grandparent with such a connection; or who have been lawfully settled (i.e. 
ordinarily resident without any restriction on their period of stay) in the UK for 
five years, and on other Commonwealth citizens who have a parent or 
grandparent bom in the UK' (Immigration Bill, 23/2/1971, p.l).
According to Reginald Maulding, it can ‘accord [to those] who have a family 
connection with it a particular and special status’ (Commons, ibid., col.46,
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8/3/1971), and ‘there is a precedent of the 1968 Act which defined those who 
belonged to this country as those citizens of United Kingdom and Colonies who 
had a parent or grandparent bom in this country’ (ibid.). Therefore, the definition 
of ‘patrial' is much clearer than that of grandparental clause in the 1968 Act. The 
definition of ‘who has the right of abode' was quite complicated, and many 
questions were posed on this point at the Committee stage. For instance, Enoch 
Powell, who made a significant impact on the immigration debate, asked ‘why it 
was a Bill about immigration and not about citizenship’ (E.Powell, ibid., col.76, 
8/3/1971), and stated ‘I do not believe.... that one can tear one aspect of 
citizenship (immigration) apart from another and give people piece of it’ (ibid., 
col. 81). The reply from the government was : ‘It would be very agreeable if one 
could draw up a simple Bill tying up the concept of citizenship and basing 
immigration control on that concept...However...there are many serious practical 
difficulties which have prevented successive Governments from proceeding with a 
simple citizenship Bill' (R.Maulding, Commons, Standing Committee B, Official 
Report, Session 1970-1, col.152, 30/3/1971).
Next, it is worth examining some points posed in the Standing committee 
amendment requests, as there was substantial discussion of Clause 2, the 
definition of patriality (some points posed in this stage will see later on the court 
cases as well). Within Clause 2, together with the lineage connection 
(parental/grandparental) which had its roots in the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act, the connection with Britain arose also by ‘birth, adoption, 
naturalisation, registration', which was included in the British Nationality Act,
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and 'settlement' from the immigration provision. Among the amendments 
proposed to the Bill, were questions relating to the definition of patriality.
One of the most important of these came from Enoch Powell, who requested the 
important amendment which enables the restriction of patriality to the first 
generation only, for both ‘Citizens of UK and Colonies’ and 'Commonwealth 
citizens’, so that 'the distinction between citizenship and immigration get clearer’ 
(ibid., cols.127; 136-7, 25/3/1971). The result was that within the provisions, the 
qualification of Commonwealth citizens' descent was reduced to the first 
generation (ibid., cols.247-8; 275-6, 6/4/1971). However, the government later 
received criticism on this point from backbenchers whose constituents had 
relatives living abroad often in 'Old Commonwealth’ countries, and it was 
defeated in November 1972 in the debate on the Immigration Rules. This point is 
explored in detail by Norton (1976) that the government was forced to back 
down and restore the grandparent clause.
Norton (1976) regards the defeat of the 1972 Immigration Rules as one of the 
most important government defeats in post-war British parliamentary history 
(p.413), and explores why the original rules were opposed. He argues how and 
why the government needed to re-insert the grand-parental clause in the 1972 
Immigration rules because of the pressure from white constituents on their 
Conservative MPs. These constituents wished to protect their rights but more 
importantly their emigrant children's rights of return and access to Britain and 
British citizenship.
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Due to the combined results of the 1971 Immigration Act and the Treaty of 
Rome, 'the Rules were the preference which EEC nationals were to enjoy in 
entering the country by comparison with non-patrial Commonwealth citizens' 
(Norton, 1976:405). This left a number of Conservative MPs unhappy: Had
that [originally proposed patriality provision] been accepted and not struck out of 
the 1971 Bill, practically all Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders of 
British stock could have been accepted.’ (Bernard Braine, Commons, vol 846, 
cols.1404-5, 22/11/1972). Therefore, as Norton quotes, ‘In the opinion of this 
House, the citizens of Australia, Canada and New Zealand ought to enjoy full 
freedom of entry as visitors and rights of residence and employment in the United 
Kingdom not less favourable than the nationals of the Member States of the 
European Communities' (1972/3. No.l 19, John Briggs-Davison, Dec./19 quoted 
in Norton, 1976) and a motion was tabled and the grandparentage clause was put 
back in the immigration rules.
Under the 1971 Act, the traditional distinction between British subjects and aliens 
was replaced by a much more complicated set of arrangements by which the most 
privileged category was patrial British subjects, followed by a range of categories 
of people subject to immigration control and without the automatic right of 
abode. These categories include
1) non-patrial Commonwealth citizens
2) EC citizens
3) citizens of British Dependent Territories
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4) British Protected Persons
5) aliens.
But the major distinction after the 1971 Act was between patrial British subjects 
and the rest. The Act was a step towards making a completely new political 
status for Commonwealth subjects, categorising them as aliens.
The complexity of the second-generation clause has continued, however. In the 
1981 British Nationality Act, Section 14 (definition of British Citizen by descent) 
is, according to Baker (1982:788), 'a new and lengthy definition... one of the 
most complex, tortuous and badly drafted in any Act of Parliament’. Citizenship 
by descent status naturally imposes a restriction on its transmission to further 
generations. Dummett (1981:238) provides a rough summary as: ‘Citizenship by 
descent will pass automatically only to the first generation bom overseas, and in 
the second and subsequent generations will be available automatically only to 
Crown servants’ children and children of parents in ‘designated employment’ or 
by registration to the children of certain businessmen or business women’. 
Clearly, the shift towards a principle of jus sanguinis in citizenship legislation is 
very complex.
6.5 Patriality and Citizenship
This section examines the impact of 'the patrial clause' of the 1971 Immigration 
Act on nationality law, and in particular, on the characteristics of British 
citizenship and the subsequent change in the 1971 Immigration Act.
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After the 1971 Immigration Act provided the substantial distinction between 
patriáis and non-patrials as argued above, the next intention of the government 
was to clarify its nationality law. The Green paper (Cmnd.6795, April 1977) 
suggests possible changes. It says: ‘because Britain is no longer an Imperial 
power the all embracing concept of nationality associated with this role, including 
the CUKC, is no longer appropriate...the present CUKC, as its name implies, 
relates both to the UK and overseas territories, it does not identify those who 
belong to this country and have the right to enter and live here freely, in 
consequence it prevents the UK from basing its immigration policies on 
citizenship’ (p.4). It assesses the impact of the 1971 Act on the nationality issue 
thus: ‘The Immigration Act 1971 increased the confusion, since not only did 
distinctions within the citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies continue, 
the right of entry was also conferred, to a limited degree, on certain citizens of 
other Commonwealth countries' (Section 10).
The main intention of nationality reform was to replace the existing ‘Citizens of 
UK and Colonies’ with a ‘British Citizenship’ for those who had close ties, and a 
‘British Overseas Citizenship", for the remainder, who did not have a close 
connection with Britain. On evaluating the Green paper, the Conservative 
Political Centre (1980) offered its support, stating the view that the 1971 
Immigration Act had become ‘so entangled with the law of the nationality and the 
law relating to immigration that it is no longer possible to consider one without 
referring to the other', and that ‘in future immigration policies... must be founded 
on a separate citizenship of the UK and that it is therefore essential that a
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reformed law of nationality should, for the first time, make clear just who are the 
‘citizens of the UK' (1980:9).
In July 1980, when the White paper (Cmnd.7987, July 1980) was published, the 
Home Secretary William Whitelaw stated: 'The first point of simplification is the 
main purpose of full British Citizenship...A British Citizen is a person who 
belongs to this country and has full rights here', adding that it was a ‘considerable 
advance to have immigration controls based on nationality and citizenship' (The 
Guardian. 31/7/1980).
The White paper describes the characteristics of British citizenship as giving ‘the 
status of people closely connected with the United Kingdom, conferring on the 
holder of it the right to enter and remain in the country without restriction', and 
making available 'a ready definition of those people who have a close connection 
with the United Kingdom’ (Sections 37 and 38) - in other words, privileges in 
immigration (border) control and definition of those people governed by it.
So, what was to be changed from the 1971 Immigration Act? The White paper 
stated that, ‘Much of the amendment will consist of the replacement of the term 
‘patrial’, by reference to British citizens. The effect of these provisions will be 
that in the long term, the right of abode in the UK will depend exclusively on the 
possession of British citizenship. Transitional arrangements will be made for 
those Commonwealth citizens who at the time of coming into force of the Act
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have the right of abode, but who do not become British citizens, under the 
transitional provisions, of the Bill, will have that right preserved' (1980, p.23).
However, consideration of the connection between British nationality and 
citizenship rights was avoided in both the documents. The Green paper says, 
’Civic privileges do not stem directly from the law of nationality and that this was 
the reason they were not dealt with. In this country the common status of British 
subject held in our law not only by Citizen of UK and Colonies (CUKC) but by 
all other Commonwealth citizens carries voting and other privileges. There are 
also special arrangements for citizens of Irish Republic- (April 1977, Section 66, 
p.22). ‘The term ‘British subject' is pursued in a number of other UK statutes to 
define certain rights and privileges...the (1981 British Nationality) Bill will 
provide that where a statutory duty or entitlement is expressed in terms of British 
subject, it should be continue to have the meaning as it had under the 1948 Act. 
But the Bill, by establishing a British citizenship will make available a ready 
definition by which those duties and entitlements may be defined in the future. It 
would not necessarily follow that these would always be attached to the holding 
of British citizenship, there might be instances in which the present under 
definition would remain desirable’ (30/7/1980, seel 10). As civic rights are not 
considered in the White paper, the main emphasis was again on ‘immigration’, the 
right to enter the territory, and remain in the country.
Not surprisingly, the White paper met with disapproval in some quarters: ’[It] 
failed to grasp that nationality was a major constitutional question involving
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allegiance to and protection by a system of law and clearly defined rights and 
duties defined from the law and enforceable in the courts' (Prashar, S. in 
Runnymede Trust Bulletin, no.123, September 1980). ‘On the whole the white 
paper is an insular document, very tightly drawn which disregards, Britain’s 
imperial responsibilities and international obligations’ (ibid., December 1980, 
p.17).
As Brubaker (1989:11) points out, ‘Lacking national citizenship until 1981, 
Britain lacked a clear criterion for deciding whom to admit to its territory’ with 
the result that ‘while other countries were debating the citizenship status of 
immigrants, Britain was debating the immigration status of citizens’ (Dummett, 
1976, quoted in Brubaker. 1989:11). Paradoxically, therefore, immigration rights 
are the only subject in Britain which ‘sticks only to the UK proper’ (Lord 
Denning, at ex parte Phansopkar) until that point. The confused relationship 
between immigration and citizenship only became clear in relation to the 
nationality issue in 1981.
6.6 The role of the courts in Britain
The role of the courts as guarantors of minority rights in Britain is not as 
significant as it is in Japan. The reasons for this are partly that in Japan aliens 
have to seek the redress for their grievances in the courts as they have only 
limited access to the political process and even then this is indirect often through 
their homelands’ governments. In Britain, Parliamentary sovereignty means that 
legislation is more important than Court decisions as there is no written
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constitution guaranteeing minority rights and enhancing the political position of 
the courts. Also minorities do have political rights and so can lobby politicians 
directly. In Britain, it is more efficient to influence legislation and gain assistance 
from bodies like the CRE rather than try to expand minority rights through 
litigation. As we shall see, the courts in Britain tend not to interfere the legislative 
policy, and they allow rights only when they are clearly laid down by Parliament.
6.7 Claims to patriality
In this section, we shall see how the points referred to in the debates remained 
(during) the implementation of the 1971 Immigration Act. Within the original 
clause on patriality prior to the 1981 British Nationality Act, ‘patrial- is defined in 
a number of different ways as: ‘personal UK connection' (1971 Immigration Act 
section 2-1-a), ‘first generation UK ancestry’ (section 2-1-b-i), ‘second 
generation UK ancestry' (section 2-1-b-ii), ‘five years residence in the UK' 
(section 2-1-c), ‘Commonwealth citizens' (section 2-1-d), ‘married 
women(section 2-2) (see Fransman, 1983). Conditions of being a patrial include 
types of connection with the UK, such as birth, adoption, naturalisation, 
registration, ancestry, settlement or marriage. With regard to patriality, the points 
of dispute in case law seem to be entry claims and claims of right of abode in 
borderline examples. In addition, among patrials, there are patrials whose status 
has to be proved by way of certificate, and those who need not. As the definition 
of patrial in relation to the right of abode in the UK was replaced by the status of 
British Citizen (and Commonwealth citizens who have a right of abode before the 
1981 Act), in order to simplify the discussion, the main attention will be on the
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cases before the enforcement of the 1981 British Nationality Act, or when the 
‘patrial' clauses were valid, although some cases are after the enforcement of the 
1981 Act.
6.8 Decolonisation
It was the process of decolonisation combined with immigration from the 
colonies and newly independent Commonwealth countries which forced British 
politicians to confront the issue of who belonged to the UK, who should belong 
to the UK and how this should be legislated for in British citizenship legislation. 
The decolonisation issue relates to the discussion of the definition of ‘the UK' 
and what it meant, in practice, as the definition grew narrower with the 
development of immigration legislation. This topic is therefore a good example of 
how the question of who belongs to ‘the UK itself is defined. As mentioned 
above, narrowing the definition of the UK started as early as the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act. There was a test case in the High Court by the 
Home Office (The Times. 12/8/1967).
This found that a citizen of the UK and Colonies, a Mauritian who held a 
passport issued in the colony was not a holder of a UK passport within the 
meaning of Section 1 of the 1962 Act, and was, accordingly, unless bom in the 
UK, subject to the provisions of that Act. After the 1968 Act introduced the 
grandparental connection, the relationship between ‘UK passport' and ‘where it 
was issued' were further complicated.
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Within the debate on the 1971 Bill, in order to enable the right of abode to ‘those 
UK passport holders', there was a suggestion to delete grandparent or parental 
connection to the UK (David Steel, Standing Committee Official Report B, 
Session 1970-1. col.82, 23/3/1971), which was rejected. After the 197] Act was 
enforced, this point still continued to be a point of dispute. For example, two 
cases can be listed in this section as 'immigration into Britain itself’ or 'the effect 
of naturalisation'. In the first, Keshwani v SSHD [1975] 1mm.A.R.38, it was 
contested as whether 'naturalisation in the UK' included the former British 
protectorate of Uganda in 1956 and whether (that) 'citizenship by the 
naturalisation in the UK', gave the right of abode as a patrial. The claim was 
dismissed. The judge said: 'It was submitted that any naturalisation must be in the 
UK. But if that were a correct interpretation of Section 2(l)(a) 1971 
[Immigration Act], the reference to ‘the islands’ would be otiose’ (p.41). 
Similarly, in ex parte De Sousa [1977] Imm.A.R.6, it was argued whether a 
'British protected person naturalised in Kenya’, was recognised as naturalised in 
the UK and therefore conferred the right of abode in the UK or not. The 
interpretation hinged on whether it was the governor’s function to naturalise 
citizens, or the UK Secretary of State (p.8). These cases highlight the 
development of the UK as 'a territory' after its decolonisation, and how the 
definition of belonging (patriality) became clearer.
6.9 Commonwealth citizens
By the introduction of the patrial clause, the category of 'Commonwealth 
citizens' had considerably changed. ‘Commonwealth citizens' were divided into
193
who has connection to the UK, and who does not, or in other words, the 
category of 'Commonwealth citizens' were not any longer useful as it was, in 
relation to immigration status. Therefore, the requirements are connected with 
'citizenship' status in part as well as with pragmatic 'immigration' categories. To 
contrast with the Japanese situation, in the following, we shall see where the line 
was drawn.
In relation to the debate on the 1971 Immigration Bill (Clause 2) and the 1973 
Rules, the entitlement of right of abode to second-generation Commonwealth 
citizens was controversial. When it came to its application in practice, issues 
arose from those Commonwealth citizens who did not have a connection with the 
UK as patrials. Non-patrials (or those who need to claim their patriality), were 
subject to immigration control.
As Britain accepts immigrants as 'future citizens', some categories such as 
settlement are necessary for consideration of patriality. In addition, as the work 
vouchers were repealed and the system of work permit introduced, it is also 
possible to enter with a temporarily permit for students, for example, as well as 
those on business and then to claim settlement (and ultimately to the right of 
abode) several years after entry.
Immigration law in the UK defines three categories of settlement. These are, 
‘temporarily purpose’, 'marriage, business’ and ‘settlement’. The people under 
the first two categories can claim settlement when the condition of stay is lifted.
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For people in the third category, the entry as settlement has to be accepted. 
Conversely, even if an applicant seeks entry for a temporarily purpose, it could be 
rejected on the grounds that his/her entry is not genuine, (see for example, 
Kawaja v SSHD [1983] 1 All.ER. 765). Once settlement has been allowed, the 
way to (important) civil rights, such as the right to enter the territory and the 
right of abode, is opened to the candidate. However, as we have seen above, 
some rights, especially access to social services are increasingly linked to the 
immigration status, that is the right of residence and settlement in the UK, while 
for other entitlements, the condition depends on British subject status most of the 
time, rather than on British citizenship.
6.10 Secondary immigration
The following section considers ‘secondary immigration’, for comparison with 
Japanese issues. This is because most status disputes in Japan are brought by 
‘aliens' within Japan, and the formulation of nationality/immigration policy has 
occurred after their entry to the country.
Some ‘secondary immigration’ has been indistinguishable from primary 
immigration, such as ex parte Ruhul [1987] 3 All.ER. 705, where the son of a 
Commonwealth citizen (settled) applied for settlement and was refused as they 
must be qualified for themselves. Referring to the 1971 Act, the judge implied 
that similar treatment prevailed for aliens and Commonwealth citizens alike.
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There are quite a large number of cases connected with this topic. These section 
provides some examples of adoption of foreigners or other minors and entry as a 
spouse. These are particularly interesting from the point of view of ‘patriality', as 
they involve not only the status of entry-seekers but also the status of the 
sponsor. In addition, adoption and marriage involve family law issues, too.
In one case, Christodoulider [1985] Imm.A.R.179, a British Overseas Citizen in 
the UK renewed her passport (which was originally without any restrictions), and 
it came back as being subject to immigration control. The point of dispute was 
‘the right of abode, formerly called patriality'. ‘It was not something which could 
be conferred, it was something which a person either was or was not entitled 
to...’ (ibid, p.182) and the judge stated in her case, it (having been) ‘granted', 
‘she should not now be denied it'. Similarly, in Menon v ECO [1993] Imm.A.R. 
577, a citizen of Malaysia, ordinarily resident in the UK for five years, claimed 
CUKC in December 1982 and the right of abode in the UK. The grounds of his 
claim were that the place where his father was bom was a part of a ‘British 
possession' (an Indian native state) at that time. His request was rejected owing 
to ‘the difficulty stemming from the historical uncertainty as to the effect of the 
relationship between the Indian native states where he was bom and the UK on 
the concept of national of this country. They are not part of the dominions but for 
the international purpose from the national point of view, nor so recognised 
(p.580)’.
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Babies bom in the UK are British only if one of their parents is British or settled 
here at the time of their birth. Prior to 1981, birth in Britain could confer a status 
of citizen. In Minta v SSHD [1992] Imm.A.R.380, it was found that where a 
person bom in the UK travelled by British Visitor’s Passport, and was refused to 
enter on his return, neither a British Visitor’s Passport nor birth certificate are 
proof of their status as a British Citizen.
6.11 Spouses
In the initial 1971 Bill, the existing statutory rights of dependants were in effect 
withdrawn, remaining only in the immigration rules which ’may be altered... at 
any time, by the Home secretary’ (James Callaghan, Standing Committee B, 
ibid., col.289, 6/4/1971). It was suggested by Merlin Rees that these rights be 
reinstated (col.276, 6/4/1971) at the Committee stage, and although they 
remained withdrawn at that stage, the statutory rights of wives of 
Commonwealth citizens were put back by a Lords Amendment. Merlin Rees 
also commented that if Britain join the EEC, ’under Article 48 of the Treaty of 
Rome, there will be freedom of movement for workers, to come into this 
country, with their families', so that Bill should include the right of aliens as 
well’ (ibid., col.277-8, 6/4/1971).
Within the cases which came to court, there was an interesting distinction by 
which the entry of a wife depended on the status of her husband, between 
‘patrial’ and ’settled’. Later, the statutory right itself was repealed. In ex parte 
Phansopkar [1976] QB 606, a judicial review case, the wife of a patrial (CUKC)
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husband resident in England required a certificate of patriality (Section 3(a)) to 
get entry to the UK. She was in India, but the queue to obtain certificates was 
long and she decided to apply directly to the Home Office in Britain. She had 
been refused entry because she did not hold an entry certificate. However, within 
the judicial review. Lord Denning stated: 'By being registered as ‘CUKC’, not 
only he himself, but also his wife become a patrial with the right of abode 
automatically. The only thing she needs to do is to prove that she is his wife by 
way of obtaining ‘certificate of patriality'. 'There is nothing in the Act or the 
rules to tell us what the machinery is... therefore, she was entitled to apply to the 
Home Office in England for a certificate of patriality' (p.621). The Home Office 
of London cannot be 'justified in refusing the application simply because they are 
jumping the queue, they are entitled as of right and not by leave' (p.622). The 
Director of Runnymede Trust commented that the case was a ‘profound 
development for the humane administration of the immigration laws' (The Times, 
12/7/1975).
In the case of a wife of a settled person, the case was different. In ex parte Bibi 
[1976] 1.W.L.R.879, the wife of a settled Commonwealth citizen in the UK from 
Pakistan came to the UK and claimed entry, but was refused as she did not have 
an entry certificate from Pakistan. After Pakistan left the Commonwealth, 
‘anyone coming from Pakistan must comply with the rules relating to a non- 
Commonwealth citizen' (p.984). And ‘the wife of a Commonwealth citizen was 
not free to come into this country unless she was in possession of a current entry 
certificate granted to her’(p983. Lord Denning). In ex parte Ullah [1988] 3
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All.ER. 1, regarded as a test case, the husband, a British citizen argued his right 
to bring his wife who did not have the right of abode for herself to the UK based 
on his right of abode 'without let/hindrance', but was unsuccessful (Juss, 1988).
In relation to a husband's entry, settled wives in Britain contended that their 
spouses could not gain entry or were refused to remain because of discrimination 
on the grounds of sex and race, and a case went to the European Court of Human 
Rights. It was held that it was discrimination on the grounds of sex, in Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali vs UK [1985] 7 EHRR 471. But after this judgement, by 
the enforcement of the 1988 Immigration Act, the government removed the 
existing 'right of certain wives to join their husbands in the UK' so that there was 
no longer an absolute right of entry for the spouses of British citizens and 
Commonwealth citizens (Dummett and Nicol, 1990:230; WING, 1985).
6.12 Adoption and the case of children
Children's status in relation to patriality involves factors such as their domicile, 
ancestry, legitimacy of marriage and adoption (lineage), so that the disputes can 
be quite complicated. In the 1971 Immigration Bill debate, issues of adoption as 
well as legitimacy were questioned at the Committee stage. For instance, David 
Steel questioned why in the initial Bill, the statement ‘...a person who has been 
legally adopted shall be regarded... as being the child of his adopter or adoptee as 
well as that of the natural parents' was included (Standing Committee B, ibid., 
col.347, 20/4/1971), as for instance, non-patrials could adopt a child of patrials, 
and that child then become non-patrial. Concerning legitimacy, Jill Knight
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proposed including the word 'legitimate’, in order to stop claims of patriality by 
an illegitimate child who has a British father (ibid., col. 248-251, 1/4/1971). In 
the Act, it stated clearly that 'parent' referred to illegitimate mothers only.
In the courts, in the case of adoption, in Re W [1985] 3 All.ER. 449, a foreign 
minor, a Chinese national from Hong Kong came to the UK as a student, and his 
aunt a British citizen wanted to adopt him. His application was refused. The 
ruling shows the criteria of adoption as: ' in the context of (adoption of a foreign 
minor by a British citizen) its relationship with the immigration law, there are two 
significant effects; first, it confers on the adopted child 'British citizenship as from 
the date of the adoption order', second, it confers on the adopted child the right 
of abode in the UK' (p.452). In the application of a ‘foreign national's case, 
national securities are not overlooked'. Therefore, when ‘the application is based 
on the desire to nationality and the right of abode rather than the general welfare 
of the minor, the adoption order should not be made' (Re H [1982] 3 All.ER. 
84). Besides, ‘it is a matter of balancing welfare against public policy, and in the 
wider aspect less weight maybe attached to the aspect of the welfare of the 
particular individual' (ibid., p.94).
Finally, an interesting aspect of the distinction between 'existing adoptee seeks 
entry', where the main issue is settlement and 'prospective adoptee', in the first 
instance, on adoption order can be found in R v SSHD, ex p Khan [1985] 1 
All.ER. 40. When the factor of where to claim the adoption (i.e. the distinction of 
domicile) is added, the issue becomes more complicated. In Re Y [1985] 3
200
A1I.ER. 33, where questions arose whether persons who were residents abroad 
but domiciled in the UK could apply for an adoption’. By adoption, one can bring 
adopted children to the UK, as mentioned above. This case was contended mainly 
on the residence case, but avoided immigration issue, and implies ‘...if the 
children were to be adopted, they would be entitled to British passports'.
In case of legitimacy, in a very early case, C v Entry Clearance Officer, HK 
[1976] Imm.A.R. 165, an illegitimate child of a CUKC, whose father was in the 
UK, but mother was without the right of abode in the UK was refused entry as a 
student. Her initial application of entry was refused as they were ‘not satisfied 
that ...she intended to leave the UK'. Within her argument, she contended that 
she should be granted indefinite leave to remain even if she does not qualify as a 
'patrial', but the case was rejected because of her illegitimacy.
In comparison with Japan, in terms of children's status, British cases are much 
more complicated, since in Britain not only are immigration and nationality topics 
related, but also, principles of ju s  sanguinis and jus soli are applied in a much 
more complicated way.
6.13 Conclusion
This section has explored British patriality. Starting from areas which offer 
comparison with Japan, it then looked at literature to see how patrial issues are 
discussed. It also explored the debate on the 1971 Immigration Bill, and the 
implementation of the Act by case law assessing how far the problems expected
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in the debates became real issues in the courts later. It has also coasidered what
the unitary system of control of commonwealth citizens as well as aliens has 
meant in practice.
The Patriality clause was drawn up for two main reasons: firstly, to protect the 
rights of people of British descent who had settled overseas, especially those in 
the Old Commonwealth and secondly, to restrict entry of people without a close 
connection with the UK and especially, those who were non-white. The notion of 
patriality is complementary’ to the nation-state model of citizenship where it is 
argued that the state-membership ideal is based on nation-membership so that the 
political community should be simultaneously, a cultural community (Brubaker, 
1989:11). Nation membership in this model is earned through assimilation and 
also achieves this goal by preference to those with patrial status. Although Britain 
is not a typical nation-state, imposing the restriction on immigration from New 
Commonwealth countries as well as from former colonies provided gradual steps 
for a redefinition of itself as a nation-state or at least, to have a 'national' 
citizenship as Brubaker argues. However, as we have seen, the ‘patrial clause' 
was the product of a political compromise of people with different interests, and 
is not as straightforward as in Japan.
Within the perspective of comparison with Japanese issues, this study attempts to 
draw an analogy between patriality and koscki as relating to ‘British citizenship' 
and ‘Japanese nationality'. Both patriality and koscki are the criteria which
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establish subjects and aliens/nationals from others, although not citizenship or 
nationality in themselves.
With regard to the actual cases of those excluded from the patrial status, the 
cases of adoption, the status of wives or decolonisation are similar to the 
problems that have arisen in the Japanese context, although the fact of domicile 
or residence is not as complicated in the Japanese case as it is in the British. In 
contrast, with regard to settlement, those seeking entry as settlers as well as those 
claiming settlement after entry, cannot be found in the Japanese context. This Ls 
because in Japan, immigration and nationality are not linked as in Britain, where 
settlement cases are much more related to deportation issues or when settlers 
need to claim naturalisation. Therefore, in addition, rights are linked 
predominantly to nationality in the Japanese case and a move to the gradual 
linkage with settlement, while in the case of Britain, some rights are gradually 
linked to immigration status and to citizenship.
In order to compare Britain with Japan, Britain has been considered as a territory 
as well as the concept of patriality, through the topics of adoption, settlement, 
conflict of laws, naturalisation and decolonisation. Some of those are associated 
in some cases. On the relationship between immigration and nationality, the most 
important thing in the British context has been the separation of ‘right of abode’ 
and 'right of entry- from British nationality. Legislation has imposed immigration 
control on the former subjects so that their claims have been tacitly converted
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from a ’right' to enter into ’leave' to remain in the UK. However, unlike Japan, 
Britain still accepts immigrants as future citizens.
On secondary immigration, the assurance of entry for members of a family has 
arisen mainly because of the significant effect of the Commonwealth - UK 
relationship. When ties were broken, the basis of claims to enter Britain as a 
son/daughter/wife of ‘Commonwealth’ citizens was lost, as aliens have no right to 
bring anyone into the UK. having qualified his/herself for immigration control. 
Besides, unlike Japan, the UK was traditionally based on the jus soli principle at 
least until around 1962 and there is no direct co-relation between family law and 
national law.
Decolonisation arises in immigration control and naturalisation the effect of 
narrowing ‘the territorial concept of Britain'. However, one underlying fact - the 
choice of nationality - was often left open to people in newly independent 
countries, which is a difference between the UK and Japan. Although technically 
it is quite accurate to call people from Pakistan or Hong Kong ’foreign nationals', 
this attitude is quite similar to the attitude of the Japanese when they are referring 
to Korean residents in Japan as ‘foreign nationals’.
Concepts of patriality, nationality, and citizenship are considerably more complex 
in the UK compared with Japan - to the British as much as to foreigners. Sood 
commented that ’In the British case, patrial connects to descent, adoption, 
settlement...and even to domicile and residence... the things are so complicated...
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sometimes unnecessarily’ (oral communication, April, 1997). Even the Times has 
commented that ’Citizenship is a field in which a minor error in legislation 
becomes a major wrong to the individual’ (The Times, 30/7/1980 commenting on 
the White paper).
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Chapter 7: Patriality - Japan
7.1 Introduction
This chapter considers issues relating to 'patriality' in Japan. As it is 
predominantly based on a jus sanguinis principle, and as Japan has relatively 
tight control of immigration, this chapter will consider ‘patriality’ as a kind of 
exclusive form of categorisation against aliens and other groups who are 
resident in Japan, through the function of koseki (house registry). In other 
words, ‘koseki’ will be considered as a means of ‘patriality’, and be examined 
alongside the relationship between nationality and ethnicity, as these relate to 
the Japanese case. These concepts will be explored through court cases, as 
mentioned in a previous chapter. For aliens in Japan, going to court is the 
most effective strategy for getting rights granted. These provide the most 
important evidence for those wishing to gain a clear understanding not only 
of ethnicity and nationality, but also as an aspect of the close relationship 
between citizenship and nationality in Japan.
The chapter will look at the statistics related to marriage, birth and 
naturalisation to provide evidence of alien populations. Then it will move on 
to a discussion of koseki, its historical background, how it works and what 
its effects are, illustrated by an examination of the most important court 
cases. The main focus will be on two court cases which are called Kokuseki 
Kakunin Sosho in Japanese (Recognition of Japanese Nationality Suit). In 
order to give a better idea of how koseki works, it will refer to other court
cases for example, those which refer to the restoration of ‘names' as well as 
some up-to-date discussion concerning koseki  in newspaper articles.
The claims of Recognition of Japanese nationality suits are mostly brought by 
former mainland Japanese women. These court cases are contested as a result 
of the 1952 circular, which provided guidelines on who 'belonged' to Japan, 
Korea or Taiwan. Regarding the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 
circular, briefly discussed in Chapter 5, in Japan, koseki and nationality are 
often the major criteria for entitlement to various rights. This chapter will 
investigate the inter-relationship between Japanese nationality (kokusek i) and 
koseki  and the importance of kosek i's  impact upon kokuseki. Although 
‘nationality’ in a legal sense is again the main concern, by looking at koseki 
and its associated issues such as ‘naturalisation’ or ‘names', this will highlight 
the relationship between ’nationality’ and ‘ethnicity’ in Japan. This will also 
help to make some comparisons with 'nationality' in the British sense.
Patriality means ‘of or belonging to one's native country' (Oxford New 
English Dictionary). One way we can tackle ‘patriality’ in Japan is through 
the Immigration Law of 1989, which enlarged ways of entering Japan to 
persons of Japanese descent (n ikkeijin) up to and including the third 
generations of Japanese and their spouses, mainly through the categories of 
‘N ihonjin  no haigusha tou  ' (spouse and children of Japanese), and 'te ijusha ' 
(settlers). People entering under these two categories are different from those
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with permanent resident status. Under these two categories, people can stay 
in Japan initially up to three years.
Nikkeijin are descendants of people who emigrated from Japan to overseas 
destinations from 1868 onwards. After 1868, the destinations of Japanese 
emigrants were initially to Hawaii and the South Pacific islands, then to North 
America (particularly between 1900 and 1920). When restrictions were 
placed on their migration to North America, Japanese people migrated to 
South America. Between 1900 and 1942, some 626,000 people emigrated 
from Japan. Just after the Second World War, there was considerable 
repatriation as well as a shortage of food and work, and the Japanese 
government attempted population control in various ways, including 
encouragement of overseas emigration. However, by the early 1960s, the 
economic expansion had improved living standards as well as created a 
shortage of labour, and Japanese emigration declined. Between 1951 and 
1989, around 260,000 emigrated (OECD, 1994:58, Ninomiya, 1983: 281). 
The destinations for emigrants after the war are shown on Chart 7.1. Among 
those who emigrated to North and South America and China, nikkeijin, 
which is referred to in relation to immigration law in Japan at present, are 
only descendants of people from South America (such as Peru or Brazil). 
Those South Americans of Japanese descent increased after 1990 when Japan 
modified its immigration law.
However, Japan is not a jus soli country, that is, it does not have a principle 
of accepting immigrants as future citizens; being of Japanese descent does
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Chart 7.1 Japanese emigrants
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OECD (1994) SOPEMl, Trends in International Migration
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not ensure any automatic entitlement which Japanese nationals can enjoy as a 
matter of course. Moreover, there has been little discussion on the reasons 
for introducing a Japanese descendants clause in the Immigration law 
(Tanaka, 1991, Komai, 1993), nor is it possible to find any representative 
court cases which focus on these new Japanese descendants in particular. At 
the same time, Sellek (1996:263) who has researched nikkeijin in Japan 
regards nikkeijin (in this context meaning South American of Japanese 
descents exclusively) are much more alike to ‘foreign workers' than ‘ethnic 
immigration', due to the distance in terms of language, no previous contact 
with Japan, and residence in a different continent. Yet, 'as a labour reservoir, 
the nikkeijin community is too small' (Kura, 1991:142). The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs estimates that there are still some 1,280,000 people of 
Japanese descent in Brazil, 80,000 in Peru and 30,000 in Argentina (OECD, 
1994:61), but when considering those allowed to come to Japan up to the 
third generation, their spouses and those who are able to work, Kura and 
others (for instance, Cornelius, 1994:397) think the calculation by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an overestimate.
Rather, by focusing on 'recognition of Japanese nationality suits’, it is 
possible to examine part of the patriality concept or belonging to Japan, since 
those who attempt to restore their nationality, their ties or connection to 
Japan or Japanese society are much closer than those nikkeijin, even though, 
they do not have formal Japanese nationality. This may, however, be only 
part of a state-defined (top-down) view of patriality. Fukuoka (1993) and
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Kajita (1998) describe these Koreans in Japan as ‘sociological Japanese’, who 
do not have legal status but share other aspects of culture with the Japanese. 
But why and how does this formality matter? As mentioned before, as in the 
British case, formality or the issues concerning legal status do not seem to 
create a significant problem, compared with the issues of social discrimination 
in practice, while in Japan, it may be the other way round. In the following 
sections, the need to consider the importance of legal or formal distinction or 
discrimination in Japan must be borne in mind.
7.2 Birth and nationality statistics(related to naturalisation)
As compared with ‘registered aliens (discussed in Chapter 5), the figures 
shown below are connected with ‘ethnic Koreans’ (Japanese nationals with 
Korean ethnicity). According to Kim Kyeung-duk (1996, lecture), there are 
between 500,000-600,000 Korean Japanese (half-naturalised, half nationals 
by descent through having a Japanese parent). This situation is analysed in 
more detail below.
7.3 Naturalisation
In Japan, naturalisation statistics are closed to the public. The Ministry of 
Justice does not announce numbers of naturalisation applicants, nor the 
criteria for granting permission (Tong-Il-Il Pao, 28/1/1994). However, the 
yearly figures giving permission can be found in Hosojiho (Ministry of 
Justice, civil affairs bureau jurisdiction, Hosokai ed., monthly), and Tong-Il- 
II Ptw also presents the total every year. Early academic work on Koreans’
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naturalisation was carried out by Kim Yong-dal (1990) who himself 
experienced this process and this is still the main work on the naturalisation 
of Koreans. He explores and compares the view which (encouraging) Korean 
naturalisation as Japanese government policy and at the same time explores 
the views of those who went through the process of naturalisation.
As we see in Table 7.1, among those naturalised, more than 70 percent are of 
Korean origin. In 1995, a total of 14,104 were granted Japanese nationality 
through naturalisation and 10,327 of them were Koreans (Hosojiho, 
1996:48:7:32). In 1984, the Japanese Nationality Act was revised and for the 
adjustment procedure (transitionally those under 20 who had a Japanese 
mother and came under the certain conditions of parents’ lineage), acquisition 
of nationality by registration was regulated. There were 1,715 acquisitions of 
nationality by this act in 1995. The naturalisation rate of Koreans seems 
higher than the total aliens’ naturalisation rate. The numbers naturalised has 
been increasing, especially since 1992 (after the Special Immigration law 
1991, which secured the status of Koreans in Japan more than ever, as we 
saw in Chapter 5), and this is shown in Table 7.1. The total number of 
Koreans naturalised between 1952 and 1995 is 197,479 (Morita, 1996:182).
Although permanent resident status has not been secured for some time, in 
practice, many permanent resident status holders (at least those of Koreans 
and Taiwanese and their descents) have formed the majority of the registered 
population of aliens. When compared with other countries, the naturalisation
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rate is not so high, however. The reasons for the low naturalisation rate are 
firstly because upon naturalisation the Koreans believed that they must 
become Japanese ‘wholeheartedly’ as implied by the Japanese authority (for 
instance, Bridges, 1993:120). A further aspect is the view that ‘some parts of 
the society of Koreans in Japan discriminate against those naturalised, such as 
spreading false rumours that ‘those naturalised will be written down as ‘new 
Japanese' on their koseki’ (Kim Yong-dal, 1990:270). However, when we 
consider the fact that to many Koreans in Japan, ‘keeping their nationality as 
Korean is an important part of maintaining their identity' and a focus for 
protest (words by Bae, debate in Sekai, 1994:146), these sentiments are quite 
understandable.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
T o ta l  p e r m i t t e d 6 0 8 9 6 7 9 4 7 7 8 8 9 3 6 3 1 0 4 5 2 1 1 1 4 6 1 4 1 0 4
K o r e a n s  p e r m i t t e d 4 7 5 9 5 2 1 6 5 6 6 5 7 2 4 4 7 6 9 7 8 2 4 4 1 0 3 2 7
A c q u is i t io n  b v  r e p o r t* 1 4 2 6 1 9 2 4 1 9 6 2 2 0 7 8 2 0 4 1 1 7 1 5 ?
T o ta l  a l i e n s  r e g i s t e r e d 9 8 4 4 5 5 1 0 7 5 3 1 7 1 2 1 8 8 9 1 1 2 8 1 6 4 4 1 3 2 0 7 6 8 1 3 5 4 0 1 1 1 3 6 2 3 7 1
P e r c e n t  n a t u r a l i s e d  
a g a i n s t  a ll  r e s i d e n t s 0 . 6 2 % 0 . 6 3 % 0 . 6 0 % 0 . 7 7 % 0 . 7 8 % 0 . 8 2 % 1 . 0 0 %
K o r e a n s  n a t u r a l i s e d  
v s  K o r e a n s  r e g i s t e r e d 0 . 7 0 % 0 . 7 6 % 0 . 8 2 % 1 . 0 1 % 1 . 1 3 % 1 .2 2 % 1 . 5 5 %
* N a tu r a l i s a t io n  a c q u i r e d  b y  t r a n s i t i o n a l  m e a n s  ( m a te r n a l  l i n e a g e  a l lo w e d )  o r  b y  m a r r i a g e  
( r e c o g n i t i o n  a f t e r  b ir th )
Table 7.1 Naturalisation of Koreans
O E C D  ( 1 9 9 7 )  SO t‘EMl. Trends in International Migarion, Tong-U-ll Pao, 2 8 / 1 / 9 4 ,  
H o m u s h o  ( 1 9 9 6 ,  9 8 )  Hosojiho:47:6:l 18  a n d  4 8 : 7 : 3 2
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7.4 Marriage
Marriage and birth statistics can be found in Jinko Dotai Tokei (Vital 
statistics of Japan, 1995, Ministry of Health and Welfare). Marriages between 
aliens are not listed in these statistics, although births may be roughly 
estimated from alien registration statistics. For instance, according to Morita 
(1996), marriages between Koreans in 1993 numbered 1,781 couples. In 
1993, the number of children bom of Japanese fathers and Korean mothers 
was 3,704, while the number of children bom of Korean fathers and Japanese 
mothers was 3,249. The total number of children bom between Japanese and 
foreigners was 18,632, while children bom to marriages where both parents 
were Japanese were 1,169,650 (vol.l). Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
establish the number of children bom of Koreans and Japanese with Korean 
nationality (the figures shown above include 'reserved' Japanese nationals, 
i.e. dual nationality holders).
Until 1984, children with a Korean father and Japanese mother could not 
receive Japanese nationality by virtue of their birth. This changed with the 
incorporation of the United Nations Convention on the ‘Elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women', and the Ministry of Justice revised 
its Nationality Law in 1984. In 1993, the total number of marriages between 
Japanese couples was 766,001, while those between a foreigner and a 
Japanese national were 26,657. Among those, Japanese husbands with 
Korean wives numbered 5,068 and Korean husbands with Japanese wives 
were 2,762 (vol.2.table:8). Koreans here include new comers such as short
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stayers as well as permanent residents; some Koreans choose their spouses 
from Korea, and Korea liberalised its passport regulations for overseas travel 
in 1988 and this increased this flow. In the Japanese case, koseki (national 
registration) and kokuseki (Japanese nationality) are closely connected: being 
a Japanese national, you have to have koseki as an essential proof of your 
Japanese nationality.
7.5 The function of koseki, its background and effects
Next, we shall examine koseki. As described in the introduction, koseki (or 
house registry) has its origin in 1871, during the Meiji period. According to 
the Ministry of Justice, koseki initially exists for 'police, finance and criminal 
administration purposes, in order to check the familial-relative communal life 
of nationals', but after the enforcement of the Meiji Civil Code, it was 
transferred to an official registration and institutionalised (1986:199). In other 
words, koseki is connected with the period of modernisation, and national 
registration when the new Japanese government attempted to clarify the 
number and status of its citizens.
Why is this important? As we saw briefly in Chapter 5, koseki and nationality 
are criteria for the entitlement to rights. Secondly, as an institution and also as 
an ideology, the function of koseki is problematic. The notion of the pre-war 
‘family state system' has been described as ‘racial mythology' in Weiner 
(1994:19), but it was not possible without the institutional existence of the Meiji 
Civil Code (which regulated 'house' in law) and its procedural registration,
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koseki. Concerning koscki, there has been a couple of research from legal 
(mainly family law) aspect, including a work on court cases and law by Bryant 
(1991). However, there is not much written on koseki in English and Bryant’s 
work seems to emphasise its effect on minorities, and indirectly put the blame 
on them. It is therefore helpful here, to consider some up-to-date issues with 
respect to koseki.
Regarding koseki and Civil Codes, there have been several disputes in the past. 
Toshitani (1995) points out two major disputes: one in the Meiji period, and 
one just after the war. When it was compiled in 1871, koseki was in a conflict 
with the new Civil Code, which was strongly influenced by French law. The 
1890 Civil Code assumed the registry of self-identification instead of house 
registration (koseki), which is centred on the head of the household. Because of 
this, it caused a debate. Mizukuri, one of the drafters of the new Civil Code, 
argues that 'koseki is a kind of Oriental distinctive thing', which was only 
necessary during the feudal period. Therefore, after the enforcement of the new 
Civil Code, which requires a self-identification card, koseki will no longer be of 
use. Watanabe, a civil servant, has supported the continuing necessity of koseki: 
‘The purpose of koseki is that where there is a house, there is a head of the 
house, and he should have responsibility for taking care of the whole family, 
elders as well as infants, maintaining ethics, and shelters (without the help of 
the state), everyone can have things to eat and wear.'
(Genrouin kaigi, quoted in Fukushima and Toshitani, 1957:317)
2 1 6
In this context, Hozumi Yatsuka, a legal scholar wrote a famous article 
entitled 'the Civil Code appears and loyalty and filial piety disappears' 
(Minpo iclete chuko horobu, 1891). He argues: ‘Our country is that of 
ancestral worship, the home of house system, power and law were bom 
under 'house' (ibid., 223). This showed an ideological argument of ‘house’ 
and 'family' in Japan as well. In the end, the Civil Code concerning the family 
and assets was re-drafted so that it fitted with koseki.
In addition, the disputes concerning koseki and the Civil Code arose just after 
the war. After Japan lost the War, the Occupational Powers required the Civil 
Code to be revised in order to fit in with the ‘equality between both sexes’ in 
the new Constitution. This time, the erasure of the clause concerning the head 
of household and the family in the Civil Code was the topic. While one side 
argued the importance and the continuation of the ‘house system', the other 
side opposed this view as the present system of the house was no longer 
adequate for the present situation. As there was not enough time to revise the 
new Civil Code, before the enactment of the new constitution, the 
modification was minimal. The Koseki Act was also revised, and instead of 
'family', those who shared the same surname (uji) became the unit of a 
household (Wagatsuma et al. eds., 1956).
Since 1991, discussion has again arisen concerning the revision of the Civil 
Code, which has some impact on the koseki system as well. Public attention 
focuses exclusively on the possible inclusion of a clause which allows
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different surnames for a married couple(F«/w bessci) (Yomiuri shinbun 
27/2/1996). At present, a married Japanese couple have to have a unified 
surname (uji), which is registered and written in koseki. In most cases, the 
woman changes her maiden name. But in daily life, if these married women 
(and some men who changed their surname) want to continue to use their 
birth surname after their marriage, they might be or might not be allowed1. 
Some argue that different surnames spoil the totality of a family, while others 
argue that they do not want to lose their identity. As those sharing the same 
surname consist of a unit of a koseki, at this moment, the revision will affect 
the present system of koseki as well. This is quite different from the situation 
in Britain, where it is possible to change a surname quite easily without wider 
social effects.
Next, let us turn our attention to the function of koseki in relation to 
citizenship status. The function of koseki is critically examined by Tanaka 
(1980) first, as an ‘invisible tool of national integration’. He explores the 
works written by the officials of the Ministry of Justice, which holds 
jurisdiction and the local authorities where they carry out the practice of law. 
He cites the work of Tashiro (1972, 1975) as Tashiro includes some 
comparisons with other countries on koseki. According to Tashiro and 
Kozuma (1980), in countries where jus sanguinis prevails, a newborn baby 
acquires its father's or mother’s nationality, and therefore these countries 
needs law which regulate parent-child relations. Among these, countries
1 In Japan, it is rather common to call each other by his/her surname, unless they are very 
close. And that the change is very obvious and easily recognised.
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which take the principle of paternal priority need the law to recognise the 
father/child relationship legally, as this relationship is difficult for the state to 
confirm objectively. In this case, marriage law becomes important, and family 
law inevitably develops. The Japanese nationality law had paternal priority 
until 1984. Secondly, koseki confirms those who hold Japanese nationality as 
it only keeps records of those who are domiciled in Japan. The relationship 
between house registration (koseki) law and nationality (kokuseki) law is that 
the former is procedural law and the latter is substantive law. However, 
within the actual process of registration, house registration precedes 
nationality registration (Tashiro, 1972). This system is in fact, regarded by 
officials as an effective way of ensuring comprehensiveness. The problem is 
that regulation of the procedural law often binds and restricts substantive law 
such as Conflict of laws or Civil Codes (Ishiguro, 1992:82) which we will see 
in cases later. By drawing on these works, Tashiro (1980) attempts to make 
comparison with other countries' registration processes.
In this regard, koseki is a national registration for identification as well as 
familial status registration, and extended both to public and private law. In 
countries where Jus soli prevails, there is no need to consider familial 
relations but only domicile status in order to establish to  where a person 
belongs (Tashiro, 1972). In comparing Japan’s situation with Britain, he 
considers that maintenance obligation belongs to social security (public law) 
in the UK while in Japan these obligations depend on private (familial
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obligation regulated by the Civil Code). Koseki provides perfectly for this 
purpose (Tashiro, 1975:14-7).
Koseki is not pure jus sanguinis nor jus soli, it is se mi jus sanguinis or 
domicile (Kuwata. 1961:663). This comes from its connection with the 
‘house system’. The purpose of registration is firstly for the status 
registration of who belongs to which house. For instance, koseki is organised 
by household, and embraces the head of the household and his family. Koseki 
is also connected to familial status registration (such as the beginning of a 
relationship or its alteration). After status registration began in the 
1898(M31) Civil Code (kinship and succession), the purpose of koseki has 
changed. In 1886 (M19V the purpose of koseki was to assist a census, 
together with control by the authorities but by the 1898 Civil Code, koseki 
began instead to focus on the house system (Tashiro and Kozuma, 
1980:108).
The kinds of registration necessary for reporting are; birth, 
acknowledgement, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, succession, 
naturalisation, acquisition of Japanese nationality, alteration of family name or 
given name, change and establishment of new domicile etc. (29 topics are 
given in Hosojiho (1996, 48:7:32). The compulsory registration include birth, 
death, divorce by court order, renunciation, loss or change of nationality, 
naturalisation and establishment of a new domicile status. Options are
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marriage, divorce by mutual agreement, adoption, and voluntary 
acknowledgement etc. (Homusho, 1986).
Many scholars agree that, as a registration system, koseki is very effective 
(Tanaka, 1980; Matsuo. 1990), in the sense of giving authorities detailed 
information and control over the population. As shown above, it is an official 
view of house registry, but there are other problems associated with this 
registration, as 1 roughly touched on this in chapter 3 (method and 
methodology) and also in chapter 5 (rights and residence-Japan, on Park's 
employment discrimination case). Sato (1997:25-29) defines koseki"s five 
different functions of 'discrimination' as being:
1) differentiation: nowadays, only the Imperial family and aliens fall within 
different systems of registration, but in the past, groups such as indigenous 
Ainu and Burakumin who were put into separate sections of house registry,
2) labelling: the registry includes personal information, such as adoption etc.,
3) tracing: it is possible to research a person’s record and find out where s/he 
originally came from. This makes it possible to identify Burakumin, for 
example who are discriminated on the basis of where their families originate 
from,
4) comprehension: by emphasising 'house', individuals are connected as a 
family, and things like the Japanese-style surname or closeness to the Imperial 
family are valued. This aspect also relates to the above-mentioned issue of the 
different surnames of a couple.
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5) certification: which means koscki registry is not impossible to look up, so 
that everyone can check on other’s personal details when they want to, for 
the purposes of marriage, employment etc.
Sato (1997) regards the last function (certification) as the most significant, as 
it is crucial in relation to discrimination. Taken overall, the effectiveness of 
institution (koscki) all the more binds and controls the Japanese people's lives. 
However, as this registry seems ‘so natural that it is hard to notice its 
problems' (Tanaka, 1980).
The following section looks at cases of 'names' and naturalisation, partly to 
show some examples of the problems associated with koscki. Although this is 
not directly connected to recognition of Japanese nationality suits, it relates 
to 'nationality' in the Japanese sense and 'ethnicity', so it produces useful 
comparisons with 'nationality' in the British sense.
7.6 Attempts to restore ‘ethnic names’
In order to discuss these court cases, it is necessary to start from the problem 
of the Japanese colonial policy and to be aware that there is still social 
discrimination which forces many Koreans in Japan to hide their ethnic origin. 
During the period of the Japanese Empire, a policy called ‘policy for 
assimilation of empire subjects' (kominka seisaku) was implemented. It was a 
twofold measure, firstly prohibiting the use of non-Japanese languages such 
as Korean and Chinese, and secondly, under sousi kaimci it created a 'family'
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surname and altered given names. Traditionally, in Korea unified family 
names for a household do not exist: married women retain their familial name 
after marriage. Koreans were ordered to choose one family name per 
household and at the same time to change their Korean ethnic name into a 
Japanese style name2.
According to Kim Kyeung-duk (23/10/1996, lecture), at present, out of 
roughly 660,000 holders of Korean nationality in Japan, only 10 to 20 percent 
of them use their real (Korean) name (this figure, includes ‘new comer’ 
Koreans). Korean-Japanese (that is, those of Japanese nationality but with a 
Korean ethnic background) are estimated to number between 500,000 and 
600,000, and 99 percent use their tsumci (common Japanese) name at 
present. Most of these need to use their Japanese style name in order to avoid 
social discrimination within the society, and this may lead over time to 
assimilation and naturalisation in Japan. Discrimination also works in both 
ways: the ‘Korean-Japanese- and ‘dual nationals' are not fully accepted by 
either Japanese society or Korean society, according to Kim Kyeung-duk 
(ibid.,), even though, the naturalisation rate is not very high in Japan.
Until the revision of the 1984 Japanese Nationality Act, the guidelines for the 
application of naturalisation included the need to have a Japanese-style name 
for the purpose of koseki registration. Until 1952, ‘Japanese (subjects)' 
should belong to a house and have a unified Japanese-style family name. This
2 Takasaki, 1995:71; Maher and Kawanishi, 1995; Sugihara, 1993; sou in detail Miyamoto, Kim, 
and Yang, 1990 or Kim, 1978.
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custom remains in the practice of koseki and a belief exists that ’only 
Japanese nationals have a family name within Japanese domestic law' (Kasai 
geppo, 1981:33:5:94, quoted in Ishiguro, 1992).
In November 1982, it was reported that a Vietnamese (naturalised Japanese) 
successfully restored his real name Tran Din Ton after being given a Japanese 
name. Within this judgement at a family court, the judge criticised the 
naturalisation policy of the Ministry of Justice which ‘forces the applicants to 
hold Japanese-style names', quoted in Yoshioka and Yamamoto (1986). 
Since then, some Korean-Japanese (including those who have been 
naturalised as well as those bom a Japanese national through mix-parentage) 
have individually requested family courts to restore their ethnic name. After 
their first claim was rejected (on grounds of needing to maintain 'stability of 
the language of naming, and ‘nationalism is not accepted as a reason for 
change' (Maher and Kawanishi, 1995), they formed a group dedicated to 
restoring ethnic names in 1985 (Minzokumci wo torimodosukai, 1990). In a 
TV interview in December 1996, a member of that group. Park Sil spoke of 
his experience of naturalisation and the restoration of his ethnic name. In his 
case, naturalisation was recommended by his fiancee’s parents for their 
condition of marriage. His second request to revert back to his ethnic Korean 
name was allowed in June 1987 at a family court.
The belief that when you speak your name, people can tell your nationality 
(Tanaka, 1991) is gradually changing. However, although the requirement to
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hold a Japanese-style name in order to achieve naturalisation was cancelled 
after the revision of the 1984 Act, problems remain with its 'pronunciation’, 
as a name must be written in Japanese letters (Sato, 1993). It is worth noting 
that 'to hold Japanese-style name' and ' to have a koseki as a ‘Japanese 
national' is closely connected and still remains in the koseki registration and 
other administrative practices.
7.7 Recognition of Japanese nationality suits- why these are in question
This section describes other suits regarding recognition of Japanese 
nationality which will not be examined in the main part. According to the 
supreme court decision on the famous Maclean ruling in 1978, depending on 
the nature of rights, aliens also have basic human rights (Hanji:903:3). 
However, within the Japanese constitution, the actual wording says nothing 
of aliens' rights, as previously discussed in Chapter 3. Although most ‘basic 
human rights' (kihonteki jinken) except political and some economic rights 
are nowadays ensured to aliens, the problem lies in the fact that the 
discussion of aliens' rights often starts from  the point that 'aliens are not 
guaranteed equal protection of the law, citing Article 14 of the Constitution 
(for instance, Gaimusho. 1965). In this context, it is worth stating agreement 
with Hideo Tanaka in his view that ‘the word ‘kokumin ’ is more properly 
translated as 'nationals' rather than ‘the people’, which is the term used for 
the official English text (Tanaka, 1976:721), especially when it comes to its 
application and interpretation. For the difference between the English 
‘original' text and the Japanese version ('proper’ text), see Furukawa (1986).
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Furukawa (1986) considers that the equal protection clause included 
originally the words, 'regardless of nationality' within the Constitutional 
draft, but later 'regardless of nationality' was removed. Tanaka's (1976) 
discussion only relates to Article 14 on the 'equal protection of the law', and 
quite often this 'kokumin' means Japanese nationals only. However, 
according to Mori Yasunori (verbal communication, 25/10/1996), the main 
consideration at the time of drafting the new constitution was whether or not 
to include 'monarchy' (tcnno) within 'kokumin' , rather than focusing on 
‘aliens'. In relation to the condition of being 'kokumin' , the English text uses 
the term 'nationals'. Hereafter unless stated, I shall use 'nationality' for the 
legalistic meaning, in order to deal with court cases as well as contextual 
consideration.
Suits for Recognition of Japanese nationality are brought by those who have 
lost or do not have Japanese nationality for some reason, and wish to gain it 
as of right. Those who have brought these suits are ex-Japanese wives 
married to foreigners before 1952, former empire subjects such as Koreaas 
and Taiwanese, stateless children and war-displaced persons.
There are several reasons for focusing on these Recognition suits. There are 
many cases of this nature and they address key questions relating to the 
nature and extent of Japanese nationality. Exploring these cases also provides 
an opportunity to elaborate surrounding issues around Japanese nationality 
such as koseki, naturalisation and ‘names’, and help to paint a picture of the
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official view of Japanese nationality. It is impossible to understand the 
‘official' view of Japanese nationality or membership of the Japanese national 
community merely by examining legal documents or constitutional law. It is 
also necessary to consider other criteria which may even include such issues 
as ‘mentality or people's sense’ (Nakagawa, 1994).
7.8 Former empire subjects
There are a number of cases brought by former empire subjects. Among those 
Koreans in Japan, Song Tu-hoe first brought his case to a court in October 
1969 (Hanji: 1010:139). He was bom at a time when his parents had Japanese 
subject status but with Korean koseki. He thereby acquired Japanese subject 
status but lost it in 1952. He argued that he was still a Japanese national, and 
therefore set fire to his alien registration card and did not renew his ‘alien 
registration' nor his condition of stay in Japan.
In another case, a second-generation Korean living in Japan, Cho Kon-chi 
filed for his ‘recognition of Japanese nationality' (in this context, ‘first 
generation' means those who came to Japan before the war and those who 
were bom in Japan between 1945-71, while ‘second generation' refers to 
their children). Cho's parents had come to Japan before the war. He asked for 
reconsideration of deprivation of Japanese nationality on 1952 by the effects 
of the peace treaty (this point is made by Onuma, 1979b). This case includes 
a noteworthy judgement {Hanta:76\:166) saying that ‘it is true that in spite 
of the historical circumstances of Koreans in Japan... they are placed in an
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inferior status compared to the Japanese, by way of discrimination... but it is 
not because Koreans do not hold Japanese nationality, but because the 
fallacious Japanese legislative policy which was inconsiderate to the Japanese 
past colonial policy and did not give equal status to Koreans as to the 
Japanese.' Cho Kon-chi's claim itself was dismissed. The comment in the 
legal digest is also worth quoting, as it clearly indicates the aim of this suit: 
The case filed for the recognition of Japanese nationality to be argued in 
court, but his real intention seems to be rather to criticise the Japanese 
government policy over Koreans in Japan until now’ (ibid., 166).
7.9 War-displaced women and war orphans
In this context, war-displaced people are regarded as 'may be holding 
Japanese nationality without domicile' (Kidana, 1996). They are those who 
migrated overseas, to China for example, during the Japanese empire, but 
when Japan lost the war, they could not go back or in the case of children, 
their parents left them, and they remained outside Japan.
For instance, there is a case reported in the Japan Law Journal (1994:7:4) 
that after repatriation, the plaintiff's Japanese nationality was revoked as she 
was married to a Chinese national. She moved to north-east China when she 
was 10, was left behind after the war, and was raised by Chinese foster 
parents. She then married a Chinese man, and had children. She returned to 
Japan with her children in 1983. She applied for her daughter’s naturalisation, 
and was eventually rejected by the Ministry of Justice which argued that she
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herself had become an alien. It is reported that this is the third case filed by 
war-displaced Japanese women, and the two previous plaintiffs won their 
cases. It is said that many war-displaced women have been naturalised after 
their repatriation to Japan. There is even a case reported that a war-displaced 
Japanese woman filed against the invalidity of her naturalisation (Yomiuri 
shinbun, 3/9/1996).
7.10 Stateless children
Apart from these recognition of Japanese nationality suits, there is another 
different type of recognition of Japanese nationality suits filed by stateless 
children in Japan, which is not related to the 1952 issue. A woman from 
South-East Asia (possibly the Philippines) gave birth in Japan. The child, 
Andre, was passed to an American couple, who were pastors. The mother 
disappeared, and his father was unknown. Later, the American couple 
adopted the child, but his status was left as stateless. This case was widely 
covered by the newspapers and according to their reports, after the Appellate 
Court ruling when the government’s appeal was allowed and his claim was 
rejected, 25,000 signatures were collected and submitted to the Supreme 
Court for reconsideration of this case (Asahi shinbun, 6/9/1994). According 
to the Ministry of Justice, there were 138 stateless children (less than four 
years old) at the end of 1992 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun: 27/1/1995). It became a 
celebrated case in 1995 at the Supreme court (27/1/1995), which overturned 
the Appellate Court ruling and allowed Andre his Japanese Nationality. It has 
also had a great impact on the practice of the Ministry of Justice, as it very
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rarely used to allow Japanese nationality to stateless people. For this case, the 
supreme court allowed exceptional application of jus soli for the acquisition 
of Japanese nationality, saying that in order to prove ‘neither of parents 
unknown, the claimant should only prove that s/he ‘cannot specify’ the 
parents’ (.Asahi Shinbun, 27/1/1995). Although this is not connected to the 
1952 issue, it is included here as it has something in common with other suits 
over the point that the intention of the Japanese government to interpret 
narrowly the definition of ‘nationals’, and protests from claimants, who are 
not fixed in that framework.
7.11 Some suits on Recognition of Japanese Nationality 
case 1(5/4/1961, Minshu: 15:4:657)
Most of the Recognition of Japanese Nationality suits are filed by former 
mainland women (that is, those who were bom Japanese, married to former 
empire subjects moved into their koseki, and thereby lost Japanese nationality 
in 1952) (Tameike, 1993).
There were two kinds of Japanese empire subjects - one was ‘mainlanders’ 
(bom Japanese) and the other was ’hinterlanders’ (acquired Japanese). The 
two koseki registries were kept strictly separate, except in the case of 
marriage, which meant incorporation into a different household for women.
This is the first Supreme Court judgement on the effect of the 1952 Peace 
Treaty (and directly, to the 1952 Minji Ko 438 circular) for deprivation of
Japanese nationality of a Japanese-born woman (who married a Korean man 
before the World War. II) which was approved (Egawa, 1961:92; Onuma, 
1979b, 96:3:267) and it is a leading case in the recognition of Japanese 
nationality suits. Furthermore, this ruling influences on the result of other 
recognition of Japanese suits filed by Japanese as well as former empire 
subjects later on.
Japan acquired its overseas territories after the enactment of the Meiji 
Constitution. As there was no statement within the Meiji Constitution on the 
acquisition of territories, overseas territories are regarded as different legal 
entities from mainland Japan. The Common Code (1898) was enacted in 
order to arbitrate disputes between mainland Japan and its overseas 
territories. In relation to house registry, the Common Code Article 3-1 says: 
’One who gets in a house in an area shall leave the house in other area.' This 
article connects to house registry and to the house system regulated in the 
Meiji Civil Code. However, this Common Code lost its substantial effect after 
the Potsdam Declaration and later, the Meiji Civil Code (the part related to 
kinship and succession) and the Meiji Nationality Law were repealed after the 
enforcement of the present Constitution.
7.12 Case 1
A Japanese-native bom woman was married to a Korean man in 1935. 
However, she was divorced (by court approval) in November 1952. Her 
divorce registration to the municipal office was not accepted as she was told
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that she had lost her Japanese nationality after the 1952 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty therefore, she became an alien. She filed a suit against the state to 
recognise her holding Japanese nationality.
Tokyo District Court (27/2/1954) ruled that she keep her Japanese 
nationality. 'Mainland woman loses her Japanese nationality if she marries a 
Korean (acquired Japanese) before the 1952 Peace Treaty, and also live with 
him at that time in Korea as residents, husband and wife will lose their 
Japanese nationality by the enforcement of that Treaty. In this case, however, 
at the time of the 1952 Treaty enforcement, the couple had already separated 
and she lived independently in Japan with reasonable (divorce) reason. 
Therefore, she is not immediately denationalised. Furthermore, within the 
present Nationality Act, a wife does not lose her Japanese nationality when 
her husband loses his...' (Tameike, 1995).
The Tokyo Appellate Court (30/3/1955) overturned this judgement. It stated 
that:' by the former (before annexed) Korean law, an alien woman who 
marries a former Korean man shall acquire Korean nationality. According to 
the previous Japanese Nationality Law, a native Japanese woman who 
marries an alien man and acquires his nationality shall lose her Japanese 
nationality (Article 18). If there had not been the annexation of Korea... it Ls 
clear that a Japanese woman who got married to Korean man would acquire 
the former Korean nationality and shall lose Japanese nationality' 
(Saikosuibunsht) Minshu:693).
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At the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that first, the Appellate Court 
judgement was against the (present) Constitution and the Nationality Law. In 
addition, there was no consideration of the fact that if Korea had not been 
annexed, there would be no marriage between the appellant and her ex- 
husband. Second, on the interpretation of the effectuation of the 1952 Treaty, 
it is impossible as well as unreasonable to estimate renunciation of rights in 
person (of Japanese), who became the wife or the adopted children of 
Koreans from the section which states the renunciation of Korean sovereignty 
by Japan. Third, the appellant is bom Japanese and has already had a divorce 
order and is settled in Japan, therefore she is disqualified from the criteria of 
deprivation of Japanese nationality (the reason of appeal, 1961:675-6).
After 9 years of dispute, the supreme court finally dismissed her appeal. The 
reasons were: first, there is no regulation of alteration of nationality by the 
alteration of territorial jurisdiction within Japanese Nationality Law. There is 
no clear principle for this in international law, and it depends case by case on 
the individual treaty expressly or implied, (therefore, there is no reason for 
this to be against the Constitution nor the application of the Nationality Law). 
Second, the interpretation of the 1952 Treaty Article 2-a) ‘Japan, recognising 
the independence of Korea, renounces all rights, title and claim to Korea...’, 
is to abandon the Japanese jurisdiction over people who belong to Korea, and 
that they shall lose Japanese nationality. Third is the extent of 'who' belongs 
to Korea, it means people who hold legal status as Korean after the 
annexation within Japanese domestic law. Those who receive the application
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of Korean House Registry Order, were registered in Korean House registry 
accordingly. Koreans and Japanese clearly belonged to a different house 
registry system as well as to a different legal system. By the Common Code 
Article 3-1 (shown above), a Japanese will became part of a Korean 
household by adoption or by marriage, when they are legally treated as 
Koreans. Concerning her divorce and her nationality, as she was married to a 
Korean man. her divorce cannot be established by the fact, but by court 
order. Since her divorce was granted in October 1952 after the 1952 Peace 
Treaty, it will not change the situation regarding deprivation of Japanese 
nationality (Judgement, p.3). This ruling was done by all 15 judges, including 
3 concurring opinions and 1 dissenting opinion, about the reason for 
deprivation of Japanese nationality and the exact point of when it happened. 
This judgement confirmed at the same time the present practice of house 
registry administration.
Asuhi shinbun reported that ‘more than 10,000 of people were estimated to 
be in the same position as this woman applicant. By this judgement, it became 
clear that they cannot expect their nationality restoration by lawsuits’ 
(5/4/1961). I found Egawa's comment (1961:93) particularly interesting. He 
agrees with the supreme court judgement, and said ‘after the Korean 
Annexation. Korea became part of Japan, and Koreans were also given 
Japanese nationality within an international law sense. However, within the 
Japanese domestic law, Koreans and Japanese were strictly distinguished. It 
is reasonable to understand the alteration of nationality after the 1952 Peace
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Treaty according to this distinction' (emphasis added). There was no strong 
opposition against this supreme court judgement. Despite Japanese and 
Koreans having shared the status of Japanese subjects, the distinction based 
on house registry was strictly enforced.
7.13 1994 Recognition of Japanese nationality suit
This case has just received a judgement from the Supreme Court in March 
1998. Although this is regarded as a ‘very rare case’ (Hanta) in terms of its 
factual situation, nevertheless, it received attention as the appellate court 
ruling in 1994, did not concur with the 1961 judgement (given above) the 
first time round.
The plaintiff is a child bom of a Korean man and Japanese woman. Firstly, 
her mother filed for invalidity of their marriage and after she won it (mother 
filed that the initial registration was against her will). The order was made as 
void in December 1989 Dec. (Hanta:824:l20). Her mother and her younger 
sister (who was bom after the 1950 new Nationality Act) restored their 
Japanese nationality accordingly. Then, this case is filed by her, requesting 
that although she is currently registered as an alien, her mother and her sister 
recovered their Japanese nationality, and she wants to live as a Japanese 
national (written answer from Mr. Hondo, spokesman, 7/1/1997).
The fact is that she was bom after the present Japanese constitution and the 
revised civil code, but before the enforcement of the 1950 Nationality Law.
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Her birth registration (house registration), which is the precondition to 
acquiring nationality both in Korea and Japan was not sent to Korea nor 
received in Japan. She was bom and lives in Japan. The point is, ‘how to 
interpret subordinate legislation when the old constitution is replaced by the 
new constitution (ibid.,).
The issue for the Osaka District Court is whether the ‘acknowledgement' by 
her Korean father, established the birth registration, and whether she lost 
Japanese nationality by the Peace Treaty. The judgement was as follows: first, 
the birth registration of the plaintiff had been submitted by her Korean father, 
second, this registration had the effect of ‘acknowledgement- even though 
Korea and Japan belonged to different legal entities at that time. When the 
birth registration was reported, the house system terminated (within mainland 
Japan) by the enforcement of the Japanese constitution and the revised Civil 
Code. However, the Common Code Article 3 was effective by the fact that 
even the house system terminated within the mainland, and Korean customary 
law existed in those days as well as the Meiji Japanese nationality law Article 
23, the criteria for the common code is satisfied (Hantu:824:122-3). This 
clearly follows precedents so far and the position of the Japanese government 
(the Ministry of Justice).
The Osaka Appellate Court overturned this ruling. The issue was on the 
‘acknowledgement effect' of birth registration under the new Constitution 
and the Civil Code. The kind of legal effect that ‘acknowledgement' had
2 3 6
depended on the applicability of the Common Code Article 3. The judges 
divided the period in two: the first period is before 3 May 1947 when the new 
Constitution and other legislation is enforced (until this point, Meiji Civil 
Code was effective): the second period is after 3 May 1947. When the 
present Civil Code and the new Koseki Act became effective, the appellant's 
birth certificate was reported on 17/6/1948. The Common Code is enforced 
in order to adjust conflict of laws between different legal entities. The actual 
law for the private law case is Horei (the Law for the application of laws, 
M31). defined in the Common Code. As the marriage registration of their 
parents' became void, her birth registration became that of an illegitimate 
child. In this case, the registration of birth has the effect of 
'acknowledgement'. Having established the division date of 3 May 1947, the 
legal effect of 'acknowledgement' can now be checked. The key factor is the 
applicability of the Article 3 of Common Code. The interpretation of 'house' 
in that article is the same 'house' regulated in the Meiji Civil Code. It means 
the acquisition and loss of domicile (i.e. ‘area and registry' (chiiki-seki). For 
the effect of ‘acknowledgement’ in this case, at that time Korean Civil Code 
and custom was still applicable. However, as it is also based on the ‘house’ 
system and is therefore against the new Constitution principle. At the time of 
'acknowledgement' the Meiji Nationality Law is still effective which regulates 
denationalisation by 'acknowledgement'. However at that time in Korean 
legislation, the illegitimate child of a Korean father cannot acquire Korean 
nationality and that Meiji Japanese Nationality Law (Article 23) is not
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applicable correspondingly (Hanta:875:257-8). The Appellate Court allowed 
her Japanese nationality.
The Appellate court ruling has taken the approach of conflict of the law 
(international private law) perspective, while the first ruling was done from 
the domestic (Nationality Law and the interpretation of the Peace Treaty) 
perspective (//««to:875:250). According to Mr.Hondo, this approach has not 
appeared before.
He assumed that quite many people were in similar position to her. Although 
as the Ministry of Justice is reluctant to permit recognition of Japanese 
nationality, and as this kind of suits is quite difficult to win, most people 
reject the court process in their attempt or acquire Japanese nationality 
through naturalisation (ibid.,). The problem of this judgement lies in the 
interpretation of Horei. Whether the judgement considered Korea’s public 
policy or not. (Samura, 1994). This is the only comment for this ruling. The 
Japanese government appealed to the Supreme Court afterwards. The content 
of deprivation of Japanese nationality by the 1952 Treaty is not statutory but 
is passed by way of the administrative interpretation (koscki) shown in the 
circular 438. And the circular influences important matters like deprivation of 
nationality (ibid., 447).
After this high court judgement, the plaintiff answered at a press interview: 
’Although 1 am a Japanese, without holding Japanese nationality, I always
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feel I lack something... 1 hope the state will not appeal and 1 have an easier 
life.' (Asa hi Shinbun, 26/2/1994). However, the appeal was allowed, and she 
lost the case (Asahi Shinbun, 13/3/1998). In a sense, the Supreme Court kept 
to the line of the 1961 ruling.
When I compare these two suits, which relate to 'marriage/divorce' for one 
and to 'recognition of birth' for the others as well as koscki and nationality 
for both, I agree with Moriki (1995), who explores the different examples of 
marginality associated with Japanese nationality. She states simply, 'the 
recognition of nationality suits are difficult things to understand’, because of 
legal complexities of when one act is repealed or when the effectuation is 
valid appears to us for an instance. It is also quite notable and odd to see that 
this incident around 1952 remains an important point of dispute in Japan. 
Although Japan is regarded as following the jus sanguinis principle, the role 
that koseki plays is not addressed in English academic literature.
As a source of defining patriality, the koseki system certainly qualifies as an 
important institution which connects rights (citizenship) and identity 
(nationality). It is naturally a legal institution and also has the important 
function of constructing and preserving the way the Japanese see 
'themselves', or perhaps, the way the Japanese government defines who are 
‘the Japanese’.
7.14 C o n c lu s io n
This chapter has examined Japanese patriality -in terms of koseki- with 
particular attention to its relationship with nationality status, as well as 
ethnicity. In order to understand the closeness of the concepts of citizenship 
and nationality in the Japanese context, we have to note that the koseki 
system is one of the key issues. Koseki influences all Japanese as well as 
minorities who are partially or totally excluded from the registry, and at the 
same time, its historical importance and continuity, as it has existed since the 
Meiji period. As we saw above, since its compilation during the Meiji period, 
it has caused controversy, and its problems have not yet been totally solved.
Those affected by the descent clause are few compared to the British case, 
but those influenced by koseki are many, including ‘aliens' who continuously 
live in Japan or have close connections with Japan, but are not included in 
that registration. For those who are considering the possibility of 
naturalisation, achieving koseki may be a symbol of Japanese nationality, 
which connects the status of ‘citizenship- with ethnic values, as shown clearly 
in the emphasis on having a ‘Japanese-like’ style of name.
This chapter also discussed cases of the recognition of Japanese nationality 
suits brought by former empire subjects, stateless children, war-displaced 
persons, and former mainland (i.e. Japanese) women. With regard to those 
married to Koreans before the war, and those who stayed in Japan after the 
war, whether or not they were included in koseki was the grounds for their
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loss of nationality in 1952. As this was not purely a jus sanguinis nor a jus 
soli principle, this left some people in between. Those war-displaced persons, 
in particular, had some difficulty in returning to Japan, because of the 
replacement of koscki.
It seems that the recognition of Japanese Nationality suits have a common 
characteristic. The plaintiffs’ ’ethnic origin’ or ‘ethnicity’ do not coincide 
with their legal status (or 'state membership’), or they are reproached for this 
by the Japanese government, in a way either implied or openly expressed. 
This seems to be a common reason why these cases are filed by the claimants.
After the war, it was considered reasonable to limit those who hold Japanese 
nationality, e.g. by removing this status from Chinese, Koreans and 
Taiwanese. Also, perhaps the Japanese government did not wish to be 
accused of stealing their citizens. Also, at this time there was little status in 
having Japanese nationality. However, as the Japanese economy has 
developed and prospered after the post-war period, and as Japan had become 
the important global state, so the status of being a Japanese national has 
become a valuable asset and privilege which more people wish to achieve. At 
least in this sense, from the government point of view, there is a reason to 
keep a tight population control policy.
In addition, the practice of koscki, a procedural legislation, strengthens the 
effect of substantive law, such as the Civil Code. In some cases, keeping
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koseki consistent is valued, for instance, in the debate of differentiation of
surnames, and places obstacles against those who suffer from it. Moreover, 
because of the rigidity of koseki, it prevents the Japanese government (or the 
Ministry of Justice) from being flexible in defining ‘nationality’. This partly 
accounts for the reason why these suits resulting from the effect of the 1952 
Treaty are still being filed. As a result, the extent of Japanese ‘national’ status 
is defined narrowly, and the distinction between aliens and Japanese is 
emphasised.
When we compare Japanese koseki with the British 'patrial' clause, they are 
found to be quite different: one relates to border control (immigration), while 
the other relates to internal control (registration and nationality). However, 
both help to differentiate aliens from citizens, and help to connect the 
concepts of 'citizenship' and 'nationality'. In the British case, the emphasis is 
on 'ethnic' migration, while in the Japanese system, these concepts are 
brought together by the registration of Japanese nationals.
When considering the application of Brubaker's model of nation-state 
membership) 1989), in the Japanese case, by considering exclusion of those 
outside Japan, and assimilation pressure of those inside Japan, ‘national’, 
nation membership and state membership should coincide, and should be 
'unique' as well. In other words, membership of the state and nation should 
coincide. These principles are important. In the British case, the 'national'
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principle is valued, but not as a ‘unique’ principle. This may be a consequence 
of the fact that Japan is closer to the prototype of a nation-state than Britain.
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C h a p te r  8: C onclusion
8.1 Summary
The withdrawal from Empire by both Britain and Japan had major consequences 
for their colonial subjects. In the case of Britain, the consequences were very 
gradual as the ties between Britain and its former colonies were severed slowly. 
Independence for colonial territories transformed colonial British subjects into 
citizens of independent Commonwealth countries, but they did not lose their 
status as British subjects. It was only in 1947 that the first Commonwealth 
country, Canada, introduced its own citizenship, independent of British subject 
status. New Zealand did not introduce its own citizenship until 1975, after 
Britain had joined the European Economic Community.
In the British case, it was the gradual introduction of immigration controls 
against British subjects from the colonies and independent Commonwealth 
countries which opened up the issue of British citizenship. The status of British 
subjects which included millions of people all over the world was appropriate for 
an imperial power with global interests and resources. It was not appropriate for 
a European country nervous about its ability to maintain its position as a leading 
European country.
The introduction of immigration controls and the right of deportation of colonial 
and Commonwealth citizens meant that British subjects without a close link to 
Britain were treated more like aliens than people with citizenship rights. In a real
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sense the pressure for immigration controls against Commonwealth and colonial 
British subjects resulted in a rethinking of the nature and content of British 
citizenship which led to the 1981 Nationality Act and the attempt to define 
precisely who had the right of entry and permanent abode in the UK. The 
process of defining who is a British citizen is still continuing, as the recent 
decision by the British government to extend British citizenship to the remaining 
citizens of British Dependent Territories shows.
In the Japanese case the historical circumstances could not be more different. 
Japan lost her empire as a result of defeat in the Second World War in 1945. 
Immediately after the war, former colonial subjects, mainly Koreans, started 
voluntary repatriation. But gradually, when the tougher situation of the peninsula 
was realised, the move slowed down, and many decided to remain for the time 
being. By 1952, the Korean war had already broken out, and the diplomatic 
considerations of international circumstances determined most of the conditions 
for restoringJapane.se sovereignty. There was no voluntary, nor any arrangement 
with Korea, or China/Taiwan for the arrangement of former empire subjects. The 
Peace Treaty of 1952 forced Japan to relinquish her Empire. Under the guidance 
of the United States, Korea was not even given a chance to represent their 
opinions at the treaty. As a result, former colonial subjects became ‘citizens of 
independent countries’ overnight, without their ties with Japan being recognised 
by the Japanese government. The consequences of this were most 'adverse' for 
former colonial subjects resident in Japan, though most people (including 
Koreans themselves) thought that they would return eventually. Former colonial
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subjects were not allowed any kind of special status or dual nationality in 
recognition of their previous historic links with Japan, unlike in the British 
experience.
With regard to Koreans in Japan, the Japanese side had the principle of ‘peace- 
at-any-price' and ‘leave to take its own course’, and the government could not 
plan a comprehensive policy to Koreans in Japan on time, which made the issues 
more complicated. Although more than 90 percent of Koreans came from 
southern part of Korea initially, in 1957, more than 73 percent chose to register 
their origin as * Korea '(Chosen, which did not necessarily mean they belonged to 
North Korea), instead of ‘South Korea'(Kankoku) (Tsuboi, 1959:794). For the 
Koreans' side, they were also reluctant to request their rights in Japan despite 
their historic ties. This meant that the rights of Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan 
were more precarious than those of former British colonial subjects resident in 
Britain, and remained so for quite a long time after the war.
The very different histories of the British and Japanese colonial subjects has, 
inevitably, had different consequences. In Britain, colonial and New 
Commonwealth immigrants were quickly accepted as ethnic minorities and as full 
British citizens, even though in practice they might be subject to racial 
discrimination and treated as second-class citizens. In Japan, former empire 
subjects, especially of the second and third (and even fourth) generations, are in 
no way distinguishable from Japanese nationals, unless they show their passports, 
alien registration cards and other official documents. Discrimination against them
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is therefore on the grounds of their legal status, as aliens, rather than their 
ethnicity as Koreans.
In order to defend and expand their rights and situation, former colonial subjects 
were forced to adopt different strategies in the British and Japanese political 
systems. In Britain, former colonial subjects could involve themselves directly in 
the political process by lobbying MPs, going to MP surgeries, standing for local 
councils and even for Parliament. Involvement in anti-racist or anti-deportation 
campaigns with sympathetic trade unions or political groups were common. In 
Japan, former colonial subjects did not have political rights as they were aliens, 
so that in order to advance their rights they had to use the courts. Direct political 
activity would not have brought results as their political power was limited and 
their potential allies within Japan were few. They could expect some support at 
the international level from their ‘home’ governments, or by going to 
international organisations like the United Nations. However, for various reasons 
recourse to courts has been a popular strategy.
8.2 Discussion
The hypothesis proposed in the introduction was that ‘the withdrawal from 
empire by both Britain and Japan after the World War II and the subsequent 
'post-colonial adjustment' had a major impact on legal and political definitions of 
citizenship and nationality'.
Themes discussed in the main part of this study were:
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1) Issues relating to former empire subjects can be categorised in Britain as 
'racial', while in Japan, as ‘kokuseki’ (legal nationality) issue.
2) 'Denizenship' and 'patriality’ are two key concepts to measure the 
relationship of the two concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’, as well as 
important indicators of the status of ‘former empire subjects' on citizenship and 
nationality legislation.
3) For those former empire subjects, the best way to make some impact on the 
government policy is to go to courts in the case of Koreans in Japan, while for 
ethnic minorities in Britain, it is to engage in party politics and press for 
parliamentary legislation.
8.3 ’Race’ vs. kokuseki
This study has examined the importance of these concepts in each country’s 
context. Why is ‘race' more important in Britain than in Japan? Or, why 
'nationality' is more important in the Japanese context than in the British 
context?
In the British case, there was a long experience of empire which imprinted the 
British with feelings of supremacy over people in Africa and Asia. The period of 
holding empire had been long as well as spread in many different regions. This 
means that in the British case, there were chances to meet people from various 
cultural backgrounds, from all parts of the world. Contact with people from non- 
European regions as empire subjects usually had Europeans in positions of 
supremacy even after the empire was given up. Post-war migration of
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Commonwealth people again initially had newcomers in worse jobs and housing 
and so confirmed the superior-inferior relationship.
While in the case of Japan, the period when it held the empire was short - only 
for 50 years, and they were just the neighbouring areas. The Japanese colonial 
system was more suited to incorporating people who shared similar cultural 
settings from near geographical areas. That is why, in the Japanese case, the 
imposition of the mainland system to the colonies and an assimilation policy were 
possible, while in the British case, where the difference was significant, ‘indirect’ 
administration was the only viable alternative.
Regarding the debate on colonialism, Oguma once argued (1995) that 
‘separation is suitable for a society where equality within a same race is 
established', and that ‘within the same race, if they consist of a hierarchical 
order, within families or by elders, they do not need to have a separation’ (as 
order exists naturally), by which he means, the difference of the Japanese case 
from western cases.
In the context of the post-war period, in the British case, the gradual process of 
decolonisation allowed former subjects to keep their status as British subjects as 
well as rights attached to the status until 1962. In this situation, formal equality is 
taken for granted. While in the Japanese case, the rapid decolonisation stripped 
former empire subjects' status and made them mere aliens. Therefore, without a
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visible difference, it created a clear division of status between Japanese nationals 
and Koreans and Taiwanese.
8.4 Social vs legal discrimination
Regarding the ‘race' vs. ‘kokuscki’ framework, in Britain, as well as most 
countries in western Europe, discussion on discrimination is mainly about the 
quality or the level of social rights of ethnic minorities (de facto discrimination), 
while in Japan, discussion is about the dimensions of discrimination on formal 
rights (de jure discrimination) yet these remain in relation to those former empire 
subjects.
In the Japanese case, for instance, a former mainland woman's comment, 
'without Japanese nationality, I have been feeling lacking something...' or Chong 
Hyang-kyon’s comment as ‘when I am working in the same way as others, all o f 
a sudden, one day I am told that I am a foreigner...’ would never be made unless 
legal discrimination matters to them greatly in Japan. The core of discrimination 
against Koreans and Taiwanese is the kokuscki as well as the koseki criterion. 
This emphasises how formal rights in relation to former empire subjects are still 
important in Japan. It illustrates the point that Iyotani (1992:129) argues, 
namely, in Japan, ‘even in the area relating to basic human rights, for instance, 
education and medical treatments, formal equality has not yet been achieved’. 
This we can see in the examples of court cases challenging restrictions on rights 
to hold public office and the right to receive medical treatment. The situation 
which Iyotani (ibid.,) argues is that 'achieving formal equality should be first and
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foremost rather than abolishing social discrimination’, and this still remains with 
regard to former empire subjects. Conversely, statements like: ‘there is no 
serious racial hatred existing in Japan, but ethnic and racial discrimination is 
institutionally sanctioned to a degree in Japan that would be unacceptable in 
most Western countries’ (Howell, 1996:185) must be understood in this context.
In the British context, the situation is the other way round. As we saw, most 
rights are not linked to citizenship status, but to British subject status, which 
most former empire subjects have once they entered Britain. However, their 
immigration status became not only a condition upon which to enter and settle, 
but also to receive certain kinds of entitlements. Clearly, discussion of 
entitlements is not the significant issue by itself.
8.5 Denizenship and patriality
Regarding ’rights and residence’, as we saw in earlier chapters, the stability of 
the status of permanent residence is much more secure in the case of Britain than 
any permanent resident status in Japan. In Britain, rights have not been the 
significant issue for those former empire subjects already in Britain, since rights 
depend on British subject status, but it has mattered to those who have come to 
Britain after the substantial immigration control began. In addition, because of its 
principle of jus soli in nationality legislation, the status of ‘settlement’ for the 
second generation and beyond can be changed easily into citizenship.
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The importance of ‘nationality’ as status, is more significant in Japan compared 
to Britain. The requirement of being a British citizen is limited to some areas, 
such as the service in the Foreign Office or registration of overseas voting, but 
these conditions have only been required after the 1981 British Nationality Act. 
In Britain, ‘most of the immigrants already enjoy a secure residence status and 
broad economic and social rights that differ only at the margins from those of 
citizens’ (Brubaker, 1992:181). The main criteria for access to entitlements are 
residence and immigration status for new entrants, as well as recently settled 
people. In Japan, until the ratification of international conventions, in particular 
the 1981 Refugee Protocol, nationality criterion in most entitlements legislation 
remained, and as we saw. there are still some ‘nationality’ criterion remaining in 
such as political rights and some post-war compensations.
The immigration issue in relation to ‘rights and residence' is more dominant in 
the British context than in the Japanese context. As we saw, though Koreans in 
Japan are treated as 'aliens', their status as ‘immigrants' seldom comes to the 
point of discussion, in terms of ‘settlement’, or 'deportation'. Instead, it is 
always about ‘rights in Japan' as well as their ‘historic ties with the society’. 
While in Britain, though 'rights’ seldom come into the question, in comparison 
with 'immigration' status, and these two debates are indistinguishable, while in 
the Japanese case, they can be distinguished. This is because as we saw, the 
overwhelming majority of those affected by the arrangement were mostly outside 
mainland Britain, while in contrast, most were within mainland Japan. So that, 
the issue of 'post-imperialism' or the adjustment of the status of former empire
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subjects is discussed mainly in connection with immigration in Britain, while in 
Japan, mainly dealt with as an issue of nationality. As we saw, discussion of 
denizenship, proposed by Hammer (1990) is more applicable to the case of 
Koreans in Japan, although in a sense, they do not have ‘immigrant’ 
characteristics.
Regarding ‘patriality’, although it is not a well-covered topic, we have seen that 
there are many issues and problems connected with patriality, and show the 
increasing importance of this topic. In particular, to non-native minorities, 
‘patriality' is one of the main sources of insecurity, because of its substantial link 
with lineage. Moreover if patriality is incorporated into legislation, it defines 
people of native descent as those who really belong to the society both in fact 
and in value. Patriality helps to differentiate not only citizens from aliens but the 
included and the excluded. You may be an alien in terms of citizenship but 
welcome because you are a patrial. This is clear in the case of the 1981 British 
Nationality Act and the 1971 Immigration Act. In addition, patriality helps to 
keep the population homogeneous directly by immigration control in Britain, but 
indirectly by rigid koseki registration in Japan to its nationals, so that the country 
is not too diluted by foreigner intrusion, by certifying who belongs to the 
country.
In the Japanese case, koseki forces people to clarify their status and belonging. 
Those with Japanese lineage who went overseas are rather discarded (Moriki, 
1995:8) or at least, discouraged from returning to Japan, as shown in the war-
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displaced women and children's case and also in the reluctant acceptance of 
nikkcijin. If you are included in the koseki registry, there are some attributes 
which are preferable than others. We saw that registration of koseki has an 
oppressive impact on minorities. It does not only have 'facts records' but also 
the 'value' which are attached to it, such as by differentiation, tracing, and 
certifying functions. However, as this is the registration of ‘Japanese nationals’ 
only, and as those who are thereby privileged do not protest against it (Bryant, 
1991), the importance of its nature or discriminatory points are relatively 
inconspicuous. Koseki registry includes much important personal information, 
and although access to the registry has been restricted nowadays, however, 
through some professionals, such as judicial scriveners, it is possible to obtain 
such information. When aliens are applying for naturalisation, they may be 
instructed to change their name into a Japanese-style name. For a married 
woman, alteration of her surname is a serious problem, as people could easily see 
the change. Former empire subjects as well as former mainland Japanese women 
were deprived of their Japanese nationality by their replacement of koseki 
registration.
In Britain, the imperial legacy which kept British subject status for a while, has 
resulted in a lack of clarity between those who are British citizens and those who 
are not at a later stage. While in the case of Britain, the ties of ex-patriates who 
have emigrated abroad seem to be maintained, and they are welcome to come 
back to Britain. These contacts and the strength of its ties can be seen in the 
lobbying of conservative MPs in the battle over the Immigration Rules in 1973.
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The origin of patriality goes back to 1968, when the lineage connection was 
introduced in relation to immigration control. The turning point was at the time 
of the 1971 Immigration Act. At that time, the connection to the Old 
Commonwealth was favoured compared to the European Community, while the 
New Commonwealth connection was left out. Later, patrial status was linked to 
nationality status, by the 1981 Nationality Act. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
argue, patriality laws which began with the 1968 Act ‘constructs a legal 
boundary between colonisers and colonised, something for which there was no 
need in the earlier period of imperial glory' (1982:45).
Apart from the legal implication of being a national, what did patriality create? 
Oguma (1995:372) and Moriki (1995:265-6) contend that the Japanese do not 
want to have ‘grey zones' in between alien and nationals, so that those who look 
alike and have been living in Japan for so long, such as Koreans and Taiwanese, 
are encouraged to be Japanese, while those who are not, are left to remain as 
aliens. But, on the other hand, this point is also affirmed by Korean states with 
their own. Ryang (1997) points out, in part, that the identity of ‘Koreans in 
Japan' is 'political' rather than 'ethnic'. The formation of South and North Korea 
took part after they came to Japan. Because of that, the emphasis on Korean 
activities, was over whether they wanted to identify with western South Korea or 
communist North Korea rather than emphasising whether to become Japanese.
While in the British case, the favourable treatment to emigrants coming back to 
Britain, as well as the imperial tradition of British subject status, has meant that
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the distinction between aliens and nationals are not as clear as in Japan, and it is 
regarded as not as important as in Japan either. Instead, the idea of ‘race’, or the 
conflation between ’race' and ‘nation' is considered as more important (Gilroy, 
1987).
By attempting to apply Brubaker (1989) ‘s principles of nation-state membership 
into ‘patriality' and 'settlement' legislation in Britain and Japan, we can see that 
Japan is closer to the nation-state ideal-type than Britain.
8.6 The impact on public policy
In Britain, former empire subjects are ethnic minorities, so that they have direct 
access to the political process and can engage in all forms of political activity. 
While in Japan, Koreans and Taiwanese are aliens, therefore, so the only way 
they can address their problems is to go to courts.
8.7 Significant cases
As we have seen, in the Japanese context, there were man)- court cases brought 
by Koreans which have had some impact on Japanese government policy. Cases 
like Chong's on ‘the right to hold public office’, brought with it, some 
expectation that it could be easier than the suffrage suit, which was ruled as 
requiring some legislative amendment. However, as we saw, it was not so easy. 
The distinction was made to clarify the entitlement to rights, again between 
Japanese and aliens, and that the ties between the special permanent resident 
status holders and the Japanese society, or the fact that they are in no way,
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‘aliens', is obscured. Apart from that, a clear standard has not been set, namely, 
to which level aliens are allowed or not. At this point, the decisions of politicians 
or bureaucrats are the key, though they are yet bound by the notion of ‘Koreans’ 
as aliens.
Regarding the recognition of nationality suits for those former empire subjects as 
well as for the former mainland women, the arrangement after the 1952 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was the key. Instead of applying for naturalisation, there 
are many people who were ‘deprived o f  their Japanese nationality, and wish to 
get them back 'as of their right'. Being categorised as an alien overnight, without 
knowing it, as in the case of former Japanese women who married colonial 
subjects, has in fact, left them as 'stateless'. But the status of ‘stateless’ is not 
even recognised, and they are left in limbo between Korea and Japan, their status 
is undecided. Recognition of the Japanese Nationality suits for those new comers 
like the child in the ‘Andre’ case, the courts showed liberal opinion in favour of 
decreasing statelessness. As the arrangement of 1952 in the circular (restoration 
of original nationality as well as denaturalisation of Japanese subject status) has 
never been ruled as unconstitutional, it is difficult for each individual to restore 
their previous status by courts. Regarding ‘names' or koscki, when tradition or 
direction is firmly established, it is hard for them to have a favourable judgement 
so easily. The functions of koseki, for those not included in the registry, are very 
significant, as we have seen.
257
In general for the socially disadvantaged groups in Japan, courts are useful but 
for former colonial subjects, it is the most useful tool, since through their status 
as aliens they have only limited access to the political process. The results could 
be oppressive, as in the recognition of Japanese Nationality cases from mainland 
Japanese women, but could be liberal, such as the case on suffrage rights of 
former empire subjects. At the same time, by bringing cases to the courts, 
minorities can appeal to a certain degree for international support, like in post­
war compensations cases.
In Japan, because of their status as 'aliens’, some Koreans and Taiwanese have 
used the courts extensively since the 1970s and have achieved or 
restored(regained) some of their rights since 1970s. In most cases, they argued 
that because of their historical connection with Japan, their history as former 
empire subjects, the courts should distinguish them from other ‘aliens’. For 
minorities or at least, for former empire subjects, it is more beneficial to go to the 
courts in Japan, as a form of 'protest litigation’, and it can create a political, 
social movement, if it is successful (Upham, 1987:216). For Koreans and 
Taiwanese, going to court has proved useful since without political rights and 
given an unsympathetic Diet, the administration treat them as the objects of alien 
control. But through the courts, though the results are not consistent, they have 
been given a chance to give voice to criticise the Japanese government practice 
on Koreans in Japan.
8.8 T h e  r o le  o f  c o u r t s  in  J a p a n
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8 .9  T h e  ro le  o f  th e  c o u r t s  in  B r i t a in
The role of the courts as guarantors of (minority) rights in Britain is not as 
significant as it is in Japan. The reasons for this are partly that in Japan aliens 
have to seek redress for their grievances in the courts as they have only limited 
access to the political process and even then this is illiberal often through their 
homeland arguments.
In Britain, parliamentary sovereignty means that legislation is more important 
than court decisions as there is no written constitution guaranteeing minority 
rights and enhancing the political role of the courts and also minorities do have 
political rights and so can lobby politicians directly. In Britain, it is more efficient 
and effective to influence legislation and gain assistance from bodies like the 
CRE rather than try to expand (minority) rights through litigation. As we saw in 
some of court cases as in education grants or asylum seekers, when courts 
intervene it is often in a restrictive way, though not always, and court decisions 
can force parliament to change legislation. It could allow the legislative to clearly 
change the results.
8.10 In terms of policy
The status of former empire subjects in Britain is as 'ethnic minority’ citizens 
while in Japan, they are 'aliens’. Therefore in the case of Koreans and Taiwanese 
in Japan they are ‘objects of control but not the factor of policy’ (Crowley, 
1994), as we saw in the tciju gaikokujin discussion.
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The framework of the 1971 Immigration Act vs the 1952 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty as an ending of post-colonial adjustment of Britain and Japan, in a broad 
sense, connects the relationship between 'immigration policy' and 'integration 
policy' of each country. Clearly, the 'race relations’ policy or the integration 
policy in Britain, has not existed with regards to Korean and Taiwanese in Japan. 
Regarded as aliens, they were expected and indirectly encouraged to go back to 
Korea or to go for naturalisation so as to be integrated in Japan. At the same 
time, as there is no single government office which deals with minorities issues in 
Japan, the treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese - as there is nothing like 'policy 
on minorities' in existence - is awkward.
8.11 The impact of ‘withdrawal from empire and the post-colonial 
adjustment’ on citizenship and nationality legislation of Britain and Japan
With regard to the context of post-colonial adjustment, in the British case, the 
withdrawal from its empire was rather awkward, gradual and mainly voluntarily. 
While in the Japanese case, loss of empire resulted directly from the defeat of the 
war, and post-colonial changes occurred suddenly as well as radically.
The result in the British case was that there was a long process of adjustment 
which gradually led to the defining of the status of British citizen, similar to the 
citizenship legislation existing in other countries. While in the Japanese case, in 
1952 there was ‘complete negation of the past’ (Tanaka, 1974), as almost all 
entitlements were removed from the former empire subjects living in Japan. This
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permitted Japan to make a clear distinction between aliens and nationals, in 
legislation as well as in people’s minds.
Though the process and the style is different, both resulted in erosion of rights 
for the former empire subjects. In Britain, by placing immigration control in 
favour of patriáis and then by the alteration of its nationality legislation, in fact 
the guarantee of rights was limited to those people residing in Britain. Even then, 
they maybe discriminated against in practice, for example, through legislation 
which is linked to the access of their relatives to Britain. While in the Japanese 
case, erosion of right occurred by making former empire subjects ‘aliens', and 
after that indirectly encouraging them to apply for naturalisation, was done by 
way of the reluctant recognition of substantial 'permanent resident' status.
Further research could be done in the area of new immigration - such as 
guestworkers or refugees. As Japan may encounter the similar experiences which 
Britain faced after the Second World War, we might see the issue of new 
migration as a common topic for many countries in the future.
8.12 Impact on the concepts of citizenship and nationality in Britain and 
Japan
As we have seen, in Britain, 'nationality' is rather a 'relative' concept. Being a 
multi-national state, 'national' is often understood in the context of ‘ethnicity’, 
such as English. Scottish or Welsh. At the same time, as we saw in the sections 
on rights and residence in Britain, compared to the Japanese context, there are
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fewer occasions when the legal status, or ‘British nationality', becomes the prime 
importance for the entitlement to rights.
While in Japan, 'nationality- is still an absolute concept, but has some importance 
on its own, as we saw the exclusion of Koreans to entitlement to rights by way 
of the kokuseki as well as the koseki clause. In academic debate, ‘Japan is not 
homogeneous' is becoming common sense. Though at the level of daily 
conversation, there are still occasions which remind us of the importance of 
'nationality' in the Japanese context. For instance, what is known as a ‘mixed 
marriage' in English is in the Japanese context, called ‘international marriage’ 
(kokusai kekkon) including even those between a former empire subject, namely 
a Korean and a Japanese, which is the major combination of couples. If these 
Koreans in Japan go abroad and come back, their ‘returning to the 
country’(kikoku) are referred to as ‘re-entry to the country' (sa/ nyukoku). A 
'nationalistic' view of nationality still prevails in Japan, and to some extent, 
'nationality' as a concept is still quite close to 'citizenship' and also ‘ethnicity’, 
unlike in Britain.
'Citizenship' as rights, is different from ‘nationality’ as status in Britain. 
However, these are getting gradually divergent in Japan as well. Separation of 
'citizenship', or rights from ‘nationality’ is through the recognition as well as 
emergence of tciju yaikokujin, from aliens to denizens in Japan. Removal of the 
kokuseki clause from entitling criteria, omission of fingerprinting to permanent 
residents, and the movement to enable suffrage to Koreans and Taiwanese are all
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parts of the move towards this. As Kang and Kim (1994) argue, multicultural 
society in Japan will only be achieved when ‘kokuseki' - nationality has become 
a relative concept.
Judging from the trend in its citizenship and nationality and court decisions, at 
first, the situation was quite the opposite: in the Japanese case, most entitlements 
had a nationality criterion, while in the case of Britain, the criterion was on 
residence so that those within the territory were officially covered by those 
rights. Now, it seems that the relationship between nationality and citizenship in 
Japan is gradually diverging, while in Britain it is slowly converging.
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APPENDIX 1: LETTER TO MR.HONDO,
Plaintiff side's lawyer for case 2, 15/12/1996 (original in Japanese)
The reason I am interested in the recognition of a Japanese Nationality suit is 
that I can explore the idea/contents of ‘the Japanese' by examining the 
relationship between 'house registry' (koseki) and nationality (kokuseki), and at 
the same time, question cases from around the 1952 period are still in dispute 
within Japanese society.
Questions
1) When and how did this ‘Recognition of Japanese Nationality Suit’ come to 
court? (direct causes)
2) Is there any grass-root organisation to back up this plaintiff/appellant? 
Recognition of the Japanese nationality suits were filed by 'bom-(ex) Japanese’, 
Stateless people and the former empire subjects. Do you think that appeals by 
'bom-Japanese' are rather easily allowed by courts?
3) Are there many people who are in the same situation as this appellant? i.e. 
received 'acknowledgement' by Korean father, and lost his/her Japanese 
Nationality after the Peace Treaty)
4) What is 'new' within this case, i.e. Why is it brought to the Supreme court? Is 
it because of the ‘conflict of laws’ approach taken in the high court judgement.
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or the combination of acknowledgement plus other change of legislation and the 
Peace Treaty with the interpretation of the 438 Circular?
5) I would like to ask you about the different approach between the first and 
second rulings. In the first ruling, the ‘public’ law perspective such as 
administrative law seems to be emphasised. While in the second ruling, 
individuality, such as status, common code, and the Application of Law etc. had 
greater emphasis. Is it your strategy to win the case? In particular, when and 
where does the perspective in the second ruling come from?
Answer from Mr. Hondo (7/1/1997)
D'Invalidity of marriage' suit
This case begias with an ex (bom) Japanese woman, who had an alien 
registration (at the time of suing), saying that she is Japanese but is treated as if 
she is an alien, and she wants to be recognised as Japanese. By my fact-finding, I 
found out that her marriage was reported during the post-war confusion, and 
that she did not have any intention to marry nor to register it. She filed for a suit 
against the invalidity of her marriage (recognition) on 1989/9/18 to Osaka 
District Court, and it was recognised on 1989/12/1 (decree nisi), and decree 
absolute on 1989/12/19.
Then this case (recognition of Japanese Nationality 1994), is filed by her child, 
saying that although she is registered as alien, her mother recovered her Japanese 
Nationality, and that she wants to live as Japanese.
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2) 1 am not quite sure whether a grass-root organisation exists or not. There is no 
organisation which supports this case. Concerning the 'recognition of Japanese 
Nationality Suits’, it is reported in newspapers that a War-orphan from China 
won. However, it seems that the Ministry of Justice does not easily allow 
Japanese Nationality recognition, as it is quite difficult to win these cases.
3) I do not know the exact numbers, but I assume there are quite many. 
Although these people want to recover their Japanese Nationality, it is difficult 
to win these cases and, they might give up as a lost cause. It seems that these 
people often acquire Japanese Nationality through naturalisation. Besides, my 
office receives another similar kind of person’s case, and at present this is 
pending at Osaka District Court.
4) This case itself is not unique (new) in particular. As each case has its 
individuality, this will require different interpretation of legislation according to 
its individuality. If there are many different cases, there will be many different 
styles of ir*erpretation accordingly. Then, I will just try to understand these each 
interpretation of the law which has its standing by the efforts of predecessors. In 
this case, the problem is how to interpret subordinate legislation when the Meiji 
(Old) Constitution is replaced by the New Constitution. For instance, was Korea 
regarded as a 'foreign country’ or a ’quasi-foreign country’ before the peace 
treaty', or how should I interpret legislation under the new constitution in the 
sense of 'conflict of laws’, the Common Code, within the domestic law , and the
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Korean Civil Code etc. There are many things to consider, like these. But at the 
same time, within the judgement, there are various Supreme Court judgements, 
thus it is rather difficult to know how to interpret/combine these.
5) I have not changed my argument through the first and second rulings. Just in 
order to win the case, I keep the same argument. Looking for the judgements, 
certainly in the first ruling, it seems that the perspective of ‘public' prevailed. I 
think this was the same with the position of the state on the recognition of 
Japanese Nationality suits, and also the case laws by now, i.e. the position of the 
courts. In this sense. 1 appreciate the second ruling, as it contents with the 
principle of the new Constitution. Speaking of the second ruling, and its Conflict 
of laws approach, this is also how to put into practice interpretation of the 
legislation with the principle of the new Constitution. It shows the ‘new’ 
judgement which has not appeared before.
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A P P E N D IX  2: C H R O N O L O G Y  O F  K E Y  L E G IS L A T IO N /E V E N T S
R E L E V A N T  T O  J A P A N E S E  N A T IO N A L IT Y  L A W
Meiji 5 Jinshin koseki
m22.2.17 Meiji Constitution
m28(1895) Sino-Japanese Treaty
m29.4.1. Law concerning on ordinances to be enforced in Taiwan 
(Law 63)
m31 (1898) Meiji Civil Code(Kinship and Succession Section) 
Koseki Act, Horei(Lawl 1), Conflict of Laws
m32 Nationality Act(Law 66); Imperial Ordinance 289 
Enforcement of Nationality Act to Taiwan
m41(1908) Taiwan Civil Code
m43(1910) Annexation of Korea
m44.3 Law concerning on ordinances to be enforced in Korea(Law 30)
m45 Korea Civil Code
Taisho 3.3.31 (1914) Koseki Act
t7.6.1 Common Code(Law 39)
tlO Common Code Art.3. enforced
t22 Korea Koseki Ordinance(Chosen Sotokuhu Ordinance 154)
Showa 20.7.26(1945) Potsdam Declaration 
s20.8.15 Potsdam Declaration accepted
s20.10.15 Minji Ko 452(circular),'Prohibition of sending koseki to 
overseas territories’
S21.6.22 (disposition of Nationality of Overseas Taiwanese)
S22.5.3 Japanese Constitution; Law 74 'tentative measurement of Civil 
Code'; Law 229 'Revision of Civil Code’(kinship and 
succession section), Alien Registration Order 
(Imperial Ordinance 207)
s22.12.22. Koseki Act
s23.5 (South Korea Transitional government Law)
s23.9 (Independence of North Korea)
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s23.12.20 (South Korea Nationality Act)
s24.5.4 Minji Ko 2699
s24.10 (People's Republic of China)
s25.7.1(1950) Japanese Nationality Law(Law 147)
s25.1.6 Minji Ko 3069, ‘Prohibition on alteration of Koseki by parental
acknowledgement'
s26.11 Immigration Ordinance(seirei, Cabinet order, 319), applied to
Koreans and Taiwanese from 28/4/1952 
s27.4.19(1952) Minji Ko 438, ‘Disposition of Nationality and Koseki of
Koreans and Taiwanese after effectuation of the Peace Treaty’ 
s27.4.28 San Francisco Peace Treaty; Law 126,‘Measurement of
Foreign Ministry related orders for the acceptance of Potsdam 
Declaration' (allows Korean and Taiwanese who have been in 
Japan before 1945 to remain without residential qualification 
regulated in Immigration order)
s40(1965) Japan-South Korea Legal Status treaty; Law 146 ‘Special
Immigration Law for South Koreans in Japan, Legal status and 
their treatment by the 1965 treaty' (kyotei eiju) 
s57.1.(s56 Law 85)Law revising part of Immigration order (tokurei eiju) 
s59(1984 Law 45)Revised Japanese Nationality Law; Revised Koseki Act 
heisei 1(1989) Revised Immigration Law (enlarged 'settlers' category to 
include more Japanese descendants)
h3( 1991, Law 71 (Special Immigration Order for those who left Japanese 
Nationality by the Peace treaty (tokurei eiju)
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A P P E N D IX  3: J A P A N E S E  D IN A S T IE S  IN  C H R O N O L O G IC A L  O R D E R
(jomon period)
(yayoi period)
Aara (710-794)
Heian (794-1192)
Kamakura (1192-1333) 
Nanbokucho (1333-1393) 
Muromachi (1335-1576)
Sengoku (1500-1576)
Azuchi - Momoyama (1576-1603) 
Edo(\603-1868)
MeijH 1868-1912)
Taisho( 1912-1925)
Showa (1925-1988)
HciseH 1988-
270
Bibliography
AERAU995), ‘Nihonjin ga wasureta mouhitotsu no izoku' (Those war bereaved who 
the Japanese forgot), special edition, Dec./18
Allum, P.(1995), State and Society in Western Europe, Cambridge: Polity, chapter 6
Almond, G. and Verba, S.U963), The Civic Culture: political attitudes and 
democracy in Jive nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Anderson, B.(1983), Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread o f 
nationalism, London: Verso
Annen, J.(1993), ‘Gaikokujin no jinken saikou'(Reconsideration of aliens’ human 
rights), in Higuchi.Y. and Takahashi, K. eds., Gendai Rikkenshugi no Tenkai, Jo, (The 
development of contemporary constitutionalism, 1), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp.163-81
Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N.(1992), Racialised boundaries: race, nation, gender, 
colour and class and the anti-racist struggle, London: Routledge
Anwar, M.(1986). Race and Politics: ethnic minorities and the British political 
system, London: Tavistock publications
Araki, M.(1975), 'Kankokujin hibakusha to genbaku iryo’(Korean A-bomb victims and 
their medial treatment), Jurisuto, Oct./15, no.598
Araki, M.0977), ‘Kankokujin hibakusha to genbaku iryo’(Korean A-bomb victims and 
their medical treatment), Bessatsu Jurisuto, no.56, pp.200-1
Armstrong, B.(1989), ‘Racialisation and Nationalist Ideology: the Japanese case’, 
International Sociology, 4:3, Sept., pp.329-343
Aron, R.U974), ‘Is Multinational citizenship possible’, in Turner, B. and Hamilton, P. 
eds. (1994), Citizenship vol.II, London, Routledge, pp.279-291
Ashibe, N.G993), Kenpo II Kihonteki jinken (Constitution II basic human rights), 
Tokyo: Yuhikaku Sosho
Axtmann, R.(1993), ‘Society, Globalization and the Comparative Method', History of 
the Human Sciences, Vol.6.no.2, pp53-74
Azusawa, K.(1996), ’Kenpo to gaikokujin no jinken' (The constitution and aliens' 
human rights), in Hogaku Seminar, Oct.
Baker, P.(1982), 'A note on the British Nationality Act 1981 ’, Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin, vol.8(2), Apr., pp780-794
Banton, M.(1967), Race Relations, London: Tavistock
271
Banton, M.(1977), The Idea o f Race, London: Tavistock publications
Barbalet, J.(1988), Citizenship: rights, struggle and class inequality. Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press
Bassnett, S.( 1980), Translation Studies, London: Methuen
Baubock, R.(1994a), Transnational Citizenship: membership and rights in 
international migration, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, chapters 2, 8
Baubock, R.(1994b), ‘Chapter 12 Changing the boundaries of citizenship: the inclusion 
of immigrants in democratic polities’, in Baubock, R. ed. From Aliens to Citizens: 
redefining the status o f immigrants in Europe, Aldershot: Avebury, pp. 199-232
Beale, J. and Parker, A.(1984), Overseas Students: grants and Fees, London: 
Runnymede Trust
Bendix, R.( 1964), Nation-building and Citizenship: studies o f our changing social 
order, Berkeley: University of California Press
Bill of Rights(1689), in Lively, J. and Lively, A. eds.(1994) Democracy in Britain, 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp.175-178
Birch, A. (1989), Nationalism and National Integration, London: Unwin Hyman, 
chapter 7
Blackburn, R. ed.(1993), Rights o f  Citizenship, London: Mansell
Blackburn, R.(1993) ‘Introduction’, in Blackburn, R. ed Rights o f Citizenship, 
London: Mansell, pp.1-11
Blondel, J .(1995). Comparative Government: an introduction, 2nd ed. London,
Breuilly, J.( 1985), Nationalism and the State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
Introduction
Bridges, B.(1993), Japan and Korea in the 1990s: from antagonism to adjustment, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, chapter 7
Brubaker, R.(1989), 'Introduction', in Brubaker, R. ed. Immigration and the Politics 
o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, Lanham: University Press of America, 
pp. 1-27
Brubaker, R. (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press
Bryant, T.(1991), ‘For the sake of the country, for the sake of the family; the 
oppressive impact of family registration on women and minorities in Japan', UCLA 
Law Review Oct.: 39: no.l, pp. 109-68
272
Caiman, D.(1992), The nature and origins o f Japanese Imperialism, London: 
Routledge, chapter 8
Castles, F.ed.(1989), The Comparative History o f Public Policy, Oxford: Polity
Chen, E.(1984), ‘The Attempt to Integrate’ in Myers, R. and Peattie, M.eds., The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1M95-1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.240- 
274
Choe, C.(1995), Tomo ni ikiru tameni’Ito live together), in Seppyoru: Aug/25, pp.35- 
55
Cohen, R.U991), Contested Domains.debates in international labour studies,
London: Zed, chapter 9
Cohen, S. (1981), The Thin End o f the White Wedge: the new nationality laws, second 
class citizenship, and the welfare state, Manchester: Manchester Law Centre
Colley, L.(1992), Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837, New Haven: Yale University 
Press
Connor, W.(1994), Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, chapter 9
Conservative Political Centre(1980), Who do we think we are?
Cornelius, W.(1994), ‘Japan: the illusion of Immigration Control’, in Cornelius, W„ 
Martin, P, and Hollifield, J. eds.(1994), Controlling immigration: a global 
perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.375-410
Coxall, B. and Robins, L.(1994), Contemporary British Politics: an introduction, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan
Crowley, J.( 1994), ‘The theory and practice of immigration and ‘race-relations’ policy, 
some thoughts on British and French experience’, in Carmon, N.ed. Immigration and 
integration in post-industrial societies, Houndmills: Macmillan press, pp.227-247
Dale, P. (1988), The Myth o f  Japanese Uniqueness, London: Routledge
De Vos, G. and Wagatsuma, H. (1966), Japan's Invisible Race, Berkeley: University 
of California Press
De Vos, G.( 1983), Japan’s Minorities.Burakumin.Koreans, Ainu and Okinawans, 
London: Minority Rights Group
Dicey. A.U885), 'The Law of the Constitution’ in Lively, J. and Lively, A. eds.(1994), 
Democracy in Britain, Blackwell, pp. 178-180
273
Dixon, D.(1983),'Thatcher’s people: the British Nationality Act, 1981’, Journal o f 
Law and Society. 10:161-80
Doi, T.(1971), Amaeno kozo(Anatomy of Dependence), Tokyo: Kobundo
Dore, R.(1973), British Factory-Japanese Factory: the origins o f national diversity in 
industrial relations, Berkeley: University of California Press
Drewry, G.(1991). 'British Law Journals as a Resource for Political Studies’, Political 
Studies, Vol.XXXIX, no.3, pp.560-7
Dummett, A. and Nicol, N.U990), Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: nationality 
and immigration law, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Dummett, A.(1976), Citizenship and Nationality, London: Runnymede Trust, Sept.
Dummett, A. (1977), British Nationality Law-Runnymede guide to the green paper, 
London: Runnymede Trust
Dummett, A.(1981), 'The New British Nationality Act', British Journal o f Law and 
Society,vo 1.8,no.2, Winter, pp.233-41
Ebashi, T.(1995a), 'Gaikokujin no sanseiken’(Aliens' suffrage rights) in Higuchi, Y. 
and Takahashi, K. eds., Gcndai Rikkenshugi no Tenkai, Jo (The development of 
contemporary constitutionalism, 1), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp.183-200
Ebashi, T.(1995b), ‘Gaikokujin to tomoni atarashii nihon wo tsukuru’(Making a new 
Japan with foreigners), in Gekkan Shakaito(Monthly Japan Social-Democratic party): 
no.482, pp.57-9
Egawa, H.(1961), 'Chosenjin no tsuma to natta nihonjin no heiwajoyaku hakkougo ni 
okeru kokuseki no kizoku'(case study, on 1961 recognition of Japanese nationality 
case), Jurisuto 231:93-4
Ehrmann, H.(1976), Comparative Legal Cultures, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Eiger, T. and Smith, C. eds.(1994), Global Japanization?: the transnational 
transformation o f  the labour process, London: Routledge
Encyclopaedia Brittanica(\992), Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporation 
Encyclopedia Americana(\968), New York: Americana Coorperation 
Evans, A.(1982), ‘European Citizenship’, 45 Modern Law Review, pp.497-515 
Fitzpatrick, P and Hunt, A.eds.(1987), Critical Legal Studies, Oxford: Blackwell 
Foot, P.U965), Immigration and Race in British Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin
274
Fransman, L.(1983), ‘Patriality: its redeployment as British Citizenship under the 
British Nationality Act, 1-4' in New Law Journal 15/August -22/Sep
Fransman, L.(1989), Fransman's British Nationality Law, London: Fourmat
Freeman, G.(1979), Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: the 
French and British Experience, 19-15-1975, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Fukuoka, Y.(1993), Zainichi kankoku/chosenjin-wakaisedai no aidentiti(South/North 
Koreans in Japan-identity of young generation), Tokyo: Chuko shinsho
Fukushima, M. and Toshitani, N.(1957), ‘Meiji igo no kosekiseido no hattatsu‘(The 
development of koseki system after Meiji period), in Nakagawa, Z. et al. eds. 
Kajisaiban-kazokumondai to kazokuhou, VII, (Family disputes and family law to 
courts), Tokyo: Sakai shoten. pp.299-349
Furukawa, J.(l986), 'Gaikokujin no jinken(l) - sengo kenpo kaikaku tono kanren wo 
megutte’ (Aliens' human rights(l) with relation to post-war constitutional reform), in 
Tokyo Keizaidaigaku kaishi, (Journal of Tokyo Keizai University), no. 146, pp.63-80
Geertz, C.(1963), 'Primordial and Civic ties',pp29-34, in Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. 
eds. (1994), Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Gellner, E.0983), Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell
Gikaiseido 70 nenshi, shiryohcni, 1960), (70 years of the Diet System, materials),
Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku
Gilroy, P.(1987), There ain't no Black in the Union Jack', the cultural politics o f race 
and nation, London: Hutchinson, chapter 2
Goodman, R.(1993), Japan's ‘International You th the  emergence o f a new class of 
school children, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Goodrich, P.(1986), Reading the Law: a critical introduction to legal method and 
techniques, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Gordon, P. and Newnham, A.(1985), Passports to Benefits?, racism in Social 
Security, London: CPAG and Runnymede Trust
Goulboune, H.U991), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Gould, A.(1993), Capitalist Welfare Systems: a comparison o f Japan, Britain and 
Sweden, Harlow: Longman
Grant, W.U995), Pressure Groups. Politics and Democracy in Britain, 2nd ed.. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf
Griffith, J.(1991), The Politics o f the Judiciary, London: Fontana Press, 4th edition
275
Groenendijk, K.(1997), ‘Regulating ethnic immigration: the case of the Aussiedler’, in 
New Communities-. vol.23:no.4:Oct, pp.461-82
Guibemau, M.(1996), Nationalisms: the nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth 
century, Cambridge: Polity Press
Habermas. J.(1994), ‘Citizenship and National Identity', in Bart van Steenbergen ed. 
The Condition o f Citizenship, London, Sage: pp.20-35
Hagino, Y.(1996), Hanrei kcnkyu-gaikokujin no jinken:
kokusekilshutsunyukokulzairyulsengo hosho (Case laws on aliens' human rights), 
Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Hague, R., Harrop, M. and Breslin, S.(1992), Comparative Government and Politics: 
an introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 3rd ed.
Hammar, T.(1990), Democracy and the Nation-state: aliens, denizens and citizens in 
a world o f  international migration, Aldershot: Avebury
Harris, C.(1991), ‘Configurations of Racism: the Civil Service, Race & Class 33:1, 
July-Sept., pp. 1-30
Harrop, M.ed.(1992), Power and Policy in Liberal Democracies, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Hatada, T.0969), Nihonjin no Chosenkan (The Japanese view on Korea), Tokyo: 
Keiso shobo
Heater, D.(1990), Citizenship: the civic ideal in world history, politics and education, 
London: Longman
Hechter, M.(1975), Internal Colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national 
development, 1536-1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Heidenheimer, A., Heclo, H. and Adams, C.(1990), Comparative Public Policy: the 
politics o f social choice in America, Europe, and Japan, New York, St. Martin’s 
Press: Macmillan, 3rd ed.
Held, D.(1991), ‘Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship" in Andrew, G ed. 
Citizenship, London, Lawrence and Wishart, pp.19-25
Heywood, A.(1994), Political Ideas and Concepts: an introduction, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan
Hirowatari, S.(1992), ‘Gaikokujin ukeireno houteki ronri'(The legal framework of 
accepting foreigners) in Iyotani, T. and Kajita, T. eds. Gaikokujin 
Rodosharon,(Discussion on guestworkers), pp.63-97, Tokyo: Kobundo
276
HMSO (1991), Aspects o f Upper Secondary and Higher Education in Japan
Hobsbawm, E.(1992), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, 
reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.
Hokama, H (1979), ‘Hibakusha kenkotecho kofushinsei kyakka jiken jokokusin 
hanketsu’ (the Supreme Court ruling on Son case), in Juristo no.693, Showa 53 nendo 
juyo hanrei kaisetsu, (Important cases in 1978), 10/July/l979, pp.29-31
Homusho(1986), Q&A atarashii kokuseki, koseki ho, (New nationality and koseki 
Law), Tokyo: Nihon kajo shuppan
Homusho(1992), 'Gaikokujin torokuho no kaisei’ (Revision of Alien Registration 
Law) in Kokusai Jinryu,(International migration), July, pp.26-31
Honda, T(1994), ‘Shimon onatsu kyohi to sainyuikoku fukyoka- (Fingerprint rejection 
and re-entry rejection), Jurisuto, no. 150, pp.30-1
Horitsu jiho (1985), ‘Jinkenron ni okeru teijugaikokujin’(human rights and 
teijugaikokujin), discussion by Onuma, Y.; Imamura, T.; So. Y. et al., in Horitsu jiho, 
57:5, pp.8-20.
Hosokawa, K.(1990), ‘Japanese nationality in international perspective' in Ko, S.ed. 
Nationality and International Law in Asian Perspective, Dordreht, Boston, Martinus 
Nijihoff, pp. 177-253
Howarth, M.(1991), Britain's Educational Reform, London: Routledge
Howell, D.(1994), ‘Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modem Japanese 
State’ in Past and Present, 142, Feb., pp.69-93
Howell, D.(1996). 'Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary History', in Journal of 
Contemporary History, 31,1, Jan., pp.171-190
Hozumi Yatsuka(1891), ‘Minpo idete Chuko horobu’ (Civil Code appears and filial 
piety has gone) in Hozumi, S ed., Hozumi Yatsuka Hakase Ronbunshuu, (Collection of 
the works by Dr. Hozumi Yatsuka), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp.223-228
Hucker, J.(1975), 'The House of Lords and the Race Relations Act’, in 24 
International Comparative Legal Quarterly, pp.284-304
Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.eds.(1994), Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Ijichi, N.(1994), Zainichi Chosenjin no namae (Koreans in Japan and their name), 
Tokyo: Akashi Shoten
Ikegami, E.(1995), ‘Citizenship and National Identity in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-89, A 
Comparative Assessment’ in International Review o f Social History ,40, s3, pp. 185- 
221
277
Imai, H.(1982), ‘Futatsu no kakumei’ (The two revolutions), in Aoyama, I. and Imai, 
H. eds. Gaisetsu igirisushi (General British history), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp.97-117
Inoguchi, T.(1993), Nihon-Keizaitaikoku no seiji unei (Japan - the governing of 
Economic superpower), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai
Inoue, K. et al. eds.(1991), Shosetsu NihonshH)apanese History), rev.ed, Tokyo: 
Yamakawa shuppan
Inoue, K.(1990), Mac Arthur’s Japanese Constitution: a linguistic and cultural study 
of its making, Chicago, University of Chicago Press: Chicago
Ishida, R.(1984), 'Igirisu ni okeru eirenpou iminseisaku no tenkai jou/ge' (The 
development of British immigration policy, part 1/2), Rekishigaku kcnkyu, (Journal of 
History), vol.582, pp.1-12; vol.583, pp.19-31
Ishida, R.(1985), ‘Igirisu no jinshu sabetsu heno chosen-1976 nen Jinshukankeihou to 
jihatsu soshiki no dentou’ (An attempt to tackle racial discrimination in Britain - 
traditions of 1976 Race Relations Act and Voluntary organisations), in Isomura, E. ed. 
Gendaisekai no sabetsu mondai, (Contemporary discriminations in the world),
Tokyo: Akashi shoten, pp. 181-226
Ishiguro, K(1990), Kokusaisihou sinpan (Conflict of laws, new ed.), Tokyo:
Yuhikaku
Ishiguro, K(1992), ‘Uji no henkou’ (Changing of surnames) in Yamada, R. and 
Hayada, Y. eds., Enshu kokusaiShihou (Practice conflict of laws), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
pp. 78-82
Ito, M.(1963), ‘Ho no shihai to nihonkoku kenpo' (The Rule of Law and the Japanese 
Constitution) in Kiyomiya, S. and Sato, K. eds. Kenpo Kozal: soron, tenno, senso no 
hoki, (Constitution 1: general, monarchy, renounciation of wars), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
pp.429-573
Iwasawa, Y.U986), Legal treatment o f Koreans in Japan, International Human Rights 
Group
Iyotani, T.0992), ‘Sakerarenai kadai, gaikokujin rodo sha’ (Unavoidable task: guest 
workers) in Iyotani, T. and Kajita, T. eds. Gaikokujin Rodosha ron, (Discussion of 
guestworkers), Tokyo: Kobundo
Jacob, H. et al.(1996), Courts, Law and Politics in Comparative Perspective, New 
Haven: Yale University Press
Jones, C.U985), Patterns o f  Social policy, an introduction to comparative analysis, 
London: Tavistock, ‘1 Argument’
278
Jones, C.U993), ‘The Pacific Challenge' in Jones, C. ed., New Perspectives on the 
Welfare State in Europe, London: Routledge, pp.198-217
Joppke, C.(1995), ‘Review article- Citizenship and nationhood on France and 
Germany', Archives Européennes De Sociologie:36, 1, Apr., pp. 168-178
Juss, S. (1988),'Justice denied', New Law Journal, Jan/29, p67
Juss, S.G993), Immigration, Nationality and Citizenship, London: Mansell
Kajita, T.G994), Gaikokujin Rodosha to Nihon shakai (Foreign Workers and Japanese 
Society), Tokyo: NHK books
Kajita, T.(1998), ‘The challenge of incorporating foreigners in Japan; “ ethnic 
Japanese" and “ sociological Japanese” , in Weiner, M. and Hanami, T. eds.
Temporary’ Workers or Future Citizens?: Japanese and the United States Immigration 
Policies, London: Macmillan, pp. 120-147
Kang, J. and Kim, D.U994), Zainichikankokulchosenjin - rekishi to tenbo (South and 
North Koreans in Japan, history and prospect), Tokyo: Rodokeizaisha
Kasama, C.U988), 'Doshitsu no nakano Ishitsu genso’ (Illusionary difference within 
homogeneity), in Miyajima, T. and Kajita, T. eds.(1988), Gendai Yoroppa no chiiki to 
kokka, (Contemporary Europe, its region and states), Tokyo: Yushindo Kobunsha, 
pp. 142-167
Kasama, C.(1992), ‘Nationalisumu to Racisumu no kosaku’ (Nationalism and racism), 
in Kajita, T.ed. Kokusaishakaigaku (International sociology), Nagoya: 
Nagoyadaigakushuppankai, pp.241 -66
Kavanagh, D.(1996), British Politics: continuities and change. 3rd ed., Oxford:
Oxford University Press, chapter 2
Kibata, Y.(1992), ‘Eikoku to nihon no shokuminchi tochi’ (The colonial policy of 
Britain and Japan) , in Shokuminchi teikoku nihon, (Colonial empire -Japan), Iwanami 
koza 1, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, pp.273-296
Kidana, S.(1996), ‘Kokuseki hou tikujou kaisetsu 1 ’ (Interpretations of Nationality law 
1), Kosekijiho(\996.4-), no.460, pp.3-15
Kido, T.0982), ‘Chusei igirisu no tenkai' (The development of feudal England), in 
Aoyama, I. and Imai, H. eds. Gaisetsu igirisushi, (General British history), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, pp.45-78
Kim, C.(1986), ‘Zainichi chosenjin ‘sanseiken’ yokyu no kentou’ (Reconsideration of 
the request of suffrage rights by Koreans in Japan), Sekai, (World), pp.262-268
Kim, 1.(1978), Chosenjin ga naze Nihonmci wo tsukau noka (Why Koreans in Japan 
use their Japanese-style name), Tokyo: San’ichi shobo
279
Kim, K.(1995), Zainichi korean no aidentiti to hoteki chii (Identity and legal status of 
Koreans in Japan), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Kim, Y.(1990), Zainichi chosenjin no kika (Naturalisation and Koreans in Japan), 
Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Kobayakawa, K.(1940), Meiji Hoseishi Ron, Koho no bu Jo (The discussion on Meiji 
Legislation, public law part 1), Tokyo: Iwamatsu Shobo
Kobayashi, Y.(1996), Goomanizumu sengen Yakugaicizu sosho (Cartoon on medical 
AIDS case), Tokyo: Kodansha
Kohn, H.(1946), The idea o f Nationalism: a study in its origins and background, New 
York: Macmillan
Komai, H.(1993), Gaikokujin roudousha teiju heno michi (Living together with 
foreign workers in Japan), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Komai, H.(1994), ‘Dankaiteki shiminken wo teishosuru- (Proposing a grade of 
citizenship), Sekai, (World) June, no.596, pp. 122-33
Kondo, A.(1996a), Gaikokujin sanseiken to kokuseki (Aliens' suffrage and 
nationality), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Kondo, A.(1996b), ‘Kokuminshugi, minshushugi, juminshugi no trilemma’ (The 
trilemma of nationalism, democracy, and residents autonomy) in Kyushu Sangyo 
Daigaku Shokeigakkai ed. Kyushu Sangyo Daigaku Shokei Ronso, (Journal of Kyushu 
Sangyo University, economics and management), vol.36, no.4, pp.177-210
Kotkin, J.< 1992), Tribes: how race, religion, and identity determine success in the 
new global economy, New York: Random House
Kura, S.(1991), 'Latin America' in Kokkyo wo koete, Tsukuba Daigaku, pp.127-144
Kuramochi, T .(1995), ‘Igirisu kenpo kenkyu no 50nen' (Works on British 
Constitution- 50 years), Horitsu Jiho, vol.67, vo.12, pp.10-13
Kuwata, S.(1961), ‘Hanrei hihyou' (on 1961 case) Minshoho zasshi, 45:5:67
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W.(1994), ‘Return of Citizema survey of recent work on 
citizenship theory', Ethics, pp.352-381, Jan., vol. 104
Lardy, H.(1997), ‘Citizenship and the right to vote’, Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies, 
vol,17:no. 1, pp.75-100
Layton-Henry, Z. ed.(1990). The Political Rights o f Migrant Workers in Western 
Europe, London: Sage
280
Layton-Henry, Z.U999), ‘Citizenship and Nationality in Britain’ in Layton-Henry, Z. 
and Wilpert, C. Challenging racism in Britain and Germany, Macmillan (forthcoming)
Lee, K.(1995), 'Denizen to kokumin kokka' (Denizen and Nation-state), in Shiso, 
(Thought) no.854, Aug., pp.45-62
Legomsky, S.(1987), Immigration and the Judiciary: law and politics in Britain and 
America, Oxford: Clarendon
Lehmann, J. (1982), The Roots of Modern Japan, London: Macmillan, chapter 6
Lester, A. and Bindman, G.(1972), Race and Law, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Lester, A.(1975), Citizens without status, London: Runnymede Trust
Li, Y.U993), Zainichi KankokuiChosenjin to sanseiken (Suffrage rights and 
South/North Koreans in Japan), Tokyo: Akashishoten
Lijphart, A.(1971), 'Comparative Politics and Comparative Method’, American 
Political Science Review, vol.65, pp.682-693
Lipset, S.0994). ‘Binary comparisons: American exceptionalism-Japanese 
uniqueness', in Dogan, M., and Kazancigil, A. eds. Comparing Nations: concepts, 
strategies, substance, Oxford: Blackwell, pp.153-212
Llobera, J.U994), The God o f Modernity: the development o f nationalism in western 
Europe, Oxford, Berg
Lustgarten, L.(1980), Legal Control o f Racial Discrimination, London: Macmillan
Macdonald, I. and Blake, N.(1995), Immigration Law and Practice in the United 
Kingdom, 4th ed., London: Butterworths
Maher, J. and Kawanishi, Y.0995), ‘on Being there: Koreans' in Japan' Journal o f 
Multilingual and Multicultural Development: 16: Nos.l, 2
Mahler, G.U995), Comparative Politics: an institutional and cross-national 
approach, London: Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed.
Mann, M.U987), Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, in Bulmer, M. and Rees,
A. eds.(1996), Citizenship Today: the contemporary relevance o f T.H.Marshall, 
London: UCL Press, pp. 125-144
Marsh, R.0967), Comparative Sociology: a codification o f cross-social analysis.
New York: Hercourt Brace and World
Marshall, T. and Bottomore, T.(1992), Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto 
Press
281
Marshall, T.H.(1950), Citizenship and Social Class and other essays, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Mason, M.(1986), 'Introduction: controversies and continuities in race and ethnic 
relations theory', in Rex, J. and Mason, D. eds., Theories o f Race and Ethnic 
Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-19
Matsumoto, K.(1988), ‘Zainichi Chosenjin no Nihonkokuseki hakudatsu - Nihonseifu 
ni yoru heiwajoyaku taisakukenkyu no kentou’(Deprivation of Japanese nationality 
from Koreans in Japan - regarding the policy of the Japanese government on the Peace 
Treaty), in Tohokudaigaku Hogaku (University of Tohoku) , vol.452
Matsuo, H.(1990), 'Jinken kara mita koseki (jou)’ (Koseki from human rights aspect, 
part 1), in Koseki, vol.4., no.562, pp.1-37
Mayer, L, Burnett, J. and Ogden, S.(1993), Comparative Politics: nations and 
theories in a changing world, Englewood cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Mclnnes, P.(1996), ‘Concept Citizenship- in Politics Review 5:3:Feb., pp.25-26
Meehan, E.(1993), Citizenship and European Community, London, Sage
Miles, R. and Phizaklea, A.(1984), White Man's country: racism in British Politics, 
London: Pluto
Miles, R.(1989). 'Nationality, Citizenship, and Migration to Britain, 1945-51’, in 
Journal o f Law and Society, 16:4, winter, pp.426-442
Miles, R.(1989), Racism, London: Routledge
Miles, R.(1993), Racism after Race Relations, London: Routledge
Minami, H. et al. eds.(1996), Gyoseihou(2) (Administrative Law 2) 3rd ed., Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku
Minzoku mei wo torimodosu kai(1990), Minzokumei wo torimodoshita chosenkei 
nihonjin(Korean-Japanese who restored their ethnic names), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Miyajima, T. and Kajita, T. eds.(1996), Gaikokujin roudousha kara shiminhe-chiiki 
shakai no sitenkara (from guestworkers to citizens, perspectives from regional 
societies), Tokyo.Yuhikaku
Miyata, S.. Kim. Y. and Yang, B.(1990), SoushiKaimei, (Creation of surnames and 
alteration of given names), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten
Mizuno, N.(1996), 'Zai chosenjin/taiwanjin sanseiken 'teishi’joko no seiritsu' (The 
origin of ‘suspension’ of suffrage rights of Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan), Kenkyu 
kiyo (sekai jinken mondai kenkyu centre) vo. 1, pp.43-65
282
Moore, B. ( 1966), Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: lord, peasant in the 
making o f the modern world, Boston: Beacon press
Moraes, C.U993), ‘Twenty-five years of the JCWI:an appraisal of the past and a 
perspective on the future', Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice:\o\.l,2, 
pp59-64
Mori, H.(1996), Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan, Macmillan
Moriki, K.U995), Kokusekino arika(the proof of kokuseki), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Morita, Y.(1996), Suujiga kataru kankokulchosenjin no rekishi (History of 
South/North Koreans in Japan by statistics), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Naim, T.(1977), The Break-up of Britain, London: NLB
Naim, T.(1988). The Enchanted Glass:Britain and its monarchy, London: Radius
Nakagawa, A.(1994), ‘Kokuseki toiu mondai’(kokuseki as problem), Sekai (World), 
June, no.596, pp. 164-9
Nakahara, R.(1993), Zainichi chosenjin koyo sabetsu to kokusekijoko (Koreans in 
Japan , their employment discrimination and nationality clause), Tokyo: Akashi shoten
Nakai, K.(1989), Teiju gaikokujin to komushuninken (Settled Aliens and their right to 
hold public office), Tokyo: Takushoku shobo
Nakamura, M.(1989), Shocho Tennoseiheno michi (The process toward symbolic 
tenno status), Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho
Nakane, C.(1967), Tateshakai no Ningen kankei (Japanese society), Tokyo: Kodansha
Neary, 1.(1992), 'Ethnic Minorities’, in Harrop ed.(1992), Power and Policy in Liberal 
Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174-194
Neveu, C.(l 989), Ethnic Minorities, Citizenship and Nationality: A case study for a 
comparative approach between France and Britain, CRER, Research Paper, 
University of Warwick
New College English-Japanese Dictionary(1994), Tokyo: Kenkyusha
Nicol, A.(1993), ‘Nationality and Immigration’ in Blackburn, R. ed., Rights of 
Citizenship, London: Mansell, pp.254-270
Ninomiya, M.(1983), Kokuseki hou ni okcru danjo byodo (Equality between sex in 
Japanese Nationality Law), Tokyo: Yuhikaku
283
Norton, P.(1976), ‘Intra-party dissent in the House of Commons:a case study , the 
immigration rules 1972', Parliamentary Affairs vol.29, no.4, pp.404-20
Norton, P.(1994), The British Polity, New York: Longman, 3rd ed., chapter 1
Ogawa, M.(1978a), ‘Shakaihosho ken sabetsu jiyu, saigono shoheki, kokuseki'(Social 
rights and its final excuse of discrimination-nationality), in Shakai jiyyo no shomondai 
(Nihon Shakaijiyy'o tankidaiyaku Kiyo), no.24, pp.203-57
Ogawa, M.(1978b), ‘Hibakusha kenko techo sosho hanketsu no igi'(on Son case), 
Hoyaku seminar, July
Ogoshi, A.(1996), Feminisumu Nyumon (Introductory Feminism). Chikuma shobo
Oguma, E.(1995), Tan ’itsu minzoku shinwa no kiyen (The origin of the myth of 
homogeneous nation), Tokyo: Shinyosha
Oishi, S.U977), Edo Jidai (Edo period), Tokyo: Chuko shinsho
Okazaki, K.(1978), 'Gaikokujin no hoteki chii ni tsuite no ichi kosatsu-kokkoritsu 
daigaku kyoin ninyo mondai ni sokushite’ (An article on Aliens' legal status with 
regard to their appointments in public universities), Hosei Ronso (Nagoya daigaku), 
vol.75,pp. 179-220
Okazaki, K.(1996), ‘Gaikokujin no koumu shuninken' (Aliens and their rights to hold 
public offices), in Gekkan jichiken, June, pp.34-49
Oldfield, L.(1990), ‘Citizenship:an unnatural practice?' in Turner, B. and Hamilton, P. 
eds.(1994) Citizenship /, London: Routledge, pp. 188-198
Onuma, Y.(1979a), ‘Shutsunyugoku kanrihousei no seiteikatei no. 15'(the enforcement 
process of immigration control law), in Horitsu Jiho:51:7, pp. 100-110
Onuma, Y.(1979b), ‘Zainichi Chosenjin no hotekichii ni kansuru ichi kosatsu 1-5’, 
(Articles on Koreans in Japan and their legal status), Hoyaku Kyokai Zasshi, 96:3-97:3
Onuma, Y.(1983), ‘‘Gaikokujin no jinken’ ron saikosei no kokoromi’ (An attempt to 
reconstruct 'alien's human rights'), in Hokyo Hyakunen Ronshu, vol.2
Onuma, Y.(1985), 'Kokuseki to sono Kinouteki Haaku' (Nationality and its functional 
understandings), Hoyaku Kyoshitsu no.55, Apr., pp.132-137
Onuma, Y.(1986), Tan ’itsu minzoku kokka no shinwa wo koctc (Beyond the myth of 
homogeneous nation), Tokyo: Toshindo
Onuma, Y.(1993). Sakhalin kimin (Sakhalin displaced persons), Tokyo: Chuko 
Shinsho
284
Ota, Y.(1994), 'The enterprise of Orientalism: comments on Jacalyn Hardee's 
enterprise of empire’, in Identities:Global studies- in culture and power, 1 -2, Nov., 
pp.275-277
Owers, A.(1994), 'The Age of internal controls?’ in Spencer, S ed. Strangers and 
Citizens, a positive approach to migrants and refugees, London, IPPR/River Oram, 
pp.264-281
Park, K.(1986), Zainichi Chosenjin no senkyoken mondai (Suffrage issue of Koreans in 
Japan), Doho to Shakai kagaku(Fe\\ow countrymen and social science,), vol.l., pp.52-9 
Prentice-Hall
Prosser, T.(1983), Test Cases for the Poor, Legal Techniques in the Politics o f Social 
Welfare, London: C.P.A.G.
Pye, L. and Verba, S. eds.(1965), Political Culture and Political Development, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press
Rich, P.(1986), Race and Empire in British Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Rikumoto, K.(1991), Hoshakaigaku nyumon-tuutorial IS lectures (Introductory 
sociology of law),Tokyo: Yuhikaku
Rokkan, S and Urwin, D.(1982), 'Introduction: centres and peripheries in Western 
Europe’, in Rokkan, S.ed., The Politics o f Territorial Identity .studies in European 
nationalism, London: Sage, pp. 1.-18
Rose, E et al.(1969). Colour and Citizenship, London: Oxford University Press, 
Institute of Race Relations
Rose, H.(1973a), 'The Politics of Immigration: after the 1971 Act', Political 
Quarterly, pp. 183-96
Rose, H.(1973b), 'Britain's Immigration Act of 1971: a study in British Politics', 
Migration Today, 72: no. 16, pp.26-37
Rose, R.(1971), Governing Without Consensus: an Irish perspective, London: Faber 
and Faber Limited
Rose, R.(1991), ‘Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis', Political Studies, 
Vol.XXXIX, no.3, pp.446-62
Roskin, M.(1995), Countries and Concepts: an introduction to comparative politics. 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Ryang, S.(1997), North Koreans in Japan, Connecticut: Westview Press
285
Samura, H.(1994), ‘Hanrei shokai’ (Chong Hyang-kyon case), Minji Kenshu, no.447, 
July, pp.36-45
Sapporogakuindaigaku America Kenkyukai(1989), ‘Hokkaido to American Indian - 
introduction’, in Sapporogakuin daigaku jinbungakkai kiyo (Sapprogakuin University 
humanities'journal): no.45, August, pp.1-4.
Sartori, G.(1994), 'Compare Why and How’, in Dogan, M. and Kazancigil, A. eds., 
Comparing Nations: concepts, strategies, substance, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 14-34
Sato, B.(1991), Kosekiga miharu kurashi (Life controlled by koseki), Tokyo: 
Gendaishokan
Sato, B.(1997), ‘ Koseki ga tsukuru sabetsu’ (discrimination created by koseki), in 
Buraku kaiho (Buraku liberation): 419, pp.20-29
Scheingold, S.(1974), The Politics o f Rights: lawyers, public policy and political 
change. New Haven: Yale University Press,
Sekai (1994), ‘Gaikokujin no sanseiken-zentei ha nanika’(Aliens' suffrage, what are 
the conditions), debate between Ebashi, T. and Bae, J., June/94, pp.143-152
Sellek, Y.(1996), ‘The U-turn phenomenon among South American-Japanese 
Descendants: from Emigrants to Migrants', Immigrants and Minorities-. 15:3:Nov., 
pp.246-69
Seton-Watson, H.U977), Nations and States: an enquiry into the origins o f nations 
and the politics o f nationalism, London, Methuen, chapter 4
Shah, R.(1994), 'Diminution of status', in New Law Journal, Jan.14, pp.62-3
Shapiro, M.(1981), Courts: A comparative and political analysis. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press
Shipman, M.(1971), Education and Modernisation, London: Faber and Faber
Shiso no kagaku(l995), 'Zainichi surukoto no siza’ (The perspective of being a 
Korean in Japan), by discussion by Takeda, S., Kan, S., and Kato, N., Shiso no 
Kagaku (Thought and science): May:no.524, pp.54-78
Shutter, S.(1995), Immigration and Nationality law handbook, London: JCWI, 1995 
ed.
Shutter, S.(1997), Immigration and Nationality law handbook, London: JCWI, 1997 
ed.
Siddle, R.(1996), Race, Resistance and the Ainu o f Japan, London: Routledge
286
Simmonds, K.(1984), ‘The British Nationality Act 1981 and the Definitions of the term 
‘national’ for community purposes’, Common Law Market Review. Oct: 21:no.4: 
pp.675-86
Sivanandan. A.(1982), A Different Hunger: writings on Black Resistance, London: 
Pluto
Smith, A.D.(1986), The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Smith, A.D.(1991), National Identity, London: Penguin Books
Smith, A.D.(1995), Nations and Nationalism in Global Era, Cambridge: Polity
Smith, R. (1983), Japanese society: tradition, self and the social order, Cambridge 
(USA): Cambridge University Press
So, Y. ed.(1992), Teijugaikokujin no chiho sanseiken (Voting rights of teiju 
gaikokujin at local level), Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha
Soysal, Y.(1996), 'Introduction', in Cesarani, D. and Fullbrook, M. eds. Citizenship, 
Nationality, and Migration in Europe, London: Routledge
Stevens, D.(1998), 'The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996: Erosion of the Right to 
seek Asylum’, Modern Law Review, Mar., pp.207-222
Stewart, A.(1995), 'Two conceptions of citizenship’, British Journal o f  Sociology, 
46:1, Mar., pp.63-78
Stronach, B.(1995), Beyond the Rising sun: nationalism in contemporary Japan, 
Connecticut: Praeger Westport
Sugihara, M.(1993), ‘The right to use ethnic names in Japan', in Journal o f Inter- 
cultural Studies. 14:2, pp. 13-33
Sugimoto.Y., and Mouer, R.(1995), Nihonjin ron no Hoteishiki (the equasion of 
nihonjin ron), Tokyo: Chikuma gakugei bunko
Supperstone, M.(1994), Immigration Law and Practice, 3rd ed., London: Longman
Takano, M.U995). ‘Gaikokujin no jinken hosho’ (Protection of aliens' human rights), 
in Bessatsu Jurisuto, Sept., no. 130, pp.12-3
Takasaki, S.(1995), Sengo Hosho Mondai ni tsuite (On post-war compensation issue), 
Lecture, Nov./25, kokusai rikaikoza koenroku, Kodaira-city
Takegawa, S.(1991), 'Shakaiseisaku ni okeru imin no atsukai-lgirusu no baai'(The 
treatment of Immigrants on social policy-the case of Britain). Shakaihosho kenkyujo 
ed., Gaikokujin roudousha to shakaihosho, (Guestworkers and social security), 
Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku shuppankai, pp 187-215
287
Tameike, Y.(1993), Kokusaishiho kogi (Lectures on conflict of laws), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku
Tameike, Y.(1995), ‘Chosenjin otoko to konin sita moto naichijin onna no kokuseki’ 
(1961 case), in Bessatsu Juriusto May no.133, pp.252-3
Tamura, S.0992), ‘Naikoku shokuminchi to shite no Hokkaido' (Hokkaido as an 
'internal colony'), in Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon (Colonial empire Japan), Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, pp.87-99
Tanaka, Haruo.(1996), ‘Minzoku, kokka, kokumin-kokka" (Ethnic groups, states, 
nation-states, a survey article) Shiso (Thought):May,ppl4-30
Tanaka, Hideo.(1976), The Japanese Legal System, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press
Tanaka, Hiroshi.(1974), ‘Nihon no shokuminchi ni okeru kokuseki kankei nokeii- 
taiwan/chosen ni kansuru sanseiken to heieki gimu wo megutte' (Nationality relations 
and its circumstances of Japanese colonial policy-suffrage rights and conscription in 
Taiwan and Korea), Aichi Kenritsu Daigaku Gaikokugo Gakubu KiyoUoumal of Aichi 
kenritsu University foreign studies), , no.9, pp.61-96
Tanaka, Hiroshi.(1975), ‘Nihon no Taiwan, chosen sihai to kokuseki mondai- 
(Japanese colonial administration of Taiwan and Korea and nationality issue), Horitsu 
Jiho, Apr., pp.85-97
Tanaka, Hiroshi.(1980),'Kokumintogo no miezaru souchi-koseki' (Hidden tool for 
national integration, koseki), in Nihon no nakano Asia (Asia in Japan), Tokyo: Yamato 
Shobo
Tanaka, Hiroshi.(1991), Zainichigaikokujin(Aliens in Japan), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten
Tanaka, Hiroshi.(1994), Zainichigaikokujin(M\ens in Japan), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
new ed.
Tanaka, Hiroshi. (1996), ‘Why is Asia demanding post-war compensation now?’ 
Hitotsubashi Journal o f Social Studies, vol.28,no. 1, pp. 1 -14
Tashiro, A. and Kozuma, H.U980), Taikei kosekiyogojiten (Dictionary of House 
registry related terms), Tokyo: Nihon kajo shuppan
Tashiro, A.(1972), ‘Kokusekihou (kokuseki touroku=koseki) no sinzokuhou, 
souzokuhou ni oyobosu eikyou ni tsuite' (The impact of nationality law ‘kokuseki 
registration=koseki’ on family and succession law) in Zenkoku rengo koseki jimu 
kyogikai ed. Nihon koseki no tokushitsu (Characteristics of Japanese koseki), Tokyo: 
Teikoku hanrei shuppansha, pp.429-573
288
Tashiro, A.(1975), ‘Oranda no kokuseki, sinzoku souzokuhou to mibun 
tourokuseido(13)’ (Nationality in Holland, family and succession and status 
registration system.no. 13), in Kosekijiho:7:no.355
Tether, P.(1994), ‘the Overseas Vote in British Politics 1982-92', in Parliamentary 
Affairs:AK\),I&n., pp.73-93
Teune, H.U990), ‘Comparing countries: lessons learned', in Oyen, E.ed. Comparative 
Methodology-.theory and practice in international social research. London: Sage, 
pp.38-62
The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Oxford: Clarendon press
Tilly, C.U975), ‘Reflections on the history of European State-making', in Tilly, C.ed. 
The Formation o f  National states in Western Europe. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, pp.3-83
Tokoi, S.(1981), ‘Shutsu nyugoku kanrihoan no igi to kadai' (The significance and 
problem of the immigration control bill), Horitsu Jiho 53:7, pp.21-7
Toshitani, N.(1987), 'Koseki no sisou’ (The idea of koseki) in Kazoku to kokka - 
kazoku wo ugokasu hou, scisaku, sisou. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, pp. 139-59
Toshitani, N.(1995), 'Koseki seido no yakuwari to mondaiten' (The function and 
problem of koseki system), Juris to, no. 1059, Jan/15, pp. 12-9
Toshitani, N., Kamata, H. and Hiramatsu, H eds. (1996), Koseki to mihuntoroku, 
(koseki and status registration), Tokyo: Waseda daigaku shuppanbu
Tsuboi, T.(1959), Zainichi Chosenjin undo no gaikyou, (Koreans in Japan and their 
activities), Homukenkyu hokokusho, Koanchosacho, No.46-3
Turner, B. and Hamilton, P. eds.(1994), Citizenship I,II, London: Routledge
Turner, B.( 1986), Citizenship and Capitalism: the debate over reformism, London, 
Allen and Unwin
Turner, B.U992). 'Outline of a theory of Citizenship' in Mouffe C.ed. Dimensions o f 
Radical Democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community, London: Verso, pp.33-62
Turner, B.(1993) ‘1 Contemporary problems in the theory of citizenship’, in Turner, B. 
ed., Citizenship and Social Theory, London: Sage, pp.1-17
Ubukata, N.(1964), ‘Chosen sanseiken no rekishiteki igi' (Historical implication of 
suffrage rights of Koreans), Toyo Bunka,(Oriental culture). June, pp.1-20
Ubukata, N.(1979), 'Tan'itsu minzoku kokka no shisou to kinou' (the thoughts and 
functions of homogeneous nation-state), Shiso,(Thoughts), Feb., pp.23-37
289
Uchida, Y.U977), Shakai Ninshiki no Ayumi (The development of social 
consciousness), Tokyo: hvanami Shinsho
Uematsu, N.(1981), ‘Chosenjin hibakusha to sono engo’ (Korean A-bomb victims and 
their support), in Yoshioka, M.ed., Zainichi chosenjin to Juminken undo, Tokyo: 
Shakai Hyoronsha, pp.53-89
Upham, F.(1987), Law and Social Change in Post-war Japan, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press
Urwin, D.U982), 'Territorial Structures and political development in the United 
Kingdom’, in Rokkan, S.ed., The Politics o f Territorial Identity'.studies in European 
nationalism, London: Sage, pp. 19-73
van den Berghe, P.(1978), 'A socio-biological perspective’ in Hutchinson, J. and 
Smith, A. eds., Nationalism, Oxford:Oxford University press pp.96-103
Vedung, E.(1976), ’The Comparative Method and its Neighbours’, in Barry,B ed. 
Power and Political Theory:some European perspective, London: John Wiley and 
Sons Ltd., pp. 199-216
Verba, S.(1967), ’Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research', in World Politics:20, 
pp. 111-127
Wagatsuma, S. ed.(1968), Kyuu Horeishuu (Abolished laws and ordinances), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku
Wagatsuma, S. et al. eds.(1956), Sengo ni okeru minpo kaisei no keika (The process 
of revising civil code just after the war), Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha
Wasby, S.U970), The Impact o f  the United States Supreme Court .Some Perspectives, 
Homewood: Dorvy Press
Weber, M.(1978), ’Sociology of Law’ (Chapter 8), in Roth, G. and Wittich, C. eds. 
Economy and Society, vol.2, Berkeley: University of California Press
Weiner, M.U994), Race and Migration in Imperial Japan, London: Routledge
Weiner, M.(1995), ’Out of the very stone: Korean Hibakusha' in Immigrants and 
Minorities, vol. 14, no. 1, Mar., pp. 1-25
Weiner, M.ed.(1997), Japan's Minorities, London: Routledge
WING. (1985), Worlds Apart: women, under immigration and nationality law, 
London: Pluto
World Politics (1995), 'The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics-A Symposium’, 
vol.48, no. 1, pp. 1 -49, discussion by Kohli.A; Przeworski, A, et al.
2 9 0
Yabuki, H.(1990). ‘Nation gainen no keisei to reikishiteki haikei' (the formation of a 
concept ‘nation' and its historical background), in Shiso (Thought), Feb., pp.86-107
Yamamoto, F.(1985), ‘Zainichi chosenjin no hotekichii-genjo hen'(Legal status of 
Koreans in Japan - contemporary period) in Harada, N. and Kan, J. eds., Koza Sabetsu 
to Minzoku, no.4. minzoku, (Discrimination and ethnicity -ethnicity) Tokyo: 
Yuzankaku, pp.86-130
Yamamuro, S.(1990), ‘Kokumin kokka nihon no hatsugen,nationality no kochiku wo 
megutte' (The emergence of Japan as a nation-state, on the construction of 
nationality), Jinbun gakuho LXVII, pp.83-106
Yamazaki,T.(1991), ‘Kecchaku wo mita zainichi kankoku chosenjin hotekiichii mondai 
to gaikokujin toroku’ (Issues of South/North Koreans in Japan, their legal status and 
alien registration finally settled), Gaikokujin toroku (Alien registration), 1991:6, pp.l- 
18
Yanaihara. T.U926), Shokumin oyobi shoku/nin seisaku (Colonization and Colonial 
Policy), 5th edn., Tokyo: Yuhikaku
Yoshino, K.U992), Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan.a sociological 
enquiry, London: Routledge
Yoshioka, M. and Yamamoto, F.(1986), Zanichigaikokujin to nihon kokusekiho 
(Aliens in Japan and Japanese nationality law), Tokyo: Shakai hyoronsha
Young, 1.(1989), ‘Polity and Group Differences critique of the ideal of universal 
citizenship', in Turner, B.and Hamilton, P.(1994), Citizenship, vol II., London: 
Routledge, pp386-408
Yuval-Davis, N.U997), Gender and Nation, London: Sage
Zweigert, K. and Kotz, H.(1992), An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd rev.ed.
Primary sources. Parliamentary debates
Parliamentary Debates, Commons(Hansard), vol.813, cols 42-178, 8/3/1971
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Standing Committee B, Official Report, Session 
1970-1, cols.81-384, 23/3/1971 to 22/4/1971
Parliamentary Debates, Commons(Hansard), vol.846, cols. 1404-5, 22/11/1972 
Parliamentary Debates, Commons(Hansard), vol.997, col 998, 28/1/1981 
Parliamentary Debates, Commons(Hansard), vol.268, col 699, 11/12/1995
291
Parliamentary Debates, Lords(Hansard), vol.571, colsl785;1788, 2/5/1996 
HC Official Report, SC A col. 193, 19/11/1992
Shuugiin Shakai rodo iinkui kiroki(House of Representatives, social-labour 
committee,8/8/1972
Public record office
'The Royal Family and the Colonies’, 6/1948, 160802, in CO875/50/3
V.C.C Saunders to J.A.C.Robertson, 19/10/1946, in T215/709
Minute, T.Padmore, 9/10/1945, E.6869/8, in T215/709
Briefing note, Mrs. D.Williams, 7/1/1949, in T215/710
‘Memorandum by the Civil Service Commissioners", A.P.S., 25/10/1951, in 
D035/2593
Treasury Working Party. Draft report, 71794/110772, in C0886/82 
Cases cited
(Note: Japanese cases are listed in the Japanese way-place, year and citation, but name 
of person is also included when it was mentioned in chapters)
Judgement of the Supreme Court, 5/4/1961, Saiko SaibanshoMinshu: 15:4:657, 
(Recognition of Japanese Nationality easel)
Judgement of Yokohama District Court, 19/6/1974, Hanji:744:29, (Park Jong-sok 
case)
Judgement of the Supreme Court, 30/3/1978, Hanji: 886:3, (Son Jin-du case; High 
court Judgement on 17/7/1975, Hanji:789:11, District Court Judgement on 30/3/1974, 
Hanji :7 36:29)
Judgement of the Supreme Court, 4/10/1978, Hanji:903:3, (Maclean case)
Judgement of Osaka Appellate Court 26/1/1981, Hanji 1010:139, (Son Tu-hoe case)
Judgement of Tokyo Appellate Court, 20/10/1983, Hanji: 1092:31. (Aliens' national 
pension scheme case)
Judgement of Tokyo District Court, 29/8/1984, Hanji: 1125:97, (Han Jong-sok case)
Judgement of Osaka District Court, Nov./1989, Igirisujin no senkyo ken, (Alien’s 
voting right), mentioned in 'Gaikokujin no senkyoken’ Bessatsu Jurisuto, pp.8-9
Judgement of Hiroshima Appellate Court, 29/11/1990, Hanta:761:166, (Cho Kon-chi 
case)
292
Judgement of Osaka Appellate Court, 25/2/1994, Hanta:&75:24b (Kokuseki 
kakuninsosho 2); Judgement of Osaka District Court, 31/3/1993, Hanta:824:\ 19; 
Judgement of Supreme Court, 12/3/1998, Asahi Shinbun 13/3/1998, Koseki:674:41
Judgement of Osaka Appellate Court, 28/10/1994, Hanji: 1513, (Fingerprint rejection 
and state compensation)
Judgement of the Supreme Court, 27/1/1995, Asahi shinbun, 27/1/1995, (Andre case)
Judgement of the Supreme Court, 28/2/1995, Hanji: 1523:51 (Alien's suffrage)
Judgement of Osaka District Court, 1/5/1995, Hanta:901:153, (Post-war 
compensation case)
Judgement of Tokyo District Court, 27/9/1995, Hanta:90\:\53, (Illegal migrant and 
the application of health insurance)
Judgement of Tokyo District Court, 16/5/1996, Hanji, 1566:23 (Chong Hyang-kyon 
case); Judgement of Tokyo Appellate Court, 26/11/1997, Asahi Shinbun, 27/11/1997; 
Hanta:960:79)
‘War Displaced women files for Citizenship', in Japan Law Journal(\994) vol.7:no.4, 
August pp. 5-6
‘Court Dismisses War compensation Appeal’, in Japan Law Journal(\995) vol.8:no.6 
December, pp.7-8
(British)
The Times. 12/8/1967(Mauritian case) 
ex p Zesko(1972) AC.342 
Keshwani v SSHDU975) Imm.A.R.38 
C v ECO, HK0976) Imm.A.R.165 
ex p Phansopkar(1976) QB 606 
exp Bibid 976) 1.W.L.R.879 
ex p De Sousa(1977) Imm.A.R.6 
ex p Ved, The Times, 14/5/1981 
re H(1982) 3.A1I.ER.84 
Marqueritte(1983) QB180 
ex p Shah(1983) 2AC 309
293
Kavvaja vSSHD (1983) 1.A1I.ER.765
ex p Orphanos(1985) AC 761
re Y(1985) 3.A11.ER.33
re W(1985) 3.A11.ER.449
R v SSHD, ex p Khan(1985) 1.A11.ER.40
Christodoulider(1985) Imm.A.R.179
Abudalaziz, Cabales and Balkandali vs UK, 7EHRR471
ex p Ruhul(1987) 3.A11.ER. 705
ex p Ullah(1988) 3.A11.ER.1
Minta v SSHDU992) Imm.A.R.380
Menon v ECOU993) Imm.A.R.577
R v SSSS, ex pJCWI, 27/6/1996, The Times
pamphlets and others
Chong Hyang-kyon case. Junbishomen, Hanketsubun etc. Saiban shiryo (Chong 
Hyang-kyon case materials) photocopied
Granada Television, TV programme, ‘World in Action', Gordon Bums interviewed 
Margaret Thatcher, 30/1/1978, transcript
Hondo, R.0996). Written enquiry in December 1996
Kim Kyeung-Duk, Lecture at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 1996, Oct.-Dec. 
Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau renraku kyogikai(1995), Mintoren news 
Mori, Y.(1996), Verbal communication, in Oct. and Dec.
Nihon Shakaito Ainuminzoku mondai tokubetsu iinkai(1989) Ainu minzoku mondai 
kokkai shitsumonshuu (Japan Socialist-Democratic party committee on Ainu groups, 
Questions at Diet), pamphlets
Park Sil, interviewed by a TV program, on 2/12/1996, ‘NHK ETV Tokushuu’
294
Son Jin-du case, Junbishomen, Hanketsubun etc. Saiban shiryo (Son Jin-du case 
materials), photocopied
Sood, U. (1997). Verbal communication, in April 1997
Teiju gaikokujin no chiho sanseiken wo motomeru renraku kyogikai(1995) symposium 
5.17 (Organising committee for teijugaikokujin's suffrage rights), Pamphlet
(Newspapers etc)
Asahi Shinhun
Mainichi Shinbun
Tong-Il-Il Pao
Yomiuri Shinbun
JCWI Bulletin
Runnymede Trust Bulletin
The Guardian
The Times
Times Educational Supplement 
Times Higher Educational Supplement 
Official Publications etc.
Civil Service Commission, Annual Reports, 1983, 86 
Cmnd 2739, Aug./1965, Immigration from the Commonwealth 
Cmnd 6234, Sep./1975, Racial Discrimination
Cmnd.6795, Apr./1977 British Nationality : Law-discussion o f possible changes
Cmnd 7987 July/1980 British Nationality Law-outline o f  proposed legislation
Gaimusho (1965), Nihon ni okeru Ippan Gaikokujin no kokunaiho jo  no chii(Aliens in 
Japan and their legal status)
Homusho(1991), Nihonkoku tono heiwa joyaku ni motozuki nihon no kokuseki wo 
ridatsusita monotouno nyuukoku kanri ni kansuru tokubetsuhou kankei siryou (The 
information on those who left Japanese Nationality on the grounds of the Peace 
Treaty, and their status on Special Immigration-Control Law related materials), 
photocopied
295
Homusho (1996a), ‘Heisei 8nendo no homugyosei no ayumi' (Practice of 
administration), in HosojihoA7:6:118
Homusho( 1996b), Heisei Snendo ban Zairyu Gaijkokujin Token (Statistics of Aliens 
in Japan), Nyukan kyokai
Homusho( 1996c), Dai 35 Shutsunyugokukanri tokei ncnpo Heisei finendoban (Annual 
report of statistics on legal migrants)
Homusho (1997), 'Heisei 9nendo no homugyosei no ayumi’ (Practice of 
administration), in HosojihoA8:7:32
Koseisho( 1995), Jinko Dotai Tokei (vital statistics of Japan)
OECD(1994), SOPEM1. Trends in International Migration 
OECDU997), SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration 
Unpublished thesis
Abe, K.(1989J, Japanese Capitalism and the Korean minority in Japan:class, race 
and racism, Ph.D. thesis. University of California, Los Angels
Harajiri, H.(1993), The force o f  Strangers: Construction and Deconstruction o f 
Japanese Identity, Ph.D thesis. University of Hawaii
Hayashida, C. T.(1976), Identity, Race, and Blood Ideology o f Japan, Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Washington
Kim, T.(1996), Sengo Zainiehi chosenjin mondai no kigen - SCAP no tai zainichi 
chosenjin taisaku (The Origins of the issues of Koreans in Japan-SCAP policy), Ph.D. 
thesis, Hitotsubashi University, Faculty of Law , July
Weiner,M(1982), The Origin and Early Development o f the Korean Minority in 
Japan, 1910-25. Ph.D. thesis.,University of Sheffield
296
T H E  B R ITISH  LIB R A R Y
BRITISH THESIS SERVICE
COPYRIGHT
Reproduction of this thesis, other than as permitted under 
the United Kingdom Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988, or under specific agreement with the copyright 
holder, is prohibited.
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it 
is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis 
may be published without proper acknowledgement.
REPRODUCTION QUALITY NOTICE
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the original thesis. Whilst every effort has been 
made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction, some 
pages which contain small or poor printing may not 
reproduce well.
Previously copyrighted material (journal articles, published 
texts etc.) is not reproduced.
THIS THESIS HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
